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SM:  Standard Method 
SME:   Small- and Medium-sized Entity 
SOFI:  State-owned Financial Institution 
SSA:  Simplified Standardized Approach 
S&P:  Standard & Poor’s 
TTC:  Through the Cycle  
UCR:   Uniform Credit Rating 
WCC:  Wholesale Credit Committee 
WCRM:  Wholesale Clients Risk Management 
WCS:  Wholesale Client Strategic Business Units 
USD:  US Dollar currency 
UT:  Under secretariat of Turkish Treasury  
VAR:  Value At Risk 
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SECTION I: Introduction to the Thesis and the 
Environmental Analysis of Basel II from an Emerging 
Market Perspective 
 
Chapter 1: The Objectives and Structure of the Thesis 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In June 2004, the Basel committee on Banking Supervision issued the “International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework” 
known as the New Basel Capital Accord or more commonly as “Basel II.” This thesis 
argues that lending institutions in Turkey should carefully consider the credit risk 
policy issues and recommendations raised by the Basel committee in the context of 
managing credit risk and allocation of capital.  As detailed in the thesis, Basel II can 
serve Turkish banks in creation of a “new culture” of credit risk management, that will 
ultimately lead towards more economic allocation of capital and help them in gaining  a 
competitive advantage, when sourcing customers and credit risk assets, and ultimately 
more value creation for the banks’ shareholders.   
 
The motivation to start with the thesis has come from the daily experiences during 
turbulent times when financial crisis broke out in 2000 and 2001. Bankers in Turkey 
had to survive in the thunderstorms of a twin crisis and still manage their credit risk 
portfolios, despite those unbearable “correlated tail events”, resulting in capital erosions 
and decreased liquidity. Further experiences at a state owned bank in Turkey working 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (the Bank) mission 
delegations under Article 4 surveillance regime, regarding bank restructuring and credit 
risk management issues, provided the thesis with depth and formed the backbone of the 
research. As capital is easily destroyed on the account of misallocation of capital, in 
other words the result of misruling and mispricing of credit risky instruments at banks, 
the credit risk management practices and capital adequacy ratios of Turkish banks are 
constantly reviewed by the World Bank and IMF authorities. In this sense, an 
implementation example of a Basel II related solution proposed in this thesis can 
influence the banking restructuring program initiated by World Bank for Turkey, but 
also on close watch by the IMF and the European Union’s (EU) accession monitoring 
institutions.   
 
Based on an observation period of almost a decade, it is important to mention here that 
the market and liquidity risks during financial crisis turned out to manifest themselves 
as bottom line credit risks as experienced in the twin crises of 2000 and 2001 in 
Turkey1. In particular, the transmission of fragility from the financial sector to non-
financial sector stemmed from low capital ratios, inadequate risk-premiums, lack in 
diversification of financial claims and the over reliance on extensive credit risks carried 
on the books of the banks2.   
 
1
According to the Economist from 17th of May 2008, p. 12, the last sub-prime crisis also caused credit risks to become stuck on the 
books of investment banks and turned them into credit risks as well. 
 
2 For detailed analysis of the economic theory of systemic risks, refer to Davis, E. P.: Debt, Financial Fragility and Systemic Risk, 
Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 117- 146.   
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ith them.  
llow up the road map of the regulator, which is approached more like “wait-and-see”. 
 
                                                
 
By nature, credit risks are challenging and demanding more specialist insight and hands 
on experience from risk managers and originators. Basel II challenges banks not only 
by the capital adequacy point of view, but merely by widened credit risk best practices 
that require more sophisticated knowledge and highest level of specialization, which 
cannot be met and replicated by the existing standards, knowledge and experience in 
the Turkish banking sector. A quote from the experts of McKinsey during the 
implementation of banking restructuring program of a public bank in Turkey provides 
another rationale for the thesis and sets the objectives to be fulfilled in the following 
sections. After many years of working to encounter the effects of financial crisis, 
McKinsey found that, “simple errors and weak credit skills made during origination 
and underwriting of loans combined with politically instructed lending practices put 
enormous pressure on banks’ capital”. In many emerging market economies including 
Turkey, deficient credit skills are still among the biggest weaknesses leading to 
systemic or financial crisis.  
 
Without sounding patronizing over what is presented in the former bitter experiences in 
Turkey, more complex and trivial versions of credit crisis are experienced in the rest of 
the financial world today. With devastating speed, the crisis is spreading back into the 
heart of the most regulated parts of the financial system, causing justified concerns over 
the future financial stability of global banking systems3. Banks on the international 
arena also seem vulnerable to a “loss of memory” inside the credit markets. In recent 
years, a number of factors have come together that led to a significant relaxation of 
credit standards and to the repricing of credit risks globally. These factors include 
global growth, relatively low interest rates, higher demand of investors for high yield 
assets originated from the “sub-prime” obligors, resulting in the corrections of the 
“irregularities” during the summer of 2007. Today, the credit and liquidity squeeze are 
at the core of the global financial system, triggered by rising defaults at the major 
financial imperial institutions of the money centers in the world4. The events of 
summer 2007 have shown that more challenging risks remain and that the Basel I 
fortified banking system in Turkey is not equipped to deal effectively and efficiently 
w
 
In this regard, there have been efforts to speed up the implementation of the new Basel 
Accord rules, based on the argument that a new framework may help to make the 
capital base more relevant to the changing risk profile of banks and also serve to create 
incentives for better risk measurement and management. Basel II rules, based on the 
new tripartite pillar system, are able to improve its forerunner’s shortcomings in an 
extensive way. However, Basel II is not yet in place in Turkey and the worries go 
beyond the “slow pace of implementation” towards suspension of Basel II until 2009. 
Regrettably, only a handful of Turkish banks will be able to implement the new 
framework by the end of 2009. Many of the small and medium sized banks will revert 
to the implementation of the Standard Approach, neglecting the advantages of 
incentives provided by the IRB, while relying on the shortcomings of the rating 
agencies in measuring the true risks of their corporate clients. The rest of the banks will 
fo
 
3 The Economist: A special report on the world economy, October 2007, p. 3. 
4 United Nations: World Economic Situation and Prospects 2008, p.110. 
 14
Overall, Basel II is an improvement from the Basel I because the new rules cover a 
broader range of risks, align capital more tightly with the actual level of obligor and 
facility risks, reward institutions with more sophisticated risk management systems and 
demand more control on the level of securities that a bank holds. Consequently, the 
modeling of credit risks, application of Basel II Internal Rating Based Approaches 
(IRB) on sophisticated platforms, and management of credit portfolios by economic 
capital risk measure, will be the central issues of this thesis. Respectively, operational 
and market risk related issues, stemming from the first pillar of Basel II will be not in 
the research domain of this paper. Liquidity risk considerations under the second pillar 
of Basel II, where the world wide supervisors are now drawing up new rules at the 
moment, will also be outside the scope of this project.   
1.2 Scope and Objectives of the Thesis 
 
The thesis can be considered as a “Road Map” for all banks and the regulatory bodies 
in Turkey, that are still searching for pragmatic answers in managing and supervising 
the credit risks with the forthcoming Basel II and in the European Union’s new capital 
adequacy framework. Under the new circumstances, Turkish banks are at a very critical 
stage in anticipation of the new rules, as the adoption of the new Basel Accord and the 
new prudential structures of the European Union (EU) are postponed for late 2009, 
which were originally scheduled for late 2006. Gaps in credit risk and portfolio 
management systems should be identified by comparing the requirements of Basel II 
with the current state of the Turkish banking sector. The results of the thesis aim to 
empower the banks and regulatory bodies to take immediate corrective actions and 
develop good practices with respect to the implementation of IRB approaches. 
 
The thesis, in addition, seeks to provide insights and guidance for the international best 
practices regarding credit risk management. The implementation of Basel II standards 
at Turkish banks is of common interest to international market participants, which 
continue to increase shareholding at Turkish banks. A growing number of Turkish 
banks are  primary targets for acquisition by foreign, mostly European bidders looking 
for good value propositions where sound risk management processes are in practice. 
This is one of the unique selling propositions for possible investors who want to initiate 
a block purchase for the majority shares. Respectively, a clear understanding of the new 
Basel Accord across different levels of the bank and the effective implementation of the 
Basel II are the prerequisites of a successful selling proposition.  
 
Moreover, an increasing number of foreign investments into the Turkish financial 
markets builds more competitive pressures for the local banks. Turkish banks which 
will harvest the rewards from the significant investment towards sound risk 
management systems are those that adopt international best practice and are equally 
focused on enhancing the ongoing management and strategic direction of the business. 
The latter requires an equal focus on the economic capital and active portfolio 
management. While economic capital differs highly from regulatory capital, the same 
risk drivers such as “probability of default and loss given default”, as well as additional 
portfolio considerations on migration and concentration risks provide the building 
blocks for the calculation of both. Inarguably, banks that adopt international best 
practices will reap the rewards of portfolio diversification, where risk-adjusted return 
measures will allow them to price risk optimally, while other banks will be ruled out of 
the competition. In fact, Pillar 2 considerations stress extensively on the additional 
 15
                                                
capital requirements that may apply to banks where portfolio concentration risks are not 
managed effectively in accordance with best practice and compared with other market 
participants.   
 
As a result, the thesis will address the central issues in fivefold: 
 
1. Identification of the key influences on the path to Basel II, such as roles of the 
Turkish regulatory bodies, EU directives as well as the supranational anchors, the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this way, the thesis will 
set the scene for the current regulatory and institutional environment, which is 
critical for the successful implementation of the new Basel Accord.  
 
As stated by the Basel Committee, Basel II will apply to “all countries where 
international banks operate”. However, the new rules may fail to take into account 
the differences in economic and financial structure of developing countries5. As 
such, the developing countries experience greater macro-economic volatilities under 
severe systemic risk constellations. Incidentally, identifying the key influences on 
the path to Basel II, such as the roles of the Turkish regulatory bodies that will 
prescribe national discretions under the existence of greater systemic risks, EU 
directives that set “benchmark standards” for the adoption of capital adequacy rules, 
and the role of the supranational anchors; the World Bank and the IMF with their 
surveillance and technical assistance programs are and should be of great concern to 
adapt the new Basel Capital Accord. The Basel committee’s decentralized approach 
for the implementation has resulted in an uneven implementation and enforcement 
of its standards. For instance, the rigidity of US regulators in selecting some 
modules of Basel II or relaxing the capital adequacy rules in Japan by the Japanese 
regulators throughout the 1990s are bold examples, where those G10 countries may 
exercise meaningful influence over the formation of international regulatory norms. 
On the other hand, many developing countries and emerging market economies 
often do not have the discretion to pursue regulatory policies different than the ones 
conditioned by the IMF and World Bank through restructuring programs. With the 
effects and implementation of Basel II in mind, it is useful to step back and look to 
the practices of international financial bodies in establishing and promoting 
financial stability by exercising banking restructuring and regulatory standards. The 
application of these standards by the IMF and the World Bank and their 
incorporation into EU law shows their importance as international financial norms 
and the need for coordination of supervisory and regulatory practices, in order to 
ensure their efficient and equitable application to all countries. In this way, the 
thesis will set the scene for the current regulatory and institutional environment, 
which is critical for the successful implementation of the new Basel Accord. 
 
2. Explanation of the new Basel II rules (widely perceived as being overly complex in 
the Turkish banking sector) and the discussion of the some practical implementation 
problems regarding the credit risks in Turkey, in particular the selection of 
framework proposed by Basel II, such as Standardized Approach versus Foundation 
Internal Rating Based Approach (F-IRB) or Advanced Internal Rating Based 
Approach (A-IRB). One of the early effects of the reform process has been to create 
 
5 Alexander, K. / Dhumale R. / Eatwell, J.: Global Governance of Financial Systems – The International Regulation of   Systemic 
Risk. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 41-44.  
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a common risk language in the industry. Therefore, at first sight, it is easy to 
understate the degree of cultural and behavioral change required by the new coming 
rules and frameworks, at all levels of the organization from the board to individual 
lending officers.  
 
3. Assessment of the Impact of the New Basel Accord on the Turkish banking sector 
on a quantitative level with tangible results. The thesis will first look closely at the 
quantitative impact studies conducted by the Basel committee globally as it forms a 
benchmark for a comparative analysis against the quantitative impact studies 
conducted by the Turkish regulatory body on Turkish banks. Furthermore, at a bank 
level, the thesis will present the effects of the quantitative studies at Halkbank as a 
case-study. It is critically important, in the context of the implementation, to 
highlight variations that may occur on individual bank level due to differences in 
risk assets, portfolio composition, risk appetite and business of the bank, compared 
to the rest of the economy and global markets.   
 
4. Appraisal of an impact of the New Basel Accord rules on the Turkish banking 
sector on an organizational level. The thesis will present the Redesign of the Risk 
Management organization consistent with the BIS principles for best practices of 
Credit Risk Management. The new credit risk structure will represent a migration 
from a decentralized system to one with primarily centralized approval and 
decentralized monitoring and control. It is recognized that the successful transition 
from the current, classical risk management of the banks to the structure described 
in this thesis will require an actively managed change process. Those transition 
(change) management issues will be out of the scope of this thesis.  
 
5. Presentation of methods, data foundation, systems and procedures for the actual 
implementation of Basel II. The focus, as mentioned, will exclusively be on credit 
risk measurement under IRB framework. Particularly, the thesis will propose to 
assist Turkish banks in delivering a suite of integrated solutions in two specific 
areas; Internal rating platform with counterparty- and transaction-based models and 
Credit Portfolio Management solutions. The proposed solutions will attempt to 
provide a comprehensive framework from credit rating all the way to portfolio 
credit assessment which permits the banks to strive for Basel II compliance, but 
also allowing them to take it further beyond Basel II compliance where economic 
(or portfolio) capital becomes a strategic measure to assess business decisions.    
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
 
In line with the objectives as mentioned above, the thesis consists of six chapters 
constituted on four distinctive sectional topics.  Under Section I, while Chapter 1 deals 
with the rationale and the setting of where the whole thesis intends to go, Chapter 2 
aims to formulate the Basel II context from an emerging market perspective and 
contains an overview of the key drivers in Turkey and their relation to the 
implementation of the new Basel Accord. Having discussed the key actors of Basel II in 
Chapter 2, Section II explains the new capital rules of Basel II, and describes the key 
building blocks for measuring credit risks within the IRB frameworks; F-IRB and A-
IRB are explained in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 reveals the results of Quantitative Impact 
Studies conducted by Basel II Committee, Turkish regulator on Turkish banks and on 
Halkbank as a case in point. In various sections of Chapter 4, comparative analysis and 
the impact summaries can be found in detail, which assist in determining the 
preparedness of Turkish banks for Basel II compliance and cross checking with the 
roadmap of the regulatory body in Turkey. Following Chapter 4, that addresses 
quantitative aspects and main issues arising out of Basel II rules, Section III will start to 
formulate the imperatives to take actions. Chapter 5 will provide the implementation of 
Basel II on organizational level that includes the redesign of the credit risk management 
structures and processes at the banks. Chapter 6 will drill into the requirements of the 
new accord and present methodologies, data foundation processes, systems and 
procedures accepted as best practices by the international market participants, BIS 
Committee and the regulators worldwide.  Section IV draws final conclusions from the 
concept and model laden works of the formerly presented chapters. At this stage, 
envisioning the contents of the thesis in a table will help the reader navigate through the 
research document easily. The research is crafted on five consecutive main sections and 
contemplated under the following chapters as depicted in Figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1: Interrelations of Sections and Chapters in the Dissertation 
 
 
Source: Author 
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1.4 Methodology and Literature Review 
 
This research is based on two mutually completing approaches. To begin with, the 
evaluation is based on a survey of relevant literature starting from the basics of 
financial crisis, Basel II requirements down to the model validation issues. Further 
evaluations of the subject are elaborated inside the banking restructuring programs in 
Turkey where the new framework is in operation under an emerging market and under 
high level systemic risk conditions. The evaluation is also put into practice via the 
quantitative impact analysis globally and locally, including a case study of Halkbank.  
 
Secondly, the “solution methodology” in Section III is formulated as a “what should be 
done” type of analysis, with consideration of the main issues presented in the first two 
sections of the thesis. The “way forward solution” is attained with intensive interviews 
with organizations, that apply best practice methods, and with notable documentation 
and workshops provided by Moody’s KMV in London. The nature of work supported 
by Moody’s KMV is depicted in the Appendix IV, Confirmation by MKMV and 
Appendix I, Bibliography, v. Reading Material, g) Moody’s KMV - Published and 
Unpublished documentation. 
 
1.4.1 Desk Research 
 
The desk research with respect to the banking crisis was primarily based on the 
published and unpublished materials of BIS, IMF, IIF, the World Bank and the 
Moody’s KMV. For the subjects like financial crisis, bank restructuring programs and 
the resulting regulatory frameworks, the library of IMF and the World Bank in 
Washington D.C is a massive source of key importance.  For the works and studies 
related to the quantitative impact studies (QIS) at Halkbank, the thesis referred to the 
documents of the Halkbank, which were unique in nature. The materials of the 
Halkbank were obtained during the QIS intercourses with the BRSA and bank’s risk 
management authorities. In the absence of the internal Halkbank documents, an 
explanation of the Basel II and its implementation would not have a material impact. 
Since the market is still in the preparation stage of the Basel II implementation, QIS 
results were analyzed in a descriptive way. For other Basel II related issues in Turkey, 
an important source is the web-site of the regulatory body in Turkey, namely BRSA, 
where all regulatory and supervisory documents are officially listed. 
 
With respect to the Pillar 1 issues, the research was guided by the publications of EAPB 
(European Association of Public Banks), especially by the book of Schopmann, H. (et 
al): European banking and Financial Services Law, EAPB, 2004. The extent of written 
material was tremendous on the internet sites of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
in the UK, Bundesaufsichtsamt für Finanzwesen (Bafin) in Germany, Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank in Austria and Eidgenossische Banken Kommission (EBK) in 
Switzerland. Further material was collected from the Turkish Bankers Association and 
the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency in Turkey, in particular for the 
analysis of the Basel II road map in Turkey, which is generally “revised and advised” 
by the IMF.  
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Similarly, regarding the Pillar 2 and 3 related issues, the thesis made use of the same 
web-sites as well as extensive presentations from various risk conferences, such as the 
ICBI Risk Minds, Geneva conference in December 2007 and Moody’s KMV sponsored 
Credit Risk Practitioner conferences in 2007 and 2006. Many presentations and 
whitepapers provided by Moody’s KMV have been used as references, in particular 
during the construction of Chapter 6.  
 
1.4.2 Field Research 
 
1.4.2.1 Institutional Information Sources  
 
The preliminary information on structural factors for theorizing the credit risk 
management was sourced from the interviews with the authorities at IMF and the 
World Bank. Further interviews were held with the colleagues working at the 
regulatory and supervisory bodies like BRSA (Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Agency), SDIF (Savings and Deposit Insurance Fund), and the Central Bank of Turkey 
(CBOT). Additional data was gathered from the leading managers at Turkish private 
banks and the Undersecretariat of Turkish Treasury (UT), in charge of state banks, who 
had difficult times in surviving the thunderstorms of 2000 and 2001 crisis. Furthermore, 
a mass of information was collected from the “Basel II Working Committee” meeting 
reports held at the Turkish Banker’s Association. 
 
The descriptive field search for the regulatory issues regarding the Basel II and the 
analysis of the forthcoming EU capital adequacy directives was based on the author’s 
participation at the workshops within the EAPB (European Association of Public 
Banks), which was established in Brussels representing the interests of public banks in 
the European Commission and Parliament.  As with the forthcoming Basel II and the 
respective European provisions forming the EU capital requirements for banks, the 
public (state) banks will mostly be in jeopardy. In that respect, each new provision was 
discussed during the workshops arranged by the EAPB and the author had the chance to 
represent Turkey on these undertakings. Therefore, the workshop materials were a key 
source for the completion of QIS related chapter and sub-sections. Additionally, by 
obtaining further information about the core implementation issues by the public banks 
in EU from the EAPB and from its associated organizations, the author has identified 
on practical ground, how such issues have been tackled during the Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD) transposition processes inside European Public Banks. 
 
To describe the relevant and material aspects of the rating and portfolio management 
systems, extensive literature was requested from the Moody’s KMV Modeling, Client 
Services and Research teams. The author spent a week in the London office of Moody’s 
KMV attending workshops on different credit risk management solutions and 
individual discussion sessions with the company’s experts. 
 
1.4.2.2 Live Research Material Sources 
 
The field research was also backed by the workshops and several conferences visited 
relating to the topic of the thesis, which were organized by the World Bank, the IMF, 
and the Institute of International Finance. Some of them are listed below. The author’s 
close collaboration with the World Bank and IMF supervisors and the banking 
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community in Turkey resulted in a wide range of visual and documented material, 
based on the following workshops and conferences: 
 
1. Risk Management in Turkey, held at Istanbul Trade University in 2001. This 
was one of the first conferences about risk management in Turkey, arranged by 
the author. 
2. Assessing, Managing and Supervising Bank Risk, the World Bank, 20-24 May, 
2002, Washington, D.C. 
3. Risk Management Workshop, arranged by World Bank, 16-19 February, 2004, 
Colombia, USA. 
4. The Role of State-owned Financial Institutions, Policy and Practice, Sixth 
Annual Financial Markets and Development Conference, 26-27 April, 2004, 
Washington, D.C. 
5. IIF Basel Sessions 2004, Institute of International Finance (IIF), 6 July, 2004, 
Madrid. 
6. International Monetary Fund (IMF), Board of Governors Annual Meeting, 
2004, Washington, D.C. 
7. Risk Management Workshop Turkey, “Implementing Risk-Based Capital”, 
arranged by the World Bank, Banks Association of Turkey, Abn Amro Bank 
and Mercer Oliver Wyman, 9 – 11 February, 2005, Istanbul.  
8. International Conference on Financial Stability & Implications of Basel II, 
Central Bank of Turkey, 16-18 May, 2005, Istanbul. 
9. International Risk Management Forum, Active Finans, 8 March, 2007, Istanbul. 
 
1.4.2.3 Interviews 
 
In-person interviews were conducted to explore and understand the “uncovered” issues, 
with respect to difficulties in the implementation of Basel II. The authorities under the 
following institutions that were interviewed are as follows:  
 
1. Supervisory Authorities: 
• Banking Regulatory and Supervisory Agency 
• Higher Audit Department of Turkish Prime Ministry 
• Central Bank of Turkey 
 
2. Public (state) Banks: 
• Halkbank Risk Management and Structured Finance Departments  
• Ziraatbank Risk Management Department 
• Vakıfbank Risk Management Department 
 
3. Private Banks: 
• Garanti Bank, Turkey 
• Akbank, Turkey 
• Tekfenbank, Turkey 
• ING Bank, Turkey 
• Abn Amro Bank, Turkey  
• Barclays Capital, London 
• WestLB, Turkey 
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4. Turkish Bankers Association 
 
5. European Association of Public Banks (EAPB) for implementation issues from 
the perspective of public banks in Europe, interviews held in Belgium, Germany 
and Denmark. 
 
6. The Institute of International Finance (IIF) for implementation issues at 
emerging markets 
 
7. Moody’s KMV, London  
 
• Credit Risk Specialist Group, specialized in the marketing and 
implementation of credit risk solutions 
• Modeling Services Group, specialized in the PD and LGD custom model 
development and the implementation of validation frameworks 
• Client Services Group, on the perspective of different bank needs and 
requirements in the European and Middle East Asia region.  
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Chapter 2: The Emergence of Basel II in Turkey 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The joint decision between the EU and Turkey to start with the negotiations leading to 
the full Turkish membership to the European Union will undoubtedly accelerate the 
integration of the Turkish business and financial sectors into the EU markets further. In 
turn, the EU accession is expected to present Turkey with more opportunities and 
challenges internally and externally.  
 
In principle, the political preparedness has been firmly confirmed by the heads of state, 
but markets are driven by factors other than the political preparedness, such as the 
ambition and readiness to sustain competitive advantage efficiently and effectively in 
what is already a very competitive EU business environment. 
 
It will require de-bottlenecking of the Turkish economy (through PPP’s) further, both 
physically through the infrastructural investments in transportation, energy, etc and 
professionally through the adoption of business and financial standards common in the 
EU market place. Similar to the political journey to full “readiness”, the Turkish 
banking sector has to continue making concerted efforts to be competitive in, contribute 
to and fully benefit from the “grand European opportunity”. To exploit this “grand 
opportunity” on the way to European Monetary Integration, Turkey has to comply with 
the economic and financial acquis before the accession is conceivable. In this respect, 
Turkey needs to implement the necessary changes to its institutional and legal 
framework by the date of accession6.  
 
Turkey is basically required to adopt the acquis communautaire and the single market 
legislation to apparently make sufficient progress in sustaining a market economy, 
where the booming country should build a banking capacity to cope with competitive 
pressures within the EU7. This includes the continuation of Turkey adapting to the 
current EU rules on capital adequacy standards, commonly known as Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD). On this point, it is sufficient to say that, on 26 June 
2004 the Basel committee on Banking Supervision adopted a framework agreement on 
the international convergence of capital measurement and capital requirements, known 
as Basel II. The provisions in the new Directive (2006/48/EC) on the minimum capital 
requirements of credit institutions with Directive 2006/49/EEC form an equivalent to 
the provisions of the Basel framework agreement8. The new EU directive represents the 
practical transposition of the Basel framework agreement and its content is an 
equivalent to the Basel settlement9. With this directive, the EU directly aims to prevent 
‘dual accounting’ and establish a ‘transitional bridge’ for international institutions that 
apply for Basel II - compliance. EU legislation will implement the Basel II convention 
 
6 Arikan, H.: Turkey and the EU – An awkward candidate for EU membership. Hants: Ashgate, 2003, pp.15-17. 
7 The term “acquis communautaire” refers to real and potential rights and obligations of the EU and its institutional framework of 
full-membership. 
8 Directive 2006/48/EC of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast). 
9 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council re-casting Directive 2000/12/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions dated 
from 4/8/2005. 
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in line with the new CRD on a wider scope10. The objective of the capital requirements 
is to have in place a comprehensive and risk-sensitive framework and to foster 
enhanced risk management among the financial institutions. This will maximize the 
effectiveness of the capital rules in ensuring the continuation of financial stability, the 
market confidence in financial institutions and the protection of consumers11. 
 
Similar to the EU, Turkey should implement the new Basel capital accord into its 
legislation via the transposition of CRD and cement the new risk sensitive capital rules 
on top of its Banking Directives, as long as the accession negotiations continue for full 
membership to the EU.   
 
The new European CRD or Basel II objectives are in full harmony with the EU 
accession process and the Banking reforms introduced by the Bretton Woods 
Institutions in Turkey since early 2000’s. In this context, the implementation of Basel II 
in Turkish financial sector is inherited through the EU accession programs and the 
Banking Sector Restructuring Reforms imposed by the supranational organizations 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (the Bank). 
Consequently, this chapter is dedicated to analyze the influence of each institution on 
the path to Basel II compliance in Turkey. It will start identifying the process of 
adopting the EU acquis and then detail the roles of supranational anchors and Turkish 
regulator. This chapter will conclude with the Banking Restructuring program, which 
governs the current business practices at banks in Turkey and the impact of Basel II on 
the current corporate banking practices and the financial stability in Turkey.   
2.2 Role of the European Union’s Standards 
 
The adoption of the acquis goes back to the Helsinki Summit held on the 10-11 
December 1999, where Turkey was recognized as a candidate country for EU 
membership. Respectively, the Turkish government announced its national program for 
the adoption of the EU acquis on 19 March 2001, which was submitted to the EU 
Commission on 26 March 200112.  
 
The national program contained the Pre-Accession Economic Programs-PEP I and PEP 
II, covering the periods of 2002-2005. These pre-accession economic programs 
represented the framework for the implementation of Copenhagen economic criteria 
and the structural convergence benchmarks13. Accordingly, the EU started accession 
negotiations with Turkey on the 3 October 2005. The successful negotiations set the 
concrete principles, priorities and conditions for accession, which were documented in 
the “Revised Accession Partnership Agreement” dated as of January 2006. Turkey is 
widely expected to develop an inspiring plan that outlines the timetable and specific 
measures foreseen to address the accession partnership priorities. The revised accession 
partnership agreement provides the basis for a number of policy instruments, which will 
be used to assist the prospect state in the preparations for membership. In particular, the 
revised agreement will serve as the contractual basis for future political reforms and 
 
10 For a detailed discussion about the transposition of the Basel II Accord into EU Legislation, refer to Consultation document of 
the U.K. Treasury dated from December 2003. 
11 Press Release dated from 19/06/2006. At http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/regcapital/index_en.htm. 
12 OECD Economic Surveys Turkey, 2002, p. 39. 
13 Republic of Turkey, Pre- Accession Economic Program, 2002, pp. 1- 96. 
yardstick against which to measure future progress. The priorities listed in this 
agreement have been selected on the basis of realism, in which case Turkey is widely 
expected to fully execute and bring the reforms substantially forward over the next few 
years. A fundamental distinction is made between short-term priorities, which are 
expected to be achieved within one to two years. On the other hand, medium-term 
priorities are expected to be accomplished by three to four years. The priorities not only 
aim to reform the current legislation, but also ensure the successful implementation of 
regulations thereof. Consequently, Turkey will have to address all predominant issues 
identified in the revised accord in its progress report, in order to guarantee its 
irreversibility and ensure its uniform implementation throughout the country at all 
levels of the administration. It is important that Turkey fulfils the commitments of 
legislative approximation and implementation of the acquis in accordance with the 
commitments made under the association agreement, customs union and other related 
decisions of the EC-Turkey Association Council14.  
 
A progress report by the World Bank summarizes the progress, concerns and issues 
within the Turkish Financial Sector, as follows: 
Figure 2.1: Financial Sector Snapshot in Turkey15 
 
Source: World Bank Risk Management Workshop, Istanbul, 2005 
 
Therefore, the most striking short-term objectives concerning the accession and the 
thesis are the fulfillment of the economic criteria, regarding the continuation with the: 
 
1. Implementation of the current structural reform programs agreed with the IMF 
and the World Bank. 
2. Completion of the implementation of the financial sector reform, in particular 
the alignment of prudential and transparency regulations and their surveillance 
on international standards. 
3. Safeguarding the independence of market regulatory authorities. 
                                                 
14 Official Journal of the European Union, Council Decision of 23 January 2006, on the principles, priorities and conditions 
contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey (2006/35/EC). 
15 Fratzscher, O., World Bank, Risk Management Workshop, Istanbul, 2005. 
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4. Acceleration of the privatization of state-owned entities, in particular of state-
owned banks, taking into account the social component. 
5. Continuation with market liberalization, and price reforms. 
6. Continuation of the economic dialogue with the EU, in particular in the 
framework of the pre-accession fiscal surveillance procedures, with emphasis 
on appropriate measures to achieve macro-economic stability, predictability and 
on the implementation of structural reforms. 
 
Respectively, the ability to assume the obligations of membership depends on the 
adoption of the necessary implementation measures under the new banking laws. As 
established in the revised agreement, the “new comer” should also ensure a consistent 
progress towards the implementation of the roadmap for the new capital requirements 
framework regarding credit institutions and investment management firms16.  
 
The EU candidate should strengthen prudential and supervisory standards in the non-
bank financial sector by rationalizing the supervisory structures where necessary. This 
is equally true for the implementation of economic criteria under medium-term 
priorities. Turkey should dutifully fulfill in three to four years time the economic 
criteria, which constantly requires the completion of the privatization programs and the 
substantial progress towards the implementation of the new capital requirements 
framework, in line with the Turkish Banking Regulatory and Supervisory Agency’s 
(BRSA) detailed Basel II roadmap17. On the side of the prudential regulation, Basel II is 
expected to nurture the development of a culture of risk management, where the 
supervisory role transitions from “ratio surveillance” (checking bank positions against 
predetermined prudential ratios) to a risk-focused supervision (examining the bank’s 
risk management process).  
 
Conclusively, Basel II is the prerequisite for Turkey’s accession to the EU and hence to 
the EU’s Banking and Supervisory structures. Even though the BRSA and Turkish 
Bankers Association with the participation of several banks in Turkey carved out a 
“Basel II Roadmap”, most of the directives and material guidelines are missing on 
account of the “ownership” concern for the implementation of forthcoming capital 
adequacy framework in Turkey. This may be the result of missing political sponsorship 
and the uncertainties around the implementation of the new coming accord, where the 
interests of the bankers and the real sectors may clash. In fact, it appears to be a 
strategic issue, starting from the overall governance to the establishment of subsequent 
standards to improve the overall market discipline, which require long term solutions 
and decisive actions. Both in the past and present, such long term solutions and decisive 
actions are encouraged and sometimes enforced by the Bretton Woods Institutions, 
acting as “Supranational Anchors” in Turkey. 
 
Not surprisingly, EU widely expects to ensure the realistic solution for the deeply 
rooted financial problems in the technical implementation of institutional reforms 
embedded in the IMF programs. In addition, EU indirectly aims to facilitate the 
potential benefits of the new accord namely the “reduction in the probability and 
severity of banking crisis” in the accession of Turkey. Even though the road for full 
membership is an open ended question for Turkey, the EU offers a priceless 
 
16 Turkey has adopted a roadmap for Basel II, which will be explained in the forthcoming chapters. 
17 Official Journal of the European Union L22/34-35, 26.1.2006, p. 13. 
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opportunity for domestic governments to “lock in” their reforms and to increase the 
credibility of the distant country on the global arena18. As a result, the implementation 
of Basel II should be perceived from this perspective. 
 
In general, the threat to country’s financial stability is two-fold; macro-economic 
volatility and the strength of the financial system. While weak financial systems 
undermine the potent effectiveness of monetary policy, substantial macro-economic 
imbalances often lead to financial system fragility. Basel II aims to improve the built-in 
strength of financial systems through effective risk management processes, enhanced 
corporate governance, banking supervision and market disclosure, but the impact of 
such transition can only be long-lasting with reduced macro-economic volatility in the 
country. In that regard, it is critical to analyze the role of the supranational anchors, the 
World Bank and IMF in the next section. 
2.3 Role of the IMF and the World Bank as Supranational Anchors  
 
Two mainstream standards are working at cross purposes in mutually reinforcing form, 
namely the EU and the IMF/World Bank standards depicted in form of “conditionality 
and performance benchmarks” in Turkey. The reinforcement of “making substantial 
progress towards the implementation of the new capital requirements framework, in 
line with the Banking Regulatory and Supervisory Agency’s (BRSA) detailed 
roadmap” as a short- and long- run benchmark condition is a very significant and 
material issue. This predominant issue alone presents the Turkish standard setters and 
the banks with serious dilemmas and challenges. The EU, in addition put a ceiling to 
the Turkish financial system for the implementation of IMF Stand-By Agreements as 
prerequisite for the accession to the EU. Unfortunately, the absence of political 
commitment to create safe and sound banking systems in transitional economies results 
in “governance vacuums” and crisis prone financial institutions. The prompt resolution 
of the governance mechanisms and the quest for effective and efficient standards calls 
for the immediate interventions of the “Supranational Anchors” like International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank (the Bank).  The Supranational Anchors also 
ensure the implementation of the current financial sector reforms agreed with IMF 
under Article IV consultations, and the exercise of “Country Assistance Strategies” 
(CAS) of the Bank. Turkey is one of the heavy users of the quotas of the IMF/World 
Bank facilities as depicted below: 
 
Table 2.1: Outstanding Exposure to Supranational Organizations 
External Debt and Assets ($ million): 2002  2003 2004 2005  2006 2007 2008f 
International Financial Institutions   30860 33412 32329 24896 22164 19603 18733 
IMF      22884 24997 21507 14646 10798 8112 7379 
IBRD      5416 5225 6161 5857 6738 6818 6692 
Other multinational creditors   2560 3210 4661 4393 4627 4672 4662 
Source: IIF Database: Turkey, March 2007 Report 
 
Financial integration into the European banking and supervisory standards requires 
more powerful, external anchors namely the IMF and World Bank through Stand-By 
Agreements under Article 4 Consultation and the implementation of “Country 
Assistance Strategies (CAS)” programs for the completion of the Accession Fiscal 
                                                 
18 Arikan, H.: Turkey and the EU, 2003, p.240. 
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Surveillance Procedures of the EU, respectively19. Both institutions played substantial 
roles in rebooting the Turkish economy up to the global standards since the occurrence 
of twin financial crisis in November 2000 and in February 2001. During the preparation 
of the Banking Restructuring Program in 2001, the World Bank and the IMF co-
operated together in factoring out Turkey’s EU aspirations into their analytical works. 
Especially the Bank was quite overcautious about the changes in the legislative and 
administrative areas before the implementation, which should be in harmony with the 
existing rules and regulations of the EU. During the implementation of banking 
structural reforms, EU Experts have been approached by World Bank authorities and 
consulted in the discussions20. The challenge was and will always be to combine the 
systemic stability efforts with prudential regulations and supervisory skills of global 
standards that promote the market discipline on a sound banking system in Turkey21. 
Today, those challenges should be flanked with the norms of Basel II and the CRD in 
Turkey in the forefront of EU Accession. There is not any doubt that, becoming an 
internationally accepted counterpart in the EU, Turkey should be built on a stable 
macroeconomic environment, smoothly functioning financial markets and well 
managed financial institutions within a sound framework of prudential supervision, 
which are the prerequisites of Basel II.  
2.4 Initial Progress towards Basel II: Banking Sector Restructuring      
Program  
 
The re-structuring of the Turkish banking system was set as the first priority, in terms 
of policy implementation by the double anchors. The objectives of the Banking Sector 
Reform Program are to upgrade the legal and regulatory framework of the banking 
sector, in order to bring it in line with the Basel II accord and EU standards22. The new 
reforms should yield in operating efficiency, governance quality, and financial strength 
of the Turkish banking sector by carrying out the necessary financial and operational 
restructuring, on both the state owned and privately held banks in the system. 
Historically, the Turkish banking sector has suffered from a weak legal and regulatory 
framework, and considerable regulatory forbearance, especially in the areas of loan loss 
provisioning, connected and insider lending extendable up to the “rogue banking 
practices”. Indiscriminate and liberal licensing of banks without enforcement of proper 
ownership and governance standards has led to a proliferation of “one table-one casa” 
banks in Turkey. The existence of those practices created limited capacity or 
commitment to the development of a responsible banking culture. In the absence of 
effective regulations and clear mechanisms of enforcements, those banks were not 
concerned much about creditworthiness and good risk management. Large number of 
such insolvent, crisis prone and capital deficient banks led the entire economy to the 
twin banking crisis in Turkey in 2000 and 2001, which were the result of systemic risk 
created by these banks.  
 
 
 
19 Rubin, B. / Öniş, Z.:  The Turkish Economy in Crisis. London: Frank Cas, 2003, P. 192. 
20 The World Bank in Turkey, 1993-2004 (2006, p. 15) 
21 Masciandaro, D.: Handbook of Central Banking and Financial Authorities, 2005, p.450. 
22 Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report of the World Bank Group (2001, Annex B12, pp. 1- 4).  
Figure 2.2: Turkish Banking Restructuring Strategy23 
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Source: Pazarbasıoglu (2005, p.163), revised by the author  
 
As depicted in the above figure, the transformation of the financial system towards 
stability and efficiency started with the Banking Restructuring Program, as banks are 
the main intermediary channeling funds and restoring public confidence in the system. 
The IMF and the World Bank mandated Turkish policy makers to establish an 
independent institution called Banking Regulatory and Supervisory Agency (BRSA) in 
2000. In May 2001, in the aftermath of the crisis, the young BRSA announced the 
Banking Sector Restructuring Program. The program aims to eliminate all factors that 
may result in a systemic crisis in Turkey and upgrade the standards to EU level as 
documented in its “Basel II Road map”.  
 
Clearly, the core content of the program is in full harmony with the “pillars of the Basel 
II” framework with one exception: the state bank reform itself. The road to Basel II 
may take at least a decade since the first inception of the banking reforms. Besides, all 
supervisory standards either in form of Basel II or CRD, recognize that a set of 
preconditions (outside the scope of those standards) must be met to allow effective 
implementation of the standards. The necessary preconditions on the way to Basel II 
are highly demanding: sound and sustainable macroeconomic policies, a well 
developed public standards infrastructure (IAS, SOX, corporate governance, legal 
framework), restructuring of the state owned banks and the procedures for resolving 
problem institutions combined with huge restructuring costs24.  
 
Naturally, the IMF, the World Bank and EU institutions will have crucial roles in 
shaping the macro environment that Basel II framework will take effect. Especially the 
IMF will serve as leading anchor, in terms of encouraging decisiveness of policy 
makers to continue on long-term economic policies, structural reforms and the 
increasing credibility of the country’s institutions25.  
 
                                                 
23 Pazarbasıoglu (2005, p. 163), some amendments to the diagram has been made by the author. 
24 The World Bank & IMF, Financial Sector Assessment Handbook , 2005, p. 87. 
25 The Banker , IMF Supplement ,“interview with the former president of Central Bank of Turkey”, 2004, p.14. 
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The “Banking Restructuring Program” and the “Roadmap for Implementation of Basel 
II” concerted by the BRSA will be the leading contributors for the integration of the 
banking system into the European banking system. A strong, vibrant banking sector 
will contribute to growth and provide domestic financial stability. Transposition of the 
Turkish regulatory and supervisory legislation to the EU Capital Requirements 
Directive with parallel implementation is of the essence. It will further strengthen the 
role of the Turkish financial banking sector as counterparty and partner in the 
international financial markets. It is important to recognize that, whether banks are 
opting for the Standardized Approach (SA) or the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) 
Approach, the underlying internal process at the risk management departments should 
go beyond compliance with the Basel II framework. The key importance is the creation 
of a comprehensive integrated Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) mindset and 
framework, unique for each individual bank, which will be at the core of its strategic 
ambitions and tactical, value creating execution thereof, supported by properly 
identifying, measuring, managing and pricing the many different dimensions of risk: 
credit (including country risks), market, liquidity, operational, interest rate, business 
and finally strategic. ERM is not an IT-driven, text-book “quick fix”. Notwithstanding 
input from data and model support, its Charter (i.e. its organization and processes) and 
its common metric denominator, Economic Capital (EC), are ultimately based on the 
notion that there is not any substitute for sound judgment and accountability thereon by 
a bank’s management. As former Chairman of ABN Amro Bank, Mr. Jan Kalff stated 
during the transition to Basel II: “Regulatory Standards should be our minimums with 
respect to managing risks”. Before discussing the credit risk management best practices 
(which will be the focus in following chapters), it is worth providing background to the 
missing effective corporate banking practices at Turkish banks to date. On the path to 
Basel II, the prerequisite for the EU accession, banks will be required by the BRSA to 
significantly improve their corporate banking practices.  
2.5 Basel II: Impact on the Corporate Banking Practices at Turkish Banks 
 
Since the beginning of 2003, Turkish banks reorganized their structures, mainly driven 
by the BRSA structural banking reforms as well as international best practices that form 
the core of Basel II accord. Surviving banks following the twin crisis created “Portfolio 
Management” and “Risk Management” divisions, but the practice at Turkish banks still 
remains to be far away from what is intended by the Basel II framework as well as 
international best practice.  
 
Even though there are “scoring” systems based on “punctuation” of several ratios rather 
than full fledge econometric models, the existing scoring systems are not able to price 
the commercial credit undertaken by corporate bankers. In other words, credit is 
generously given without proper quantification of risks associated with the customer 
and hence the relationship to the bank customer is not judged on the basis of risk versus 
return or assuming “value creation”. Consequently, the calculation of product 
profitability is absent when the benefit versus cost of servicing the credit lines is not 
assessed precisely. Speculative grade domestic customers are still approved by bankers 
without considering the RAROC (Risk Adjusted Return on Capital) of the transaction, 
which will inform on the risk contribution of that single facility to the existing portfolio 
of the bank.  
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In addition, the deals are not infiltrated by the portfolio management group and 
diversification/concentration effects of asset types are not reported in any way. 
Expected Losses (EL) and Unexpected Losses (UL) are still concepts that should be 
inherited from the implementation of Basel II for better credit risk and portfolio 
management at Turkish banks. Any credit risk management system, which is not 
integrated into a value based management, will result in inefficient, “default laden” 
transactions with bitter consequences in terms of risk-taking attitudes26.  
 
There are more than enough reasons to the effective and efficient credit risk 
management practices imposed by Basel II. According to Stiglitz, the institutional 
developments, transformations in credit culture and creation of regulatory structures 
which reduce the likelihood of excessive risk-taking has proven more intractable and 
difficult than finding short-term solutions, such as recapitalizing the banking system27. 
Credit- and risk structuring are a cultural issue, which start with the mission statement 
of the bank and is deeply rooted in the transparent system adopted by the bank’s top 
management. The risk management culture of a bank accumulates throughout the time 
and culture shapes individuals’ thoughts about risk, reward and opportunity28. There is 
not any doubt that the credit culture should be creatively constructed by the internal 
resources of the bank, and reinforced by the structural reforms initiated by the leading 
supervisory and regulatory bodies in Turkey. 
 
There is much to be done with respect to the structuring and credit risk mitigation 
issues in the banking sector. The ordinary account officer’s activity is limited to 
granting working capital facilities and corporate guarantees. More structured products 
such as project finance, structured trade finance and products with cross border lending 
facilities remain still as “not available” to the market participants. This unfortunate 
“tight product scope” is directly affecting banks’ competitive position in actively 
managing their portfolios and improving returns.  
 
While the product scope remains to be limited in Turkey, banks are increasing their 
focus in the SME lending segment, which may prove very profitable for well-managed 
banks. Currently, banks seem to see real growth opportunities in the SME lending 
segment. In parallel, although SME’s have access to a variety of financing sources, 
including leasing, factoring and trade credit, they rely heavily on bank financing. 
Nevertheless, several constraints continue to hinder SME financing in line with firms’ 
natural growth cycle. According to banks, the lack of equity, the high credit risk, the 
paucity of collateral and poor information about the firms constitute the main obstacles 
to granting finance to SMEs. Other constraints that play a role in the assessment of loan 
applications, such as poor entrepreneurial capacity, business performance and uncertain 
development prospects, are felt to be equally important in granting loans to this 
segment of the credit market.  
 
Faced with implementing the requirements of Basel II worldwide and the new Capital 
Requirements Directive in the EU and in Turkey, banks are widely expected to require 
even more and better quality information from their customers. Hence, lending to 
 
26 Altman E.I/ Caouette, J.B. /, Naratyanan P.: Managing Credit Risk, 1998, p. 29. 
27 Stiglitz, J.: The Rebel within, selected speeches by Joseph Stiglitz. London: Anthem Press, 2001, p. 31. 
28 Lindsay, Stace: Culture, Mental Models, and National Prosperity. In Huntington S., Harrison, L. E. (eds): Culture Matters, How 
Values Shape Human Progress, 2000, p. 282. 
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SME’s will require a large amount of financial and strategic information in the spirit of 
reducing the critical information asymmetries. The new regulatory rules have 
introduced more stringent requirements to counter the growing concern of risks at the 
national and global levels. This step does not imply partial credit rationing. Instead, it 
basically requires banks to view their business in a more sophisticated and risk-
sensitive manner, particularly in the SME lending business.  
 
High competition results in the increased importance of better risk assessment methods 
and tools for the second-tier SME clients, and the need for preserving the bank’s capital 
with the right compensation at the level of risky portfolios. Equally, SME’s need to 
understand these regulatory changes as their financing conditions will be impacted to a 
certain degree – not necessarily by reducing their credit facilities - but by rendering the 
whole process more risk-sensitive and contingent upon the individual quality of the 
borrowers.  
 
In such complex environment, credit risk measurement and management of Basel II 
challenges the banks with more sophisticated knowledge, technology, IT and related 
credit risk management systems, which cannot be met by the existing skills, expertise, 
culture and processes in the Turkish banking sector at present. The following chapters 
will explore ways to raise the bar in the current operating environment, as far as the 
credit risk practitioners and regulating and supervising bodies are concerned.   
2.6 Basel II: Impact on the Financial Stability of Turkey   
 
The World Bank and the IMF pay special attention to support Turkey’s preparation for 
EU membership and to synergetic work closely with the EU institutions in this process. 
For example, in the banking sector reforms, prestigious programs are designed to 
ensure that Turkey’s banking supervision framework complies with both EU standards 
and Basel II norms29. In this sense, the new capital adequacy framework (Basel II) is 
perceived as the “Second Generation Financial System Development” in case of 
Turkey, if and when implemented as an indispensable part of a financial stability and 
development program arranged by the supranational anchors. Its emphasis on capital 
adequacy and its encouragement of strong risk management practices regardless of the 
regulatory capital instructions support the financial stability mandate of the central 
bankers and the regulatory authority in Turkey. Nevertheless, the accomplishment of 
the new framework relies naturally on the banking supervisory agency’s intellectual 
capability to build enough capacity for the adoption of EU directives and Basel II 
requirements. Hence, the World Bank oversees the implementation of Basel II with 
great care and reports the ongoing developments in its Country Assistance Strategy 
Reports progressively. 
 
With the introduction of the new generation of rules, the supranational anchors expect 
the development of the credit markets, due to improvements in accounting, auditing, 
development of credit information systems, new collateral regime as well as the 
development of more specialized instruments, for instance mortgages30.  
 
 
29 Country Assistance Strategy Report (2003, p. 31) 
30 Country Assistance Development Report, Annex A1, 2005, p 12.  
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Basel II is the new name of the financial stability efforts in Turkey, where its 
implementation should enhance the recent development of a strong financial sector 
infrastructure, including effective risk-focused banking supervision. A second major 
contribution of Basel II to financial stability is that it will lead the financial institutions 
to deepen and accelerate their efforts to improve the evaluation, quantification, and 
disclosure of risk. This very basic structural precondition of Basel II in turn facilitates 
and supports the ongoing World Bank and IMF efforts in maintaining the financial 
stability31.According to the former Chairman of the Basel committee, Mr. Jaime 
Caruana, “the Basel II is fundamentally about better risk management and corporate 
governance on the part of banks, as well as improved banking supervision and greater 
transparency. It is also about increasing the stability of the global financial system, to 
the benefit not only of banks, but also consumers and businesses”32. Similarly, the 
Institute of International Finance (IIF), the global association of financial institutions, 
welcomes the progress made by the Basel committee on Banking Supervision towards 
finalizing the new Basel accord and verifies the joint statements made by the former 
Chairman of Basel committee in its manifesto for the “Implementation of Basel II” as 
follows: 
 
“The New Accord can play a generously fundamental role in strengthening financial 
systems in emerging markets, primarily by providing effective incentives to the 
development of more sophisticated and technically sound risk management practices. A 
careful approach is needed for Basel II implementations in emerging markets, in 
particular regarding the necessary pre-conditions of supervisory resources, regulation 
and availability of technology, but the move toward the new framework is an important 
objective”33. This core attribute of Basel II, which has a different meaning for the crisis 
prone emerging markets, is usually neglected by the more advanced economies. This 
instance is explicitly rephrased and inserted into the core document as, “The 
fundamental objective of the Basel committee’s work (BCBS) has been to develop a 
framework, which would further strengthen the soundness and stability of the 
international banking system”34. “The worldwide accord should continue to promote 
safety and soundness in the financial system and the new framework should at least 
maintain the current overall level of capital in the interconnected system”35. As such, 
one can argue that the G-10 central banking and supervisory authorities have become 
more risk- and capital-conscience by calibrating the “single capital standard” with 
mutually reinforcing “tripartite pillars” system. The safety and soundness objectives 
cannot be achieved solely through minimalist regulatory capital requirements. The 
Basel Committee emphasizes that the new accord consists of three mutually reinforcing 
pillars.  
 
31 IMF Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 05/154, IMF Executive Board Discusses Implications of the New Basel Capital 
Adequacy Framework for Banks ("Basel II"), November 7, 2005. 
32 Remarks of Jaime Caruana, Governor of the Bank of Spain, former Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
at the international conference on Financial Stability and Implications of Basel II, Istanbul, 6 May 2005, pp. 1-16. 
33 IIF: The Implementation of Basel II, A Report of the Steering Committee on Regulatory Capital, 2005, p. 14. 
34 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, a 
Revised Framework, June 2004, Art. 4, p. 2.  A superb article about the Basel II and Financial Stability is provided at conference 
notes of Mr. W. L. Rutledge in Istanbul, being in charge of Bank Supervision Group of FED. 
35 BCBS: Consultative Document, Overview of the New Basel Capital Accord, 2001, p. 6. 
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2.7 Closing Remarks  
 
This chapter intended to highlight the importance of Basel II as part of Turkey’s 
accession to the EU and its banking and supervisory structures. However, there still 
remains to be an ownership issue for the implementation of forthcoming capital 
adequacy framework in Turkey. In the past and present, such long term implementation 
related actions are encouraged and sometimes enforced by the “Supranational Anchors” 
in Turkey. As supranational anchors continue to be pivotal, EU not surprisingly, 
expects to ensure the realistic solution to the deeply rooted financial problems in the 
pragmatic execution of institutional reforms, embedded in the IMF programs and the 
World Bank initiatives. The challenge was and will always be to combine the systemic 
stability efforts with prudential regulations and supervisory skills of global standards 
that promote the market discipline on a sound banking system in Turkey. In addition to 
this, there is today greater understanding and consensus that in order to carry out 
successful macroeconomic program, there must be a sound financial system, especially 
a strong banking system36. Today, those challenges are to be flanked with the norms of 
Basel II and the CRD in Turkey in the forefront of EU Accession. Respectively, the 
core content of the Turkish banking restructuring program was in full harmony with the 
“pillars of the Basel II” framework with one exception: the state bank reform. Although 
the banking restructuring program was a strong progress towards safety and soundness 
of the financial system, there is much to be done on the path to Basel II. Credit- and 
risk structuring are cultural issues and there is not any doubt that the credit culture 
should be reinforced by the structural reforms initiated by the leading supervisory and 
regulatory bodies in Turkey. In addition, Basel II is designed to be about better risk 
management and corporate governance on the part of banks, as well as improved 
banking supervision and greater transparency. Moreover, the stability of the financial 
system is increased to the benefit not only of banks, but also of consumers and the 
businesses world.  
 
Consequently, Basel II aims to achieve the safety and soundness objectives not solely 
through minimalist regulatory capital requirements, but more through a supervisory 
framework, that allows effective incentives to the development of more sophisticated 
and technically sound risk management practices and market disclosure.  In the next 
chapter, the thesis will explain and analyze the implications of the new framework on 
the Turkish banking system and its supervisory bodies.  
 
36 Frenkel.  J.: Remarks to Financial Crisis: What Have We Learned From Theory and Experience?, 1999, p. 65. 
SECTION II: Analysis of the Basel II Accord and the 
Quantitative Impact Studies 
 
Chapter 3: The Path towards Basel II 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 discussed the presence of “double anchors” with respect to the establishment 
of a sound and safe financial system in Turkey, a well known “must” covenant to be an 
integral part of the European Financial System. Chapter 2 also reviewed the initial 
progress that has been made and the further impact expected with the Basel II on the 
Turkish corporate banking practices and the overall financial stability of the country. 
The Basel committee implicitly stresses the importance of “maintaining financial 
stability” by marking it as one of the most material objectives of the New Accord. 
These financial stability objectives cannot be achieved solely through minimalist 
regulatory capital requirements. The Committee recognizes that the ultimate 
responsibility for managing risks and ensuring that economic capital is held at a firmer 
level consistent with a bank’s actual risk profile, remains with that of bank’s 
management. At the same time, the tireless Committee pursues to promote the adoption 
of stronger risk management practices through the Basel II three pillars, while 
maintaining the competitive equality among the international banks.  
 
Based on this continuum, this chapter will review and elaborate the three mutually 
reinforcing pillars; 1) minimum capital requirements, 2) supervisory review and 3) 
market discipline. Taken together, the combination of mutually reinforcing pillars 
contributes to a higher level of safety and soundness in the financial system.  
Figure 3.1: The New and Old Capital Regulation Structure 
 
 
Source: Majnoni, G.: Financial Sector Issues and Analysis Workshop, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 
Oct. 2003. 
 
As depicted in Figure 3.1, the new accord challenges Basel I in many non-
complementary areas. First of all, the new tripartite pillar system has to keep the 
average minimum capital requirement at the historical level set by Basel I, while 
allowing a set of incentives for banks to move towards more sophisticated risk 
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management requirements. Furthermore, more features of capital requirement 
calculations are provided in a multiple compendium of practical approaches. 
 
The architects of the new framework retained the key elements of the 1988 capital 
adequacy framework, commonly referred as Basel I, by not changing the famous 8% 
benchmark of the risk-weighted assets and the basic structure of the 1996 Market Risk 
Amendment with respect to the market risks and to the definition of eligible capital 
items37.  While the key elements of  Basel I are retained, the new framework will 
undoubtedly lead to the preservation of economic capital inside the core financial 
systems of those countries adopting the new framework through its more risk sensitive 
and generous incentives than its predecessor. This will considerably lead to the 
prevention of financial fragility and contribute more to the soundness and strength of 
the international financial system. The new accord will prove itself not only at the level 
of calculating simple capital adequacy ratios, but more on the future level of building 
sound financial systems. It is evident that Basel II cannot promise the avoidance of the 
future financial crisis in the world, but it will prove to be much more resilient and 
defensive against a financial crisis as a market-led system. Before drilling into the 
objectives and requirements of Basel II, it is worthwhile to look into the limitations of 
Basel I in the next sub-section.  
3.2 Limitations of Basel I 
 
The Basel capital accord has now been in existence for almost two decades. 
Regrettably, rapid revolution in the financial industry has exposed some weaknesses in 
the first accord. The most significant of these is the limited ability of the first accord to 
assess capital adequacy in relation to the “true risks” of the obligors. Despite its many 
achievements until 1997, it became clear that Basel I required a radical overhaul if 
prudential regulation was to maintain its relevance and effectiveness in the face of 
accelerating market turbulence, innovations and the development of new risk 
management techniques. According to Hirszowicz, in the face of continuous efforts of 
amendments, the original accord is not “time adequate” to the latest developments and 
challenges of credit risks38. In point of fact, the original accord was not only time-
inadequate; it was also “system-inadequate”. To highlight some global examples, in the 
years that followed the Basel I, 133 of the 181 members of the IMF suffered serious 
banking sector problems39. Even though the objective of sustaining a definite level 
playing field was achieved to a certain degree and the international banks were 
encouraged to add substantial new capital to the global banking system, the distortions 
to the operational conditions were unavoidable.  
 
The first accord was revolutionary in the sense that it was relating a bank’s capital to 
the “perceived risk” of the bank’s risk proliferation. It also incorporated off-balance 
sheet exposures and the quantification of risks associated with these transactions. In 
addition, it introduced the concept of “risk weighted assets” with the weighting of the 
 
37 BCBS: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: Comprehensive Version : June 2006, 
paragraphs 4-6. 
38 Pls. refer to Hirszowicz (2003, p. 153) for a complete framework and the role of Banking Regulations inside the Swiss Banking 
Policy. 
39 Gup, B. E. (ed.): The New Basel Accord, 2004, p. 4. Also see Rixtel, A. (et al) for the role of Basel I against the background of 
the banking crisis in Japan, p. 400. 
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risky assets according to specific “risk buckets”. The risk buckets or weights were used 
to reflect the “risk composition of a bank’s portfolio” for different classes of assets. The 
“risk weights” were comprised of four categories; 1) No Risk (0% weighting), 2) Low 
Risk (20% weighting), 3) Medium Risk (50% weighting) and 4) Full Risk (100% 
weighting).  
 
Asset types were classified on the basis of three dimensions; 1) Liquidity (the asset 
classification started from the most liquid assets such as cash to the least liquid one like 
real estate), 2) Debtor type (governments, central banks, public entities, banks and 
corporations), and 3) Debtor’s country of residence (OECD or non-OECD)40.  
 
The first accord used a formula to relate the regulatory capital to risk weighted assets, 
described as follows41: 
  
CR = RC / ∑ Ai * ωi ≥ 8%  
 
Where, 
 
CR: Capital Ratio 
RC: Regulatory Capital split into two categories, Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 
supplementary capital 
Ai: i-th Asset 
ωi: Risk Weight of the i-th asset. 
 
As such, the first accord was exclusively a set of minimum quantitative guidelines. 
According to the simple formula constructed as above, the banks were basically 
preserving capital of not less than 8 percent of their risk-weighted assets. The “bucket 
system” was applied to all types of banks, which was severely criticized on account of 
“one-size-fits-all” problem. The arbitrary nature of the risky asset classification and the 
risk weight levels led to a wider criticism. Accordingly, the leverage ratio of Basel I is 
not any longer considered as an appropriate measure of a bank’s capital adequacy 
because the weighting functions do not reflect the “true risks” of a bank and these risks 
may vary significantly among banks around the globe. In this sense, several 
shortcomings were also detected over time and the most important deficiencies are 
described as follows: 
 
3.2.1 Sole Focus on Credit Risk 
 
The framework of Basel I focused heavily on credit risks and was characterized by its 
poor differentiation among different types of risks, such as interest rate, foreign 
exchange rate risks, etc. To remedy this matter, in 1996, the Basel committee issued an 
amendment that extended capital requirements to market risks. However, the 
consideration of operational risks was postponed until the New Accord. 
  
 
 
 
40 Resti, A. / Sironi, A.: Risk Management and Shareholder’s Value in Banking, 2007, p. 554. 
41 Ibid, p. 549. 
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3.2.2 OECD Membership as a base of Obligor Rating 
 
All credit bases are assumed to be the same risks and treated as eligible for 8% risk 
category. Likewise, all exposures to non- OECD countries are considered riskier than 
the exposures to those in the OECD. In this context any loan to AAA rated 
multinational company generates more risks than a similar loan to a B- rated bank in 
Turkey. This is clearly inappropriate, as the AAA rated loan provided for a 
multinational company has to be supported with more regulatory capital than true 
economic capital. 
 
3.2.3 Quantification of Portfolio Diversification  
 
Since the establishment of Basel I, the international banks were fortified with different 
classes of assets, bundling “group” characteristics such as industry, rating, facility type 
or even the time horizon as means to portfolio differentiation. The recent developments 
in credit risk measurement and portfolio modeling have proven that the quantified risk 
at a portfolio level is quite different than the bundling or aggregation of credit facilities 
into groups. Appropriate portfolio diversification requires more sophisticated tools and 
concepts, which start with the calculation of “Loss given Default” (LGD), Probability 
of Default (PD), Exposure at Default (EAD) and then continues with the application of 
correlation factors. Stand-alone risk measures as well as portfolio-level correlation 
factors were missing in the first accord. 
 
3.2.4 Limited Recognition of the Link between Maturity and Credit Risk 
 
The basic rule of lending, that a loan is riskier with increasing maturity, was clearly 
neglected in the first accord. Especially, the revolving credit facilities with a term of 
less than one year did not require any regulatory capital, while a short-term facility with 
366 days to maturity bore the same capital charge as any long-term facility.42 In 
Turkey, where the average maturity of the deposits are usually 58 days, and that a 364-
day facility is not deserving any capital charge, is a very big handicap of the first 
accord. The bank is clearly at risk and capital is not required for a roll-over facility. 
This situation led to the creation of the “364-day facility”, which is usually rolled 
repeatedly without committing any regulatory capital. 
 
3.2.5 Regulatory Arbitrage 
 
The first accord put a ceiling on the technical level of risk weighted assets through the 
regulatory capital impositions. As banks eventually reached the limits of their risk 
weighted assets, they had to choose either to increase capital or divert risk weighted 
assets from balance sheets. Some banks started to resort to securitization or to loan 
sales in order to shrink their balance sheets or reduce their holdings of weighted assets. 
Such asset transfers worsened the credit quality of portfolios severely, which meant that 
the quality of the assets remaining on the books would deteriorate, defeating the 
purpose of the Accord. The first accord unfortunately created strong incentives for 
 
42 Crouhy, M. / Galai, D. / Mark, R.: Risk Management, 2001, p. 69. 
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banks not to efficiently assess the true risks. Rather, it justified motivations to play the 
game of “regulatory arbitrage”. 
 
3.2.6 Limitations of Basel I in the Higher Systemic Risk Context: A Case Study for 
Turkey 
 
At this stage, it is useful to look at the outcomes of implementing Basel I by the 
Turkish banking sector. Overall, the original Basel Capital Accord, which was a real 
contribution to the increase of the capital levels of the global banking system 
worldwide, has proven to be highly ineffective in a sophisticated, crisis prone market, 
such as Turkey. The first accord, which is implemented since 1992 in Turkey, was 
believed to be the “first line of defense” against financial instabilities before the 
occurrence of the twin crisis in the beginning of the new millennium43. 
 
Basel I was not structured to keep pace with the increasing credit risks of Turkish banks 
during the financial crisis periods of 2000 – 2001. It was also less integral to the 
ongoing supervisory processes in the country. Combined with the lack of Pillar 3 type 
of disclosure requirements and market discipline dictated by the Basel II accord, which 
should reinforce the market participants for having timely and material information 
with respect to the risk and capital contents of the counter party banks, the basic 
foundations of “stable and sound banking system” propositions were transmitted to the 
immaterial judgment capabilities of the individual market participants. Not having any 
material information to use for efficient investment and lending decisions, market 
participants had to rely usually on rumors and on “soft information” about the 
“credibility and soundness of a bank”, where such misjudgment based on soft 
information would result in severe capital losses for many market participants. As 
experienced during the crises of 2000 and 2001, these losses translated from the credit 
crunch to liquidity squeeze threatening the current integrity of the financial system with 
a high number of defaulted banks leaving the system with greater macro-economic 
consequences. There were 20 banks of different sizes transferred to SDIF during the 
period of 1997-2003, while another 12 had been compulsorily merged with each other. 
Of these banks, 5 banks were sold to foreign banks and one of them had been 
completely abolished from the interconnected system. The result was a total cost of 
USD 49 billions to the Turkish economy, consisting merely of obligations and the 
transfer costs of the transferred banks out of the system. This “systemic failure” was 
the cost of the missing effective regulatory and supervisory bodies in Turkey that could 
have taken prompt corrective actions in a timely and material manner”44.  
 
Conventional prudential supervision and the existing capital adequacy framework of 
the first accord were not designed to deal effectively with financial disasters, such as in 
Turkey as well as in other developing and transition economies. “Many supervisors in 
countries with more volatile economies have adopted the Basel standards even when 
conditions do not warrant their use”45. There are additional reasons why they might be 
                                                 
43 For Cross-Country Empirical Studies of Systemic Bank Distress, a fundamental analysis is provided by a survey implemented 
by the IMF staff members Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005, pp. 1-40). Further evaluations of Basel I at Swiss banking 
platform is provided extensively at the superb dissertation of Dr. D. Jovic, “Risk Oriented Capital Allocation and Performance 
Measurement at Banks” , Haupt Verlag 1999, pp. 261-292. 
44 Akcay, C.: The Turkish Banking Sector Two Years after the Crisis. In: Onis, Z. / Rubin, B. (2003, pp. 167-187). 
45 Lindgren, C. J. / Garcia, G. / Saal, M.: Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy, p. 188, 1996. 
inappropriate. First, the default probabilities of the institutions are higher than in G10 
countries due to the volatility in the macro economic environments. Therefore, the 
supervisory process must identify the “risk map” of the financial system and the 
individual banks thereon and assign the “vulnerable” banks before they jeopardize the 
financial system. To counter the “disaster myopia”, the recognition of true systemic 
conditions that promote the shortsightedness is the starting point. The adoption of 
reforms such as the Basel II framework should then follow suits. Secondly, as depicted 
in Figure 3.2, the reported capital ratios are grossly overstated and the general 
information content of the capital adequacy ratio is unreliable. As loan classification, 
valuation and provisioning practices are weaker than in G10 countries, the reported 
capital measures are not the correct indicators of financial soundness of the individual 
banks and the banking system at all. 
 
Figure 3.2: Turkish Banking System’s Capital Adequacy Ratio (in %) 
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As depicted in the “U” shape of the capital adequacy ratio function above, the financial 
system in Turkey is proven to be highly fragile, instable and surrounded by the 
existence of high level systemic risks. Turkey has seen a repetition of currency and 
banking crisis since 1974, and even after the inception of Basel I accord in Turkey 
since 1992. In Figure 3.2, an observer can explore a typical boom and bust cycle in the 
context of systemic risks in Turkey. The cycle from the start of financial year 2000 up 
to the establishment of the new government and a new macro economic program in 
2003, is defined as the “financial crisis” period, which is qualified as the “bust” cycle. 
The bust cycle entailed halving equity prices, crashing housing and foreign exchange 
prices, and peak interest rates. The period of 2003-2006 indicates a boom cycle or a 
“through-to-peak” rise driven by more “instabilities” in terms of interest, foreign 
exchange and asset price volatilities in the markets46. This period is also positively 
associated with “Foreign Bank Entry / Ownership”, where the foreign banks exploited 
their advantages in “pricing and funding cost”. Such exploitations presented the utmost 
competitive disadvantage and instability factor to the Turkish domestic banks. Both 
periods have witnessed consequent interventions by the supervisory authorities in 
Turkey.  
 
                                                 
46 For a discussion of Business Cycles and Asset Prices, pls. refer to a very recent book of Tvede, L. (2006, pp. 307). 
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Figure 3.2 exposes the systemic solvency of the banking sector, calculated according to 
the Basel I accord. The banking system reads an average solvency of 18.4% during the 
bust cycle, when the large portion of the system’s banks were insolvent at the time and 
their capital losses were amounting to over USD 7 billions in total. Clearly, maintaining 
higher capital ratios through directives was not an issue at Turkish banks. However, the 
question of insolvency laid more upon banks’ internal processes, controls and quality of 
assets on their balance sheets. Banks were not adequately prepared to handle the 
increasing volume of business and most likely, the increasing degree of credit and 
market risks. Consequently, for the defined financial crisis period, the existing high 
level of capital ratios inherited from the first accord could not have been realistically 
resilient during the twin financial crisis and hence did not pass the “financial soundness 
test” in Turkey. Evidence in the twin crises suggests that the Basel I mandated capital 
adequacy ratio was an “ineffective benchmark” to sustain a sound and safe financial 
system in Turkey.  
 
The period 2003-2006 reflects a boom cycle in Turkish economy, when the capital 
inflows were tripled and the GNP growth rates were around 10% per annum. The 
overly excessive capital inflows led to credit boom in Turkey as revealed by the 
diminishing solvency ratios. This period witnessed an extraordinary rise in the 
syndicated and direct debt facilities utilized by Turkish banks and corporations by a 
factor of 4, rising from USD 3.5 billion to USD 18 billion as of 2006 year-end. Coupled 
with this bubble in foreign debt, there is an alarming level of increase in the real estate 
lending facilities amounting to USD 16 billion47. In turn, the systemic risks are doubled 
due to rapid economic expansion and higher asset price appreciations, primarily funded 
by foreign debt and foreign investor demand. In this sense, the higher systemic risk 
would require higher level of capital and liquidity to sustain the stability of the financial 
system in Turkey. Taking into consideration the recent credit crunch in global markets 
and the existing political risks associated with the implementation of Basel II may 
trigger at any time a possible “retreat of the capital” and a resulting liquidity crunch in 
the aftermath.  
 
In fact, despite the boom cycle indicated by Basel I-based ratios, the systemic risks 
(undiversifiable component of risks) have significantly increased in Turkey since 2002 
from 19% to 47% in 2006, as depicted in the Figure 3.3 below. This is not surprising as 
in emerging markets; asset returns of firms tend to move up and down in sync with the 
local market (in this case, Turkey) with relatively large swings that are reflected in the 
empirical correlation that would pick up on this asset return volatility. In contrast, in a 
developed market, one would observe that the market is more subdued and individual 
firms would have different movements, but not all in one direction. Therefore, the R-
Squared (systemic risks inherent in the firms of the economy) exploded from 2002 
onwards in Turkey and not only because the empirical asset return observations showed 
large swings from 2002 onwards, but also earlier in the period of 1999-2002. Since R-
Squared calculations take more weight on the most recent 3-year period for moving 
window of asset return observations, the 2003 result shows a huge jump, indicating the 
rapid increase of systemic (undiversifiable) risks.   
 
 
 
47 Financial Stability Report of Central Bank of Turkey (June 2006, p. 87).  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Systemic Risk Estimates in Turkey 1992-200648 
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Moody’s KMV’s Global Asset Correlation model finds a systemic factor that captures 
what is common between firms in an economy and their individual sensitivity to this 
common systemic factor, which is referred as the R-Squared: the correlation 
coefficient. 
 
3.2.7 Overview to the Correlation Model 
 
In essence, Moody’s KMV uses 120 factors based on the global economy, region, 
sector, industry, and country, providing high resolution on sources of correlation. 
Please refer to the Appendix VI for the 120 factors in the Global Asset Correlation 
model. The correlation model starts by computing a series of weekly asset returns 
(changes in asset value) for all 39,000 publicly listed firms using asset return 
observations produced by its EDF model from January 1990 till December 2006 for the 
2006 correlation model. The correlation factors are updated annually adding new 
weekly asset returns observations each year. For further details on the EDF model, 
please refer to Chapter 6, sub-section 6.6.2.1.   
 
Using this individual firm asset returns, it aggregates country and industry indices and 
continues by regressions on these country and industry indices on orthogonal macro 
economic factors (e.g. global firm, small size firm, interest rate sensitivity, consumer 
durables factors etc) constructed from asset returns. Following this process, it builds, 
for each firm, a “composite factor” based on country and industry composition.  
 
It then performs a second regression on the obligor asset return to compute R-squared, 
which is the portion of asset variance explained by the composite factor. In this second 
regression, it uses the latest 3-year weekly asset returns observations. Using these 
results relating to the systemic component of the asset return (R-Squared), Global 
                                                 
48 Data is highly confidential and undisclosed.  
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Correlation model determines the asset correlation among firms. As depicted in Figure 
3.4 below, between two firms A and B, R-Squared determines the extent of covariance 
in firm’s asset returns in a given composite system, C, which will be specified by 
common industry, country and macro factors.   
Figure 3.4: Understanding R-Squared as implemented by Moody’s KMV 
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Asset correlations combined with obligor’s default probabilities and transition 
probabilities will determine the Default Correlation and Correlated Migration among 
firms, including banks in a given system or economy. In general, the financial stability 
of the banking sector will not be threatened by single obligor defaults or simplistic 
capital adequacy ratios based on Basel-I rules. Rather, financial crisis occur due to 
correlated defaults and tail events, which are the direct results of increasing default as 
well as systemic risks within an economy. While R-Squared in Figure 3.3 alarmed the 
increasing systemic risks in Turkey since the twin crisis, the increasing default risks 
starting from 2006 to date in Figure 3.5 should also caution the supervisory authorities. 
If the default risks revert back to 2000 and 2001 levels, high default risk coupled with 
higher systemic risk may mean a much more severe financial crisis ahead in Turkey. 
 
Figure 3.5: EDF of Turkish Financial Institutions and Corporations (1997-2007) 
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Turkey is one of the few countries that reflect low level of Loans to Deposits or Loans 
over GNP ratios49. Accordingly, the existence of high level solvency ratios does not 
imply automatically the existence of a sound and capital-wise banking system. The 
determination of capital levels should be a direct and explicit process of outstanding 
risks carried on- and off the books of the banks, where the supervisors and market 
participants should not have any difficulty in making sound judgments about the true 
capital and risk levels of those banks. Here, some insights were shared from Moody’s 
KMV’s Expected Default Frequency (EDF) and Asset Correlation models as possible 
ways to measure and manage such systemic risks. Further discussions will be offered in 
Chapter 6 regarding the Moody’s KMV solutions. This issue directly confronts us with 
the development of internal rating methods and the establishment of the robust credit 
risk management processes. In wrapping up the issue, the new Basel II framework 
should enable supervisors and market participants to better detect the ongoing risk- and 
supplementary capital levels in individual institutions across the financial system in 
Turkey. With its accent on efficient implementation of internal based risk assessment 
methods and systems of Basel II, banks, supervisors and finally the market place will 
get accurate signals about the materiality of the existing and contingent risks and take 
more appropriate actions in response to the changing risk appetite of the financial 
institutions in Turkey.  
 
To secure a well balanced and sufficiently capitalized financial system in Turkey, the 
Turkish supervisory authorities should be very much aware of the hazards of existing 
Basel I type regulations (simple “ratio watching”) and the dangers of the political 
developments that may lead to delayed Basel II road map. To avoid needless 
vulnerabilities, the long-term solution lies in the timeliness of the Basel II 
implementation that offers a transition of supervisory strategy from simple “ratio 
watching” to “risk-based process”. The extent of improvements in the financial system 
will unfold depending on the strategies adopted by the supervisors with the new Basel 
II framework. Having observed the pragmatic outcomes of Basel I type of regulation in 
Turkey, the thesis will examine the best policies that can be adopted by the Turkish 
supervisory and regulatory bodies, which will be supported by empirical evidence in 
the next sub-section.    
3.3 Empirical Evidence about Bank Supervision, Regulation and Financial 
Stability 
 
The aim in this sub-chapter is to provide new empirical evidence to the statements 
issued at the “Basel I” critics panel through the findings of Barth, Caprio and Levine 
(2006, pp.178-257). According to Levine and his co-researchers, one objective of bank 
regulation and supervision is to reduce bank fragility and thereby avoid systemic 
banking failures. To assess the relationship between banking sector policies and 
systemic crisis, the research used a “logit probability model”. The dependent variable, 
which is the “banking crisis”, is elaborated by using a broad array of other systemic risk 
factors such as inflation, diversification index, capital regulatory index, official 
supervisory power, government-owned banks, moral hazard index, and limitations on 
foreign bank entry, activity restrictions and private monitoring indexes.  
 
49 This ratio ranges between 25%-40% in general. 
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Initially, the systemic risk potential of the banks is mitigated to a certain extent through 
restrictions upon their range of activities. This is in contrast to the fact that banks 
generally engage in a broad array of activities whereby their income streams are 
diversified, making them more resilient to shocks. If this rule applies to the financial 
conglomerates, they become “too big to discipline”, so the activity restrictions are 
negatively associated with bank stability as banks normally diversify their income 
streams by switching to more non-lending and commission-based businesses.  
 
Secondly, the impact of deposit insurance, which intensifies moral hazard effects in 
form of connected lending  (the period from 1985 – 2001 in Turkey), may encourage 
excessive risk taking behavior and overwhelm any stabilization benefits. 
 
The researchers tested the above questions on countries with weak supervisory systems 
or with a regulatory environment that does not spur private or market discipline. The 
empirical findings surprisingly allure that there is “not any robust” link of capital 
regulations to financial stability and this link does not follow any predictable pattern.  
 
In fact, this is due to the harmonization of capital adequacy standards internationally. 
As with the introduction of Basel I, for the majority of the countries that adopted the 
first accord, there were not any major differences in capital standards, which made it 
difficult to explain the cross-country differences in bank fragility. The harmonization of 
capital standards since 1988 does not enable us to identify a robust link of capital 
adequacy and banking operations. Therefore, the research could not confirm or reject 
the view that the Basel accords reduced bank fragility to lower levels than what it 
would have been in the absence of these accords. Similarly, in terms of Basel II’s Pillar 
1, the research is conclusive such that there is weak evidence that countries with more 
stringent capital requirements have a lower probability of systemic banking crisis.  
 
However, the findings of Levine and his co-researchers route to the important role of 
Basel II’s Pillar 2, which promotes the safety and soundness of the banking system 
through stronger banking supervision. A stronger official supervision of banks will help 
to overcome a number of market failures, as depicted in Figure 3.2 earlier. During the 
boom cycle, the economy was expanding, but with increasing systemic risks. Despite 
the increasing systemic risks, the result was not another financial crisis in Turkey due to 
stronger supervision in the marketplace. Stronger official supervision, which is ensured 
by the Banking Regulatory and Supervisory Agency (BRSA) in Turkey, enhanced the 
systems stability either by reducing the incidence of crisis through “three level 
oversights” and bank recapitalization programs, or by reducing the destabilizing effects 
of generous deposit insurance. Strong banking supervision ensures lower non-
performing loan ratios and diversification in bank portfolios and hence reduces the 
possibility of a major crisis. So the old rule of thumb: “don’t put all the eggs in one 
basket”, holds true for Basel II Pillar 2. However, there is a warning by the researchers 
that excessive authorization of supervisory power is associated with greater corruption 
in lending, which was the case in Turkey until 2003. The findings of the research also 
stress the importance of Basel II Pillar 3, namely the effectiveness of transparent 
information disclosure to strengthen the market discipline of banks. The results indicate 
that the adoption of regulations forcing the disclosure of accurate and comparable 
information about the banks tend to have greater banking efficiency and higher 
integrity in lending.  
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In a banking environment, where governments regulate banks to facilitate the financing 
of government expenditures, to funnel credit to politically attractive ends through their 
state-owned banks, and more generally to maximize the welfare and influence of 
politicians and bureaucrats, the Basel II is yet to take effect. The banking system in 
Turkey still holds a significant amount of government debt, weighted as “zero” risk 
inside the current regulatory regime. The use of the state-owned bank resources to buy 
political support, which may be addressed as “systemic corruption” continues to be a 
significant issue. In Turkey, the new Basel Accord is not only about “better risk 
management” or “new incentives” for preserving capital, but about a truly independent 
supervisory framework, in order to insulate regulators from political pressures. The true 
independence with effective oversight seems to be an impossible combination and a 
difficult one to achieve in Turkey. This pressure and skepticism will challenge the 
Turkish banking community and the governmental authorities towards the adoption 
Basel II standards. As discussed in Chapter 2, the close watch by supranational anchors, 
the EU and other private interest groups will be pivotal in the shape Basel II unfolds in 
Turkey. In the next sub-section, the thesis will look more closely to the evolution, 
objectives and structure of the new Basel Accord.  
3.4 The New Basel Accord 
 
Having examined the shortcomings of Basel I in previous sub-section and the best 
policies that can be adopted by supervisory and regulatory bodies in Turkey, the thesis 
will now aim at explaining the new Basel accord as follows: 
 
1. Evolution 
2. Objectives 
3. Building Blocks: Three pillar structure  
 
3.4.1 Evolution of the New Basel Accord 
 
The stimulus behind the evolution of the capital convergence methods arises from the 
confluence of a series of trends like deregulation and increasing competition50. In the 
early 1980’s, increased competition internationally led to the concern over deteriorating 
capital levels in international banks and the erosion of reasonable risk and reward 
relationship. This concern was exacerbated by the emerging debt crisis in the major 
developing countries. The need for a more consistent approach to capital measurement 
standards was fulfilled by the Basel committee members in 1988. The existing capital 
convergence framework essentially addressed only credit risk while banks are in reality 
exposed to a range of other forms of risks such as interest, foreign exchange position, 
settlement and operational risks. Consequently, the Basel committee and the European 
Commission have been pursuing intensively the different paths in which the risks other 
than credit risks may be incorporated appropriately within the regulatory 
arrangements51. In 1996, the Basel committee extended the original accord to 
encompass the market risk with an amendment that enabled banks to calculate the 
relevant capital requirements using either internal value-at-risk models or a simplified 
 
50 Basel Committee for Banking Supervision: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, July 
1988, p. 8. 
51 Price Waterhouse, Bank Capital Adequacy and Capital Convergence, 1991, pp. 3-7. 
approach with requirements laid down by the Basel committee. The market risk 
management techniques have become more mature in recent years52. From the 
regulatory perspective, the consistent measurement, management and control of interest 
rate and credit risks were attracting continuous attention of the Basel Committee. By 
1997, the principles for the management of interest risks were also established and later 
revised in July 2004. The evolution and the road ahead of Basel II are represented in 
Figure 3.6. 
Figure 3.6: The Evolution of the New Basel Accord 
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Source: Ernst &Young, the New Basel Accord, presented in Istanbul, 2003 
The need for a more consistent approach to capital measurement standards was fulfilled 
by the Basel committee members in 1988. The existing capital convergence framework 
essentially addressed only credit risk while banks are in reality exposed to a range of 
other forms of risks such as interest & foreign exchange open positions including 
settlement and operational risks. Consequently, the Basel committee and the European 
Commission have been pursuing intensively the different paths in which the risks other 
than credit risks may be incorporated appropriately within the regulatory 
arrangements53. In 1996, the Basel committee extended the original accord to 
encompass the market risk with an amendment that enabled banks to calculate the 
relevant capital requirements using either internal value-at-risk models or a simplified 
approach with requirements laid down by the Basel committee. The market risk 
management techniques have become more mature in recent years. From the regulatory 
perspective, the consistent measurement, management and control of interest rate and 
credit risks were attracting continuous attention of the Basel Committee. By 1997, the 
principles for the management of interest risks were also established and later revised in 
July 2004. Despite the revisions and amendments, Basel I was still creating some 
undesired consequences. For instance, to attain higher income to compensate the return 
on solvency ratios or the extra burden brought by charging the capital costs to the loan 
                                                 
52 According to Jorion, there are four types of financial market risks: interest rate, exchange rate, equity and commodity risk, 2001, 
p. 83. 
53 Price Waterhouse, Bank Capital Adequacy and Capital Convergence, 1991, pp. 3-7. 
 47
                                                
pricing, banks adopted higher risk lending practices. Banks were extending loans to 
more risky businesses and diverted their activities more towards the emerging markets, 
as Basel I did not differentiate between high and low credit quality portfolios54. In 
addition, banks assumed a growing amount of leverage through derivatives, exploited 
the capital adequacy rules through securitization and bypassed the 1988 accord55. Even 
today, the events of summer 2007 have shown that risks remain and that Basel I was 
not equipped to deal with them. In particular, the rules gave banks an incentive to sell 
on their least securitized assets while keeping the least risky ones on their books, since 
both assets enjoyed the same capital charge56. Further creative structures to avoid 
capital charges are “induced” through the usage of special purpose vehicles. Because 
Basel I allowed banks to set aside less capital for these semi-detached conduits, all 
lending business and the resulting liability side transactions are “deported” to the 
conduits, which are kept as “off-balance-sheet” entities for reporting purposes57.  
 
As credit risks magnified significantly since 1988 and the credit quality worldwide 
continued to deteriorate, the demand for balancing the credit risks via a new sort of 
directives became self-evident. The complex new rules about the credit risk 
management principles and methodology documents were mobilized. In addition, it 
was understood that capital requirements alone were not sufficient to ensure safe and 
sound banking in 1997 and hence a major step was taken toward improving the 
supervisory standards. Just in the wake of the Asian crisis, the Basel committee 
imposed the “Core Principles of Supervision”, which became the first worldwide 
standard for best practices of supervisory regimes58. The main motivation behind the 
core principles of supervision was the strengthening of the global financial stability. 
The core principles of supervision also demanded the supervisory authorities to 
encourage market discipline by good corporate governance and enhanced market 
transparency and surveillance59. In essence, the core principles of supervision have 
been the inspiration and a meta-level solution to the forthcoming pillar system of Basel 
II. Moreover, the Basel committee wished to encourage further “best practice” 
improvements in the internal risk management systems at banks through new 
regulations. The shortcomings listed in sub-section 3.2 showed the essential need for a 
new regulatory paradigm for better banking supervision, which is strongly qualitative, 
while also making use of the benefits of the new quantitative methodologies to quantify 
stand-alone and portfolio risks. In sum, the road from Basel I to Basel II provides 
plenty of means to strike the right balance between: 
 
• The need for disciplining the risk taking behavior of individual banks, 
• The overall impact of regulatory capital on financial stability60, 
 
54 According to the Professional’s Handbook of Financial Risk Management, “The Basel Capital Accord generally does not 
recognize differences in the credit quality of bank assets for purposes of allocating risk-based capital requirements” (2000, p. 330). 
55 Chorafas, D.: Economic Capital Allocation with Basel II, 2004, pp.3-60. 
56 The Economist: A Special Report on the World Economy, October 20th 2007, p. 26. 
57 One company, who actually transposed that conduit structure for using them as parking place for the assets and in order to hide 
debt was Enron. “Enron was paying USD 45 million to its advisory investment banks to raise USD 1billion in loans from those 
beleaguered, “prepaid” companies” as cited by Bryce, R.: Pipe Dreams, 2002, p.355. 
58 Barth, J.R./Caprio, G. /Levine, R.: Rethinking Bank Regulation, 2006, p. 66. 
59 Mwenda, K.: Banking Supervision and Systemic Bank Restructuring, 2000, pp.12-18.  
60 Chorafas (2004, p.46) 
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• The consolidation of the individual core principles and regulations under the 
new, mutually reinforcing pillar system, which should be in command of the 
market discipline. 
 
The objectives of the New Accord are aligned so as to strike the right balance among 
the three considerations mentioned above. The thesis will explore these objectives in 
the next sub-section.  
  
3.4.2 Objectives of the New Basel Accord 
 
The Basel committee has designed the new framework to be more forward-looking for 
the capital adequacy supervision, which has the capacity to evolve through time.61 The 
maintenance of a forward-looking framework is one of the key objectives of the 
Committee, following criticisms over Basel I being time-inadequate. The new 
framework is a balance between the new advances in the risk management industry and 
the developments in the markets, constantly signaling new revisions to the Committee 
to propose new amendments for possible changes. Keeping up with the pace of 
progressive developments needs more risk-sensitive approaches to overall calculation 
of capital requirements and the continuous engagements of the banking industry in the 
discussions of prevailing risk management practices. 
 
Basel II has also recognized the importance of bank supervision in terms of influencing 
the implementation of sound practices of capital calculation and exposing the true risk 
profiles of the individual banks. The new accord encourages supervisors to perform 
more “on-site” supervision at the banks and to be more critical on the methods used by 
the banks when determining the capital levels for each risk category. A major 
concretization of this predominant issue is the implementation of “MaRisk” in 
Germany, which imposes the Internal Capital Adequacy Process (ICAAP) as part of a 
robust application of “Pillar 2 and Pillar 3”62. The internal assessment of risk and 
capital profiles will be reviewed as part of the Supervisory Review Process (SREP) and 
the conformity with the Pillars I and III will be verified by the supervisors. The role of 
the regulator shall be restricted to the examination of banks’ risk management 
procedures and to the encouragement of the use of global best practices. The regulator 
must also ensure that appropriate information is available to enable the market 
participants to assess risk, and that fair and honest dealing underpin commitments and 
transactions63.The “Leitmotiv”, which is the fundamental objective of the Basel 
framework, remains the same, namely strengthening the soundness and the stability of 
the international banking system. The forward-looking nature of the new accord and its 
empowerment of the supervisory bodies are recognized as the prerequisites of sound 
and stable financial systems. At the same time, the Committee wants to maintain 
sufficient consistency for a possible contingency, where the new capital regulation 
results in a competitive inequality among international active banks.64 Consequently, 
this Leitmotiv on “stability and soundness” routes the architects of the new regulatory 
framework towards construction of the “pillar system”, where the new integrated 
approach involves minimum capital requirements for broad category of risks, 
 
61 BCBS: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, June 2006, parag. 15 
62 Eller, R./Heinrich, M./Perrot, R./Reif, M.: MaRisk in der Praxis, 2006, pp. 13-18. 
63 Eatwell J. / Taylor, L.: Global Finance at Risk – The Case for International Regulation, 2000, p. 42. 
64 BCBS: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, June 2006, parag. 4. 
supervisory review of internal bank assessments of capital relative to risk and the 
necessary checks of the market participants as the final word. The key word here is the 
“market” and its “discipline”, namely the market discipline, which should promote the 
adoption of stronger risk management practices by the banking industry. In an 
environment where the scale of market and credit risks are enormously increasing, and 
the risks are still under priced in order to realize more market share. An appropriate 
level of market disclosure and its timeliness will provide benefits for the well-run 
institutions and for financial stability in general.  
 
3.4.3 Three Pillars of the New Basel Accord 
3.4.3.1 Overview 
 
Basel II was released by the Basel committee in June 2004, for implementation starting 
in January 2007 for a group of countries. The New Framework, which is far more 
complex than the 1988 accord, consists of three "pillars", which are the constitutional 
building blocks of the New Accord. 
 
  Table 3.1: Main Features and Key Requirements of Basel II 
Pillar 1:  
Capital Adequacy                           Main Features                                                                                      Key Requirements 
Credit Risk 1 
Standardized 
Approach (SA) 
Greater risk sensitivity than Basel I through more risk buckets 
and risk weights for sovereigns and banks based on Export Credit 
Agency (ECA) risk scores. Operational risk charge 15 percent of 
annual gross income. Pillars 2 and 3 applicable. 
 Assessments of external rating institutions. 
Credit Risk 2 
 
More risk buckets than Basel I.  
Risk weights for asset classes based on ratings of external credit 
assessment agencies (ECAIs) or ECA scores. Enhanced credit 
risk mitigation available. 
Ratings of ECAIs or classified rating agencies. 
Ability and capacity to qualify rating agencies 
and map agency scores 
Credit Risk 3 
Foundation Internal 
Ratings Based 
Approach (F-IRB) 
Based on risk components: probability of default (PD), loss given 
default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD), and maturity (M). 
Banks can use own PD estimates and supervisory estimates for 
other components. Stress testing required. 
Ability to assess banks' rating system design. 
Ability to validate banks' risk management and 
stress testing systems. 
Ability to provide supervisory estimates of LGD 
and EAD 
Credit Risk 4 
Advanced Internal 
Ratings Based 
Approach (A-IRB)  
Capital requirements determined as in F-IRB Banks can use own 
estimates for PD, LGD, EAD and M; subject to supervisory 
validation of systems. Stress testing required. 
Ability to assess banks' rating system design. 
Ability to validate banks' risk management and 
stress testing systems. 
Operational Risk 1 
Basic Indicator 
Approach 
Flat rate of 15 percent of gross annual income.   
Operational Risk 2 
Standardized 
Approach 
Operational risk charges for each business line, based on annual 
income per business line, multiplied by risk factor per business 
line. 
System to distinguish business lines and 
supervisory ability for validation of this system 
Data on operational risk occurrences and cost. 
Operational Risk 3 
Advanced 
Measurement 
Approach 
Full reliance on banks' internal risk measurement systems, 
subject to supervisory approval. 
Capacity for supervisory validation. 
Pillar 2: 
Supervisory 
Review Main Features Key Requirements 
  Banks have a process for assessing capital adequacy (ICAAP) 
and a strategy for maintaining capital level. Supervisors evaluate 
banks' internal capital adequacy systems and compliance. Higher 
capital adequacy levels for individual banks if risk profile 
requires. Early intervention by supervisors. Stress tests and 
Assessment of interest rate risk and concentration risk. 
Supervisory ability and capacity to make the 
necessary assessments. Internal risk rating 
system as tool for measuring and monitoring 
credit risks. 
 
Adequate legal and regulatory framework to take 
action. 
Pillar 3: Market 
discipline Main Features Key Requirements 
  Information to be disclosed includes: Available capital in 
the group, capital structure, detailed capital requirements 
for credit risk; Breakdown of asset classification and 
provisioning, Breakdown of portfolios according to risk 
buckets and risk components, Credit risk mitigation (CRM) 
methods and exposure covered by CRM, Operational risk. 
 
  
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Implementation of Basel II: Implications for the World Bank and 
the IMF, 2005 
 
 
 49
 50
                                                
 
The contents of the pillars are provided in Table 3.1 are as follows: Briefly, Pillar 1 
introduced a menu of options for assessing capital adequacy of banks from technically 
advanced options based on banks' internal risk management systems to simpler 
standardized approaches, representing a refinement of the Basel I. Pillar 2 necessitates 
an upgrading of supervisory practices to review banks' internal capital adequacy 
assessments, and Pillar 3 requires public disclosure of more information on banks' risk 
profile and risk management systems, thus supporting the functioning of market 
discipline.  
 
According to IMF, “the revised capital accord (Basel II)” represents a significant 
improvement over the 1988 accord, and its implementation should lead to enhanced 
financial stability through better risk management systems in banks, better banking 
supervision in member states, and improved market discipline”65. Basel II is in turn 
expected to stimulate better cross-border cooperation and exchange of information 
between home and host supervisors, in particular, when foreign subsidiaries 
occasionally operate under different regulatory systems. Basel II will also enforce a 
global standard for the capital adequacy ratio. The ratio retained the former definition 
of capital and the minimum 8% requirement in the numerator. In the denominator, the 
measures for credit risks are more complex than Basel I while market risk measurement 
remains the same. The integration of operational risk as part of the capital charge is 
perceived as the revolutionary part of the New Framework. To ensure that risks within 
the entire banking group are considered, the revised accord will be extended on a 
consolidated basis to holding companies of the banking groups.  
 
Beyond Pillar 1 that dealt with the risk quantification and its relevant reforms, an 
exceptional feature of the accord is merely on the supervisory side, where the tasks and 
role of supervisors are extended materially with Pillar 2. The close cooperation 
emphasized by Pillar 2 reflects more professionalism for the supervisory authorities, 
even much more than the current rule-makers even think. The new framework 
challenges not only the banking community through its options and alternatives, but 
also the market participants and the supervisors to be more proactive towards “risk 
sensitivity” through Pillar 3.  As revealed by Table 3.1, The Basel II capital adequacy 
rules are based on a "menu" approach. Banks and regulators are offered several distinct 
sets of options for banks for computing credit, market and operational risk capital 
charges. Since the scope of the thesis is the credit risk measurement under Basel II 
implementations, the market and operational risks will fall outside the scope and will 
not be examined. Clearly, the focus of Basel II is emphatically on the first pillar which 
lays out the rules for calculating the risk weights of all kinds of assets. The first pillar 
was also the basis of the 1988 accord. The revised framework provides a more 
elaborate calculation of the credit risks and provides banks to use either a Standardized 
Approach or an Internal Rating Based Approach (IRB). The thesis will explore these 
approaches in depth in the next sub-section.  
 
 
 
 
 
65 IMF: Public Information Notice No. 05/154, November 7, 2005.  
 
3.4.3.2 Pillar One: The New Approach to Credit Risk Measurement  
 
This sub-section will focus exclusively on credit risk measurement under Basel II, and 
is motivated by a desire to explain the new credit capital rules and to summarize the 
treatment of credit risk particularly under Pillar 1. Pillar 1 aims to provide increased 
risk sensitivity through more refined credit risk weightings under Standardized and 
Internal Rating Based approaches. 
 
The first feature of Pillar 1 is the intention to improve bank’s allocation of capital for 
credit risk by requiring relatively higher levels of capital for borrowers, which face 
higher levels of credit risk (obligor risk). In determining the capital level basically 
required for different levels of obligor risks, banks and their regulators may choose one 
of the three approaches (Standardized Approach and two Internal Rating Based 
Approaches) based on the sophistication of a bank’s risk management activities and the 
strengths of their internal controls. Under the Standardized Approach, banks engaging 
in less complex credit activities and with simpler control structures may use external 
measures of credit risk to assess the credit quality of their borrowers for regulatory 
capital purposes. Upon regulatory approval, banks tangibly engaged in more 
sophisticated risk taking activities, which have developed advanced risk measurement 
systems can choose IRB Approach. The IRB Approach, in turn, comprises of two 
different methodologies; the Foundation and the Advanced IRB, depending on the 
sophistication of risk management systems of the banks. Under an IRB Approach, 
banks rely mainly on their own measures of a borrower’s credit risk to determine their 
capital requirements, subject to strict data, validation and operational requirements. 
Whichever approach is selected, it is important to indicate that a bank must adopt the 
same approach on a consistent basis for all business lines globally.    
 
3.4.3.2.1 Standardized Approach 
 
This approach was originally introduced by the 1988 agreement for the determination 
of minimum capital requirements.  
 
Table 3.2: Credit Assessments and Risk Weights under Standardized Approach  
Obligor 
Type  
AAA to 
AA- 
A+ to 
A- 
BBB+ to 
BBB- BB+ to B- 
Below B- 
and past 
due 
claims 
Unrated 
 
Sovereign 
  
0% 
 
20% 
 
50% 
 
100% 
 
150% 
 
100% 
 
Bank 
 
Option 1 
 
20% 
 
50% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
150% 
 
100% 
Bank  Option 2 
 
20% 
 
50% 
 
50% 
 
100% 
 
150% 
 
50% 
Bank 
 
Option 2 
Short term 
 
20% 
 
20% 
 
20% 
 
50% 
 
150% 
 
20% 
 
Corporate 
AAA to 
AA- 
A+ to 
A- 
BBB+ to BB- Below 
BB- 
Unrated 
 
Corporate 
 
20% 
 
50% 
 
100% 
 
150% 
 
100% 
Regulatory Retail 
Portfolios 
 
75% 
 
Residential Mortgages 
 
35%, when past due 100% 
Commercial Real Estate  From 100% to 50%, upon discretion of the national authorities 
 
 Source: BCBS: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, June 2006. 
The new Standardized Approach directly aims to maintain greater sensitivity to the 
different credit risks generating from various “obligor” types by recognizing the 
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assessments of external rating institutions. Under this approach, ratings produced by 
authorized external rating agencies provide the basis for measuring the credit risk posed 
by a particular borrower. Thus, external rating agencies acquire further importance 
under the New Accord. The decision on whether an external rating agency is 
recognized as suitable for assigning regulatory risk weights is taken by the national 
supervisors.  
 
Under the Standardized Approach, the amount of capital basically required for a loan of 
100 USD granted to a corporate account on a “clean basis”, with no specific collateral, 
might drop to 1.6 dollars or increase upto 12 US dollars, depending on the rating 
assignment  of the obligor. The Basel committee decided to implement the revised 
method in a matrix of rating and obligor types. Although the table may appear a bit 
confusing, at first glance, rows address the obligor types and columns show the rating 
classifications. Moreover, OECD membership will not any longer be a subject of 
reference for preferential risk weighting, which was the case in Basel I. As a 
consequence, claims on sovereigns that are weighted with 0%, may go up to 150%. In 
other words, the credit quality assessment by ratings determines the risk weighting in 
contrast to the simplistic and inappropriate determination by OECD membership in 
Basel I. 
 
Regarding the bank debt, the Standardized Approach provides two choices. Option 1 as 
depicted at Table 3.2, the risk weight of a bank is based on the rating of the country in 
which the bank is incorporated or Option 2, risk weight is based on the bank’s own 
external rating. Under Option 1, banks are assigned a risk weight one notch less 
favorable than the one assigned to claims on the sovereign. Under Option 2, the bank 
has the possibility to receive a more favorable weighting in comparison to the one 
assigned to the sovereign issuer, though the risk weighting can not fall short of 20%. 
Furthermore, short-term claims with maturity three months or less are to be assigned a 
preferential risk weight within certain limits. The national supervisors are in charge of 
determining the viable options applicable to banks in their jurisdiction. 
 
Corporate debt, including insurance companies, is to be weighted depending on their 
risk rating. For this purpose, three new risk weight categories are introduced for 
corporates; 20%, 50% and 150%. As before, claims on unrated corporate debt are to be 
given a risk weight of 100%. Companies with a weak rating of B+ or lower face a 
higher risk weight of 150%. This implies that it is preferable not to have “any rating” 
than having a bad one. At national discretion, all corporate claims may be risk weighted 
at 100% without regard to external ratings by permission of the supervisors. Where this 
discretion is exercised the banks are obliged either to use ratings wherever available or 
not at all.   
 
Retail credit is defined as all claims to individual persons or small businesses with 
maximum exposure up to EUR 1 million, and the portfolio must be sufficiently 
diversified. As far as the granularity is concerned, Basel Committee imposes 
supervisors to establish a numerical limit that no gross amount of all forms of debt 
exposures to one counterpart (i.e. one or several entities that maybe considered as a 
single beneficiary) can exceed 0.2% of the overall regulatory retail portfolio. Such 
claims may be risk weighted at 75% except for past due loans. National supervisors 
may raise this risk weight when default rates, liquidity conditions or any other specific 
conditions justify an increase. 
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It is commonly verified that residential mortgage lending is relatively low risk. Basel II 
recognizes the relatively lower risk profile of fully residential mortgage lending by 
assigning it a risk weight of 35%, compared to a current risk weight of 50% for 
residential mortgages. However, in applying the 35% weight, supervisory authorities 
should imply strict valuation rules. The recent sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US may 
change the sentiment on the lower risk profile of this debt type and imply higher risk 
weights in the future. Currently, strict valuation rules implied by the national 
supervisors appear to be the “must” covenant when assigning risk weights to residential 
mortgages.  
 
Based on the experience in numerous countries, the Basel Committee regards 
commercial real estate lending as significantly riskier than residential mortgage 
lending, thus, these loans will generally not benefit from such a preferential risk weight. 
The Basel Committee believes that the type of mortgages on commercial real estate 
does not, in principle, justify (anything) other than a 100% weighting. However, a 50% 
risk weighting may be applied at national discretion subject to a number of conditions 
on loan-to-value ratios and historical loss rates66.  
 
Apart from the risk weightings, Basel II has enhanced the risk sensitivity of the 
Standardized Approach substantially through credit risk mitigation techniques. The first 
Accord only recognized cash and government securities as collateral, but there has been 
a wide expansion of the range of collateral eligible for credit risk mitigation, such as 
guarantees and credit derivatives, which are capable of reducing the capital charges in 
the New Accord. In the New Accord, the collateralization techniques and the conditions 
for the recognition of individual types of collateral have been elaborated in more detail 
for each method, in order to enable banks to reduce their capital requirements. Banks 
can choose between two recognition methods for financial collateral as follows:  
 
1. Financial Collateral - Simple Method 
 
The risk weighting of the collateral is substituted for the risk weighting of the 
counter party for the collateralized portion of the exposure (subject to a floor of 
20% except in strictly defined cases). Unlike the comprehensive method, the 
collateral must be pledged for at least the life of the exposure and it must be 
revalued at least every six months. The uncollateralized portion of the exposure is 
assigned the risk weight appropriate to the counterparty. This method may not be 
used when the IRB Approach is applied or for instruments in the trading book.  
 
2. Financial Collateral - Comprehensive Method 
 
The eligible collateral is greater in scope than under the simple method. Banks 
calculate the exposure adjusted for collateral using either their own internal 
estimates, which are subject to approval by the supervisory authority, or regulatory 
treatment of volatility. The comprehensive method allows a reduction in the 
effective exposure of the original claim depending on haircuts that increase the 
nominal value of the original claim and decrease the value of the collateral.  
 
66 Commercial real estate loans could get a preferential risk weight of 50%, if there exists well-developed and long-established 
markets, for the tranche of the loan does not exceed the lower of 50% of the market value or 60% of the mortgage lending value. 
 
In summary, the New Accord takes into account the credit quality of the obligors when 
assigning the risk weights and provides a more risk sensitive capital figure than the 
original Accord. It also allows for capital relief when appropriate collateralization is in 
place. To reiterate, this Approach can be applicable for institutions with simpler 
internal controls and less complex lending and investment activities.   
 
3.4.3.2.2 Internal Rating Based Approach 
 
By definition, internal rating estimates are key summary indicators of the risk inherent 
in an individual transaction. Internal rating estimates typically embody an assessment 
of the risk of loss in consequence of the default of counterparty, based on relevant 
quantitative and qualitative factors. The two main principles behind the IRB Approach 
are the use of banks’ own information about the credit quality of their assets and the 
application of international best practices in risk measurement techniques. This 
contrasts with the first accord and the Standardized Approach under Basel II, which 
entirely rely upon supervisory inputs to determine the capital requirement. Under the 
IRB Approach, banks must categorize banking book transactions into six broad classes 
of assets with different underlying risk characteristics; corporate, sovereign, bank, 
retail, equity, and additional classes for securitization exposures and eligible purchased 
receivables. Within the corporate and the retail segments, further sub-classes of 
different facility types are identified. The identified facility types consist of project 
finance; asset backed lending, commodity finance, income producing residential 
finance and commercial real estate lending facilities. 
  
Figure 3.7: Calculation of Capital charge under IRB 
 
Exposure Risk weight 8% Capital charge x x =
EAD LGD 8% Capital charge 
x x =
BRW M Granularity
x x +/- 
Calculation of capital charge under IRB-
Current Calculation of Capital Charge 
PD
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 PD 
PD: Probability of 
default 
EAD: Exposure at 
Foundation and 
Advanced 
default 
M: Maturity 
BRW: Benchmark risk weight 
 
Note: Granularity is assumed zero concentration 
under Pillar 1. SREP may charge +/- for 
concentration risk. 
SSource: PriceWaterhouse Coopers 
Figure 3.7 compares the formulas of risk weights under alternative capital charge 
calculation methods. The transition from the Standardized approach to IRB is 
represented by the arrows. The IRB capital charge formula derives risk weights form a 
continuous function based on the obligor’s asset class type. For each of the asset 
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classes, there are three key risk components to be calculated. These risk components 
are then used as inputs into risk-weight functions for each of the asset classes to 
produce capital requirements for the unexpected loss portion of the total loss. The three 
main features of IRB approach may be defined as follows: 
 
1. Risk Components as Inputs for Risk Weight Functions 
 
Internal or supervisory estimates of risk factors such as the probability of default 
(PD), Loss Given Default (LGD), Exposure at Default (EAD), Maturity (M) are 
inputs to the capital calculations. Everything else being equal, higher values for PD, 
LGD, EAD, and M lead to higher capital requirements (and vice versa). At the most 
advanced form, banks will calculate all of the inputs based on internal bank data. 
Granularity is a risk measure indicating the credit concentrations at portfolio level. 
Capital calculations under the New Accord assume a portfolio has an infinite 
granularity, i.e. a “nil concentration”. Later in revised Pillar 2 considerations, 
concentration risks are highlighted as part of the supervisory process. 
 
2. Risk Weight Functions 
 
The means by which the risk components for specific exposures are transformed 
into risk weighted assets. These are determined by national supervisors and 
guidelines are set out in the New Accord. 
 
3. Minimum Requirements: 
 
The minimum requirements covering issues such as governance, independent 
review and data quality must be met in order to apply for IRB for a given asset 
class. For many of the asset classes, the Committee has made available two broad 
approaches: a Foundation and an Advanced approaches. 
 
The striking point for the construction of the IRB Approach is the “Loan or Asset 
Classification System”. In this sense, the loan classification refers to the process banks 
use to review their loan portfolios and assign loans to categories or grades based on the 
perceived risk and other relevant characteristics of the loans67. The process of continual 
review and classification of loans enables banks to monitor the quality of their loan 
portfolios and when necessary take remedial action to counter deterioration in the credit 
quality of their portfolios. It is often necessary for banks to use more complex internal 
classification systems than the standardized systems that the regulators require for 
reporting purposes. The importance of loan classification was heightened with the 
introduction of the 1988 accord and the new capital accord will be likely to be a 
catalyst towards better classification regime, as banks will be required to implement 
systems that separate loans into categories based on internal rating scales. 
 
Ratings embody an assessment of the risk of loss due to default of the counterparty, 
based on consideration of relevant quantitative and qualitative information. Credit 
ratings indicate the current opinion on an obligor’s overall capacity to meet its financial 
obligations. The objective of a rating system is to establish a uniform method of 
 
67 Laurin, A. / Majnoni, G.: Bank Loan Classification and Provisioning Practices in Selected Developed and Emerging Countries, 
The World Bank, 2003, pp.1- 50. 
evaluating the quality of a specific customer. On an aggregated basis, it is then possible 
to get a view of the overall quality of the bank's credit portfolio at any given time as 
well as to establish credit quality trends over time regarding the portfolio. The credit 
ratings can be used to prepare senior management reports at different categories, such 
as performance by unit, country, region and business line. Credit ratings are used as a 
tool to provide management with timely assessment of the overall quality of the credit 
portfolio which can be used for controlling, monitoring and strategic purposes. 
Therefore, a proper classification of rating scales is of utmost importance. The 
assessment of the obligor’s creditworthiness influences also the decision on the 
required credit pricing. The rating indicates also the frequency and intensity of control 
and monitoring of facilities. It helps to deploy resources where it is mostly needed, 
which increases the efficiency and effectiveness of the review process when thousands 
of credits are concerned as part of bank’s core business.   
 
An internal model under IRB Approach can generate a corporate score on a numeric 
scale from a range between 0 and 100. Please refer to the Table 3.3 for a sample 
illustration. This score defines an initial counterparty rating as shown in the table below 
based on quantitative analysis. The next step in determining the final obligor rating is 
an assessment of certain additional qualitative elements that include factors such as 
quality of management, possible contingencies, support provided by shareholders, other 
factors like specific local aspects or prospective repayment capacity. The results of the 
qualitative factors may lead to certain adjustments to the initial obligor rating. 
Adjustments are made by determining a number of rating notches that are added up or 
subtracted from the initial rating. 
 
Table 3.3: Mapping of the Uniform Credit Rating Scale 
Internal Code Description Corporate Score Public Rating Reference
0 Interbank Risk Not applicable Not applicable 
1 Prime / very strong 92.9 – 85.8 AA- or better 
2 Strong 85.7 – 71.6 A+, A, A- 
3+ Acceptable – High 71.5 – 67.5 BBB+ 
3 Acceptable 67.4 – 62.4 BBB 
3- Acceptable – Low 62.3 – 57.3 BBB- 
4+ Watch – High 57.2 – 53.2 BB+ 
4 Watch 53.1 – 48.1 BB 
4- Watch – Low 48.0 – 43.0 BB- 
5+ Weak – High 42.9 - 38.9 B+ 
5 Weak – Low 38.8 – 33.8 B 
5- Special Mention 33.7 – 28.7 B- 
6 Doubtful 28.6 – 14.4 CCC / CC 
7 Loss 14.3 – 7.1 C / D 
X Not rated Not applicable Not applicable 
  
Source: Sounders, A. / Alleni L.: Credit Risk Measurement, 2002, p.16. 
 
Under both Foundation and Advanced IRB, banks supply their own PDs into the 
formulae for calculating risk weights. Basel II requires a history of minimum 5 years of 
default data when estimating the PDs. The key difference between Foundation and 
Advanced IRB is that banks rely on supervisory estimates of LGD and EAD in the 
foundation approach. The LGD parameters (and therefore capital requirements) can be 
reduced by mitigation with financial collateral and several types of physical collateral 
in the foundation approach. The maturity (M) is set at two and a half years except for 
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Repo type transactions under foundation IRB. Table 3.4 provides a map consisting of 
all the input variables and basic comparisons to capital adequacy calculation methods.  
 
Table 3.4: Summary of Capital Assessment Methodologies and Risk Factors 
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Source: Deloitte & Touch 
Two other risk factors that are not presented on the above matrix for Pillar 1 standards 
are the granularity and correlation factors. Again, these will be dealt within Pillar 2 
considerations under the domain of supervisory review process. These variables are 
determined by the supervisors and banks are not in any position to change those 
supervisory figures. Under the foundation IRB, LGD is fixed at 45% for all 
unsubordinated and unsecured exposures. Such value is increased to 75% for 
subordinated loans, but can be reduced down to 0% by the existence of adequate 
collateral and the haircuts.68 There are three other types of collateral, which are 
accepted; trade receivables, real estate properties both being residential and commercial 
and other collaterals such as machinery and equipment. 
 
Under advanced IRB, banks estimate PD, LGD, EAD and M internally. Estimation of 
these parameters is based on the banks’ own data and is subject to strict qualifying 
criteria. The actual value of these parameters depends on the specific practices at banks 
for using risk mitigation and handling of bad loans. The absence of limitations 
regarding the use of any physical collateral to mitigate credit risk (and therefore to 
reduce capital requirements) is a notable development and a considerable inducement 
for banks to use the advanced IRB. The historical data required for the estimation of 
LGD and EAD is a minimum of 7 years. Similar to foundation IRB, the historical data 
requirement for PD is a minimum of 5 years.  
  
With the Standardized Approach, the minimum capital associated with an exposure is 
simply 8% of risk-weighted assets, where the weighting is to be carried out subject to 
the system described in 3.4.3.2.1 Standardized Approach. In the absence of local rating 
agencies in Turkey, the application of Standardized method remains ambiguous. “To 
Rate or not to Rate” is the question that all relevant parties should ask in Turkey for the 
implementation of Basel II, Pillar 1 Standardized Approach.  
 
The IRB method, on the other hand, relies on a more complex mechanism for 
transforming the major risk factors of a facility into the capital calculations. In this 
                                                 
68 Resti / Sironi (2007, p. 601) 
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context, further work and progress are needed on a number of key issues that have 
emerged as potentially important in developing an IRB approach.  
 
For example, there is not any single benchmark for the design and operation of an 
internal rating system, which makes the implementation and supervision of candidate 
bank systems difficult. In addition, measurement uncertainties represent a significant 
source of inconsistency and/or quantification error that will need to be considered 
explicitly in an IRB framework. There appears to be a relatively limited set of data 
sources and techniques available to banks in estimating loss characteristics (e.g., the 
likelihood that a borrower in a given grade will default on their obligations, the 
economic loss likely to be experienced should such a default occur, and associated 
parameters such as the likely level of exposure to that borrower at the time of such 
default). Moreover, these data sources appear to have potentially significant 
inconsistencies with each other. As a result, variation among sources and techniques 
wind up in variation among capital charges associated with each bucket based on 
estimates of its relative riskiness. Additionally, the IRB should be an integral part of 
business and risk management decisions and bounded in the risk management culture 
of a bank (use-test proof)69. The use test will be analyzed in detail during Pillar 2 
discussions in sub-section 3.4.3.3 of this chapter.  
 
Finally, there are minimum standards and sound practice guidelines required for key 
elements of the rating process, including key characteristics of the rating system 
construction. A supervisory process for validation, including ways of ensuring that a 
rating reflects all relevant information on the underlying risk of an exposure, that the 
process by which it is assigned ensures its integrity, and that the underlying measures of 
loss are consistent and comparable across banking institutions, countries, and over 
time70. 
 
3.4.3.3 Pillar Two: Role of the Supervision 
 
The banking supervision is not an exact science, but merely a way of art. The art of 
Pillar 2 is summarized under two mutually reinforcing processes. The second pillar sets 
out fundamental principles for the overall supervision and its two main complementary 
elements: the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) - which is the 
banks' own evaluation of their capital needs - and the Supervisory Review and 
Evaluation Process - the supervisors' process (SREP) to evaluate banks. The 
Supervisory Review Process of the new framework is intended not only to ensure that 
banks have identified risks in Pillar 1 and consecutive risks identified in Pillar 2, but 
also to mobilize an internal capital assessment process to support the capital level 
against the risk profile inherent in their business. According to Bafin, the main aim of 
the supervisory review process can be summarized as “Banks are to be encouraged to 
continuously improve their internal procedures for assessing their institute-specific risk 
situation and the adequacy of their capital. The same applies to the ongoing adjustment 
and further development of new methods of risk management and internal control”.71 
 
69 Hills, S. / Barrett, R.: Explaining the Credit Risk Elements in Basel II. In: The Basel Handbook, 2007, p.55. 
70 BCBS, Range of Practice in Banks’ Internal Ratings Systems, A discussion paper by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, Basel, January 2000. 
71 http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_basel_saeule2.en.php. Please refer to circular 18/2005 of Bafin, 
Minimum Requirements for Risk Management MaRisk for details. 
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Similarly, the Committee for Banking Supervisor’s (CEBS) consultation document for 
SREP stresses that “Institutions should ‘own’, develop and manage their risk 
management processes; The ICAAP belongs to the institution and supervisors should 
not dictate how it is applied. The task of the supervisory authority is to review and 
evaluate the ICAAP and the soundness of the internal processes within which it is 
used”72. How the art is technically exercised, is left to the discretions of banking 
institution itself. 
 
Pillar 2 also encourages banks to develop and use better risk management techniques 
and systems in monitoring and managing risks. Within the Pillar 2, the triangle that 
exist between the initial capital, the potential and actual risks taken and the probability 
of the bank being forced to default, is constantly measured and evaluated. The resulting 
“economic capital” in this sense, is one of the most important risk metrics, which 
provides us a unifying framework to translate all risks into a single metric73. This 
essential attribute, namely the redefinition of capital in this way, reflects one of the 
major differentiations of the new accord against its predecessor. Furthermore, in 
implementing the new framework, the communication between the home and host 
country supervisors are especially encouraged in order to reduce the compliance burden 
and to avoid the regulatory arbitrage. In general, banks should take account of the true 
economic nature of transactions in the determination of strong capital adequacy 
globally. On the other hand, it is the duty of the national supervisors on bank vigilance 
when determining capital adequacy.  
 
Under Pillar 2, supervision begins at licensing with an assessment of a bank’s integrity, 
skills and financial strength to ensure the safety and soundness of all authorized 
financial institutions. “This involves a determination of the adequacy of capital ...so as 
to minimize the chances of failure”74. It is then extended to the supervisory revision and 
evaluation process (SREP). The supervisory revision process recognizes the 
responsibility of the board and senior management in developing an internal capital 
assessment process, which should be in line with the bank’s risk profile as quantified in 
Pillar 1. In the new framework, the bank management bears the primary responsibility 
to ensure a framework for assessing the various risks. They should also be in a position 
for developing a system to relate risks of the bank to a certain capital level and establish 
a method for monitoring the compliance with internal policies. This process is 
cemented with the capital level maintenance strategy, which is referred as Internal 
Capital Adequacy Assessment Process. The SREP essentially reviews and evaluates the 
ICAAP and the risk profiles from the supervisory point of view and takes prompt 
corrective actions if necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 CEBS: Consultation Paper Application of the Supervisory Review Process under Pillar 2, 2005 
73 Marrison, Ch.: The Fundamentals of Risk Measurement, p. 16, 2002. 
74 Hayvard, P.: The Financial Sector – The Responsibilities of the Public Agencies. In: Enoch (et al.): Building Strong Banks, 
International Monetary Fund, 2002, p. 187. 
Figure 3.8: Supervisory Review Process75 
 
Source: Committee for European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) 
As depicted by the CEBS in the above diagram, two integrated sub-processes; ICAAP 
and SREP both should be integrated into the strategic management of a bank. 
Especially, the coordination needed among the two pertinent processes and the dialogue 
required between their respective owners, namely the bank management and the 
supervisors are impressive. In practice, they are closely intertwined requiring extensive 
interaction among all parties. Pillar 2 aims to ensure that the necessary dialogue and 
feedback mechanism are in place. Further clarification and guidance will still be needed 
to ensure the soundness of this mechanism. 
 
3.4.3.3.1 Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) 
 
By definition the ICAAP is comprised of a bank’s procedures and measures designed to 
ensure the following: 
 
1. The appropriate identification and measurement of risks. 
2. Derivation of an appropriate level of internal capital in relation to the bank’s 
risk profile. 
3. The application and development of suitable risk management systems. 
 
As shown in Figure 3.9, the Risk Management Process (RMP) during ICAAP can be 
subdivided into five stages76. The purpose of the initial stage in the RMP is to record in 
a structured way as many risks as possible. Next is to find and define suitable risk 
measurement methods for the risks. In the process of identifying risks, the banks should 
also define the data types and how data supports the measurement process. The second 
stage in the ICAAP is the quantification of risks. Without risk quantification, the bank 
                                                 
75 CEBS, Consultation Paper, Application of the Supervisory Review Process under Pillar 2, 2005 
76 ONB: Guidelines on Bank-Wide Risk Management Process, Internal Capital Adequacy Process, 2006, p. 68. 
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cannot define its risk-bearing capacity and control. Once the risks are quantified, they 
have to be aggregated to determine the bank’s overall risk in the ICAAP. The ex ante 
control of risks are done via operational limit and pricing systems, while the ex post 
control is done via continuous ICAAP reporting systems. The bank’s risks have to be 
brought into line with its risk targets and preferences. Accordingly, the risks may be 
mitigated, transferred or reallocated. At the end, bank may be required to raise new 
capital based on the outcome of SREP. 
Figure 3.9: Stages of the Integrated ICAAP 
Source: Oesterreichische National Bank 
Once all material risks have been identified, evaluated and aggregated to yield the 
bank’s consolidated risk position, the challenge arises as to what amount and what type 
of coverage capital is available to service the risk appetite. Specifically, core capital, 
sustainable reserves including the hidden ones and supplementary capital should 
entirely be available. In particular, certain components of Tier 2 capital (liability 
reserves, provisions, supplementary capital or subordinated debt) and of Tier 3 capital 
should be analyzed carefully. It is the bank’s responsibility to identify and categorize its 
individual types of coverage capital. The coverage capital should be allocated to 
business units through assigned limits. A limit system per business unit is an important 
prerequisite for maintaining risk-bearing capacity. Not surprisingly, ICAAP will be one 
of the core elements of business strategy with a wide array of consequences on day-to-
day capital management decisions, which need to be backed up by internal governance. 
ICAAP is not meant to suggest that existing mechanisms, which have formally met the 
fundamental needs of institutions over the years, necessarily need to be replaced. 
However, adequate processes need to be in place to ensure ICAAP, such that ICAAP is 
embedded in the institution’s business and organizational processes. ICAAP should not 
simply be regarded as an add-on that permits both supervisory and management 
functions to ‘tick a box’ and indicate that supervisory expectations nominally have been 
met.  
 
Besides there are critical success factors in ICAAP implementation which are quite 
crucial. For example, early detection of requirements of Pillar 2 with respect to internal 
risks management system. This means that a bank should make efforts to detect gaps in 
its fulfillment of requirements as early as possible regardless of the timing of Basel II. 
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Determining the requirements and closing the gaps will definitely help to increase the 
risk-bearing capacity of the bank. 
 
Furthermore, the bank should determine the methods and procedures which best suit its 
needs, as these determine the validity of ICAAP as well as the required implementation 
resources. Consequently, bank should develop a master implementation plan, which 
covers planning, budgeting and prioritizing of all ICAAP implementation tasks. Once 
the plan reaches a certain scale, then detailed project plans should emerge out of the 
needs and demands for other risk types. 
 
The need for ICAAP and its benefits for the bank should be communicated to all levels 
of a bank. The client, product and risk management groups should be indoctrinated with 
the upcoming concepts such as risk adjusted capital or portfolio management concepts. 
ICAAP process is highly resource intensive and needs extra know-how that may not be 
available internally. Resource requirements will depend on the bank’s size and risk 
profile and educational requirements vary as with bank profiles. 
 
ICAAP also demands huge amounts of data and challenges the interconnected IT 
system of a bank considerably. Furthermore, it may require additional risk management 
systems, which bank is not accustomed to before and integration with external provider 
systems needs to be considered and explained in detail77. 
 
The overall responsibility for the ICAAP lies with the board of the bank, which means 
that the senior management will design the ICAAP with risk management function 
providing significant input and insight over the risk profile of the bank and the resultant 
capital. It is important to note that independent view during the ICAAP will be crucial, 
either by internal audit or external consultants. ICAAP is sponsored by the supervisors 
such that it promotes further discussions between the board members and the risk 
management as well as other functions at the bank. It should not simply be regarded as 
a board approval of the capital. Rather, the board is widely expected and required to 
understand and challenge whether all risks are material, how they are measured, 
managed and mitigated.  
 
For non-Pillar 1 type of risks, which are difficult to quantify or model, e.g. reputation, 
liquidity or strategic risk, ICAAP should ensure that there is sufficient management 
oversight, contingency planning and stress-testing at the bank for the prevention of such 
risks. If necessary, boundaries with other risks should be drawn for those risks.  
For example, bank can identify what portion of reputation risk is operational risk. 
Residual risk can then be managed through contingency planning.  
 
While most banks model the liquidity risks with advanced technologies, they would not 
necessarily hold capital for the liquidity risk. Although lack of capital may cause a 
liquidity problem at the bank, a lack of liquidity can not be solved with capital. Hence, 
most institutions do not allocate capital for liquidity risks. Again, this does not mean 
that ICAAP should ignore the contingency planning and stress-testing that is critical in 
understanding and managing liquidity risks.   
 
 
77 ONB (2006, p. 80) 
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Regarding the strategic risks, banks should consider when business risk ends, and 
strategic risk starts. Sound strategic planning process with good management oversight 
can be used as first line of defense for such risks. Hence, such planning process should 
be included in the bank’s ICAAP.  
 
Furthermore, ICAAP will determine the powerful effectiveness of the Basel II 
implementation at the bank through “use tests”. The typical “use test” candidates will 
involve the monitoring and capital management functions on business units and the 
group level. In addition, further use tests can be extended to the strategic planning and 
budgeting functions as well as performance measurement. Sometimes, the involvement 
of investor relations and pricing departments can be requested at use tests. The key aim 
is to foster a proactive risk management culture at all levels of the bank.  
 
Quantitative capital assessment is an important part of ICAAP. However, when capital 
is not the best mitigant for certain types of risks, control and contingency processes 
need to be well documented in ICAAP. Senior management and board involvement and 
challenge ensure an effective ICAAP. Insufficient controls over the ICAAP (for 
example, insufficient evidence at use test) could lead to capital add-ons during the 
SREP. Therefore, a bank’s risk culture and processes are as important as the 
sophistication of its capital model. In the next sub-section, the thesis will examine the 
supervisory review and evaluation process, which is complimentary to the ICAAP. 
 
3.4.3.3.2 Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) 
 
The new supervisory framework proposed by Basel II is not aiming to speculate on the 
increased level of capital, if and when the risks of a bank increase disproportionately. In 
contrary, it deploys means to deal with increased volatility and risky exposure types, 
namely the measures such as strengthening risk management, improving the limit- and 
risk systems, better provisioning policies combined with more efficient internal control 
mechanisms. Furthermore, the Basel committee is of the opinion that “capital only 
solution” or capital as the only risk metric can not replace fundamentally inadequate 
risk management processes in a bank, where the top management should always be 
aware of increasing risk profile of the bank, including awareness of risks that are not 
quantifiable by a capital measure. 
 
The sprit of Pillar 2 is the assessment and treatment of risks that are not fully captured 
by the Pillar 1.78 Material factors, such as liquidity, concentration, business, strategic 
and reputation risks can be external to the bank (e.g. business cycle effects) and these 
factors should be captured by the supervisory review and evaluation process proposed 
in Pillar 2. For example, non-Pillar 1 type of residual risks, such as litigation, guarantor 
and documentation risks need to be evaluated in Pillar 2 supervisory process.79 
Supervisors must ensure that all disclosure requirements with respect to Pillar 3 are 
being met on a continuous basis. As part of the supervisory review, the credit risk 
mitigation techniques and policies should be carefully documented to the satisfaction of 
supervisors. A special emphasis is given in Pillar 2 for the execution of “Core 
Principles of Supervision”, which became the minimum standards of supervision since 
1997 with regards to the operational and credit risk management issues. 
 
78 BCBS: (2006, parag. 724.) 
79 BCBS (2006, parag.  767) 
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In its emphasis of risks, Pillar 2 overcomes a substantial limitation of the 1988 accord, 
which barely distinguished between high- and low-risk transactions. With Pillar 2, the 
new accord introduces a more economic assessment of the regulatory capital. That is, it 
enables banks to determine capital adequacy based on the level of risk posed by a 
transaction. The definition of capital is the amount set aside as a buffer against potential 
losses inherent in a particular business activity given a certain confidence interval.  
 
The result of SERP leads to the following financial descriptions of banks; 1) Well 
Capitalized, 2) Undercapitalized, 3) Significantly Undercapitalized, and 4) critically 
Undercapitalized (2% equity to RWA ratio)80. The regulators are required to place the 
institution into a prompt corrective action.  
 
Basel committee is of the opinion that some “discretionary” elements in the supervision 
are inevitable. This refers that excessive capital requirements may be set above the 
regulatory upper bound for specific banks in consequence of the exceptional conditions. 
Such discretion will be highly critical for emerging or transition economies in terms of 
sustaining sound and stable financial markets and the thesis will discuss the national 
supervisory elements in Turkey in the next sub-section of this chapter. 
 
For example, in the UK, the FSA has stated that, “They normally expect Pillar 1 
capital to be sufficient to well-diversified banks. Additional capital may be needed in 
Pillar 2 for lack of diversification and inefficiencies of Pillar 1 processes”81.  
 
 In a sense, national supervisors may increase capital (e.g. regulatory capital equals 
Pillar 1 capital plus X) at their discretion, if banks are unable to prove their case for 
diversification benefits and efficiency of their internal processes. Moreover, UK FSA 
also stated that the link between Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 must be sound while Pillar 2 
should be forward-looking and linked closely with business growth plans and risk 
appetite changes. Respectively, unambiguous stress-testing protocols are paramount 
and these must be supported by robust business rationales.  
 
In addition, national supervisors will be looking to assess the banks in their ability to 
identify the nature of each risk, explain the ways to quantify and mitigate such risks and 
carefully apply best practice in doing so. Strikingly, peer comparison can be, as stated 
by the UK FSA, used as one review tool and particularly, to assess practices at the bank 
are reasonable.  It is possible that less than best practice can be penalized during SREP 
and hence additional capital charges may be applied by the supervisors. Indeed, the 
increased competition among peers to set the best practice will likely lead to effective 
oversight and governance at banks and promotes a more proactive risk management 
culture from the board to risk managers and credit officers.  
 
Basel committee in a recent study stated that concentration risk (which is assumed zero 
in Pillar 1) may increase capital requirements up to 50%82. Concentration risk has been 
one of the major contributors to banking distress because correlation exists among 
assets in the portfolio. Supervisors will review the adequacy of banks’ systems and 
 
80 Kaufmann, G.: The Roar that Moused. In: Gup, B, E. (ed.): The New Basel Capital Accord, 2004, p. 45. 
81 UK Financial Services Authority, “Our Pillar 2 Framework”, May 2007. 
82  BIS Working Paper 15, November 2006. 
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approaches, in measuring correlation risks. Traditionally, the limit systems of the banks 
apparently are not driven by considerations relating to concentration risk. Under Pillar 
2, the limit system of the bank needs to adequately take into account concentration 
effects. During SREP, banks need to prove that they do possess sufficient processes and 
methodologies in place and able to materially capture and mitigate concentration risks. 
In sum, the regulatory capital may be equal to Pillar 1 plus Pillar 2 capital, which will 
be the result of the SREP. Interestingly, banks’ efforts have mostly been towards 
minimum requirements under Pillar 1, although Pillar 2 may promise further capital 
charges to banks.   
 
3.4.3.3.3 Banking Supervision in Turkey 
 
“Government collapses are rare. Bank collapses are not”83. This statement reflects the 
general attitude of the domestic market practitioners in the wake of year 2000, and the 
financial stability therefore was largely a matter of convention between the 
governmental agencies and the market participants. Consequently, a fundamental task 
of the monetary authorities was to ensure that convention is stable and should sustain 
confidence in the functioning of the under developed financial markets. This 
convention was also based on the “unlimited” provision of government guarantee for 
the deposits of the banks and the bank owners knew that the influential authorities 
would always bail them out to stop bank failures. This policy inflicted intolerable 
damage to the economy and to the financial system as a whole and the supervision was 
resilient to the existence of moral hazard problems. Until the establishment of BRSA by 
the year 2000 in Turkey, the power to supervise and regulate the banks were shared 
between the CBOT and the UT, which were officially reporting to the Ministry of State. 
Upon the decision by the Minister of the State, the central bank could have taken 
corrective actions with respect to the irregularities detected in liquidity, capital 
adequacy, and in group lending practices of the audited banks. Mostly, the Minister of 
State would not even take the necessary steps or decisions to use disciplinary 
enforcements or take “prompt corrective actions” against such powerful groups of the 
private banks, which held wide influence over the public opinion through their media 
companies. The main concern was not the safety and soundness of the Turkish banking 
system, but it was more on that of getting the “support of the arms-length groups” to 
stay in power. Disciplinary enforcements and corrective actions meant loosing political 
power at times of elections.   
 
Before the establishment of the BRSA, the Minister of Councils licensed the start-up of 
several infant banks just 10 days before the election of 1992. At the same period, 
twelve other banks applied to the Treasury for the start-up licenses but their application 
was not taken into consideration. This sort of arbitrary decision to give licenses for the 
start-up banks was accustomed during other interim administrations. Banks with 
inadequate capital which gained strength from the interim administrations did not care 
about the risks of banking business. Rather, the owners of such banks found the 
dominant interest in the misuse of customer savings accounts. Nonetheless, the problem 
was how to harness and divert the public funds to the “creative powers” of their own 
industrial groups, without paying any costs for self-destruction.  Important political 
figures in the administrations and high ranked officials took their contributions in the 
holding companies directly or indirectly from the speculations. As the financial system 
collapsed and the scale of the losses spread from the banking system to corporations, 
“something had to be done”. With the formation of Banking Regulatory and 
Supervisory Agency (BRSA) in September 2000 as the main prudential regulatory and 
 
83 Eatwell, J. / Taylor, L.: Global Finance at Risk – The Case for International Regulation, 2002, p. 11. 
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supervisory body, it started a vigilant capital adequacy assessment process. This was 
consisting of a three-phase-audit program. According to this audit-program, 
independent audit institutions carried out the first and second phases, and the final 
evaluation was performed by the BRSA.  
 
The first audit worked along the joint obligation for banks to prepare supplementary 
reporting schedules within the framework of detailed instructions by the BRSA. 
Instructions for preparing the supplementary reporting schedules and statements are 
focused on four areas; 1) Capital adequacy, 2) Credit portfolio and Counterpart Risk, 3) 
Risk groups to which the bank owns “structured transactions” and 4) Other income 
recognition issues84. 
 
The independent auditing institutions that carried out the first phase of the audit must, 
in addition to auditing the financial statements, examine the supplementary reporting 
schedules prepared by the banks. Banks retained their responsibilities to supply 
consistent and accurate information.  The independent auditing institution is held 
responsible for their reporting on whether the bank schedules are consistent and 
accurate, and supplying adjustments when necessary. These audits resulted in several 
findings of substantial offences that are carried out by the banks as follows:  
 
1. Allocation of loans to the related group companies. 
2. Distance to the normal course of banking activities. 
3. Excessive concentration of risks on related parties. 
4. Carrying on a regulated activity without authorization or exemption such as 
trading of t-bills without authorization. 
5. Providing false or misleading information to an auditor or the supervisory 
institutions. 
6. Reporting of materially misleading statements like reduced level of deposits or 
non-existing income or revenues. 
7. Concealing material facts with the intention of inducing another deal or in an 
investment. 
8. Acting intentionally to create a false or misleading impression as to the capital 
adequacy of the bank. 
 
The audit list of misconduct and fraudulent structures should have been much longer 
than outlined above. Just the unauthorized exercise of T-bills trading of a private bank 
at that time had resulted not only in huge negative shocks to the real economy and to 
the consumers, it was also accompanied by additional costs to the government in an 
amount of 2 billions USD. The mismanagement of risks combined with “under 
regulation” of those malpractices of the market players, even jeopardized the success of 
the IMF stabilization program. In the Turkish case, the regulators were running several 
steps behind the “creative structures” of market practitioners.  
 
However, the dividing line between the activities of the regulatory authorities and the 
unregulated activities of the market is not a fixed point, it is a pendulum85. The 
pendulum is now on the side of the regulators and the necessity for a Pillar 2 type of 
 
84 BRSA Recapitalization Reports, 2002. For Recapitalization of Banks in a systemic crisis, Enoch, Ch.: Recapitalizing Banks with 
Public Banks – Selected Issues, 2002, pp. 308-367. 
85 Eatwell, J. / Taylor, L.: Global Finance at Risk – The case for international regulation, 2000, p. 19. 
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supervisory review has been echoed in Turkey not only by the supervisory authorities, 
but more often by the market participants and business leaders that experienced the 
bitter consequences of 2000 and 2001 financial market crises. Effective supervision of 
banks’ risks and capital adequacy levels will not only enable a well-run financial 
market, but also the successful implementation of macro-economic and monetary 
policies. The new set of rules in Pillar 2 will enhance the risk measurement and 
management of banks, which not only foster the solidity and soundness of individual 
institutions, but also strengthen the stability of the whole banking system. In addition, 
the new capital requirements provide a unique window of opportunity to achieve 
increased convergence of national rules and practices when implementing the Pillar 2. 
However, this is not an easy task as cross-country differences in legal and 
administrative systems still exist, which means that supervisory practices will not 
converge over night. But something must be done and the immediate answer lies on the 
side of the Pillar 3 of the framework. With enhanced volume of market disclosure 
requirements, it is hoped that the market participants will be able to rule the fraudulent 
banks out of the system, take actions against common market abuse and financial 
crime. In the next sub-section, the thesis will pinpoint the requirements under Pillar 3 
and elaborate on its effects over existing fraudulent banking practices in Turkey. 
 
3.4.3.4 Pillar Three: Discipline of the Market 
 
Pillar 3 is complimentary to the minimum requirements of Pillar 1 and the supervisory 
review process of Pillar 2. Basel committee aims to encourage market discipline by 
developing a set of disclosure requirements which will allow market participants to 
assess the capital structure, risk exposures (credit, market, operational, equity and 
interest), risk assessment processes, and hence the capital adequacy of the institution. 
The committee proposed six disclosures in three broad areas: 1) Capital, 2) Risk 
exposure and 3) Capital adequacy. The recommendations were as follows: 
 
1. Capital Contour 
 
A bank should, at least annually and more frequently where possible and appropriate, 
publicly disclose summary information about:  
 
a) Its capital structure and components of capital. 
b) The terms and conditions of the main features of capital instruments. 
 
A bank should disclose information on its accounting policies for the valuation of assets 
and liabilities, provisioning and income recognition. 
 
2. Risk Exposures 
 
A bank should publicly disclose qualitative and quantitative information about its risk 
exposures, involving the techniques for managing risk. 
 
3. Capital Adequacy 
 
A bank should, at least annually, publicly disclose its capital ratio and other relevant 
information on its capital adequacy on a consolidated basis.  A bank should disclose 
measures of risk exposures calculated in accordance with the methodology set out in 
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the Basel capital accord. A bank should provide an analysis of factors impacting on its 
capital adequacy position.  
 
a)  Changes in capital structure and the impact on key ratios and overall capital 
position.  
b)  Its contingency planning, should it need to access the capital markets in times of    
stress.  
c) Its capital management strategy and consideration of future capital plans (where 
appropriate). 
d) The impact of any non-deduction of participation in Banks and other financial 
institutions, where applicable. 
 
A bank is encouraged to disclose its structure and process of allocating economic 
capital to its business activities. Considering the responses received to the consultation, 
the Committee remains convinced that such disclosures will form the basis of an 
effective market discipline in the banking sector.  In principle, banks’ disclosures 
should be consistent with how senior management and the board of directors assess and 
manage the risks of the bank. Under Pillar 1, banks use specified 
approaches/methodologies for measuring the various risks and the resulting capital 
requirements. The committee believes that providing disclosures that are based on this 
common framework is an effective means of informing the market about a bank’s 
exposure to those risks and provides a consistent and understandable disclosure86. 
 
Market Discipline is one of the most important innovations inside the pillar system of 
Basel II and exactly this unique attribute distinguishes the Basel II from being a pure 
“capital accord” such as Basel I87. However, the meaning of market discipline is 
unclear and its content may be fundamentally different during the times of turbulences. 
The Committee does not prescribe any clarification on the subject. Instead, it provides 
the basis of disclosures, consisting of capital risk exposures, risk assessment procedures 
and the capital adequacy of the institution88. According to the Committee, the market 
discipline can contribute to a safe and sound banking environment. 
 
In its extreme form, market discipline means total reliance upon competitive forces 
imposing losses and ultimately failure on suppliers that do not operate efficiently 
(Leathers and Raines, 2000, p. 164)89. According to the Federal Reserve, market 
discipline can be categorized into two types. The direct market discipline is the cost of 
borrowed funds, which reflects the bank’s risk profile. The private market participants 
or governmental regulators constitute the secondary, indirect market discipline, which 
monitor the market prices of financial instruments in order to assess bank risk. An 
indirect type of market discipline puts more emphasis on the pricing within the markets 
assuming it is an efficient market. Silvio Tittonel from the Basel committee, on the 
other hand, described the market discipline as “Market Discipline is the third pillar of 
the new framework for capital adequacy, and complements capital requirements (Pillar 
1) and the supervisory review process (Pillar 2) to promote the safety and soundness in 
banks and the financial system”. The strongest definition is provided by Bliss and 
 
86 BCBS (2004, parag. 80) 
87 Chorafas (2004, pp.84-104) 
88 BCBS (2006, parag. 809). 
89 Quoted in: Gup, E. B. (eds.): Market Discipline: Is it Fact or Fiction. In: The New Basel Capital Accord, 2004, pp.67-96.  
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Flannery (2000)90, who state that “the market discipline is the evaluation of the true 
financial conditions of a firm by the investors, whose feedback impounded in the 
resulting security prices”. This feedback requires information that should be timely, 
material and relevant for its users to take effective and efficient decisions. In order for 
the disclosure mechanism of Pillar 3 to function properly, the users or the addressees of 
the information must be able to understand the content, depending on their different 
needs for information.  
 
It is particularly important to ensure that both regulators and audit companies identify 
the undersized forms and origins of risk as accurately as possible. Regulatory 
approaches that fail to do so can lead to perverse incentives and other outcomes 
undesirable to the regulators and other market participants. It is the regulator’s 
obligation to ensure that appropriate information is available so that other market 
participants can accurately assess risk and that fair dealing underpins commitment. In 
the pace of rapidly changing markets, the regulator should be close to the market 
participants. If not, it should at least assure that there are not fraudulent players in the 
market. Regarding fraudulent practices, Turkey has enough cases where the 
stakeholders (auditors, depositors, investors, rating agencies, government agencies, 
etc.) may not know the true condition of such banks. Pillar 3 aims for a qualifying 
transparency with new disclosure requirements, in respect to particular practices or the 
recognition of “particular instruments and transactions”91. In the next sub-section, the 
thesis will have a closer look at those particular practices, instruments and transactions 
and try to assess the potential effectiveness of Pillar 3 in Turkish banking sector.  
 
3.4.4 Fraudulent Banking Structures: Threats to the Financial Stability 
 
The common-law definition of fraud is the “willful misrepresentation of a material fact 
that causes harm to a person who reasonably relies on the misrepresentation”92.  
 
Fraudulent banking carries a negative stigma and connotes much greater deceit than 
what is implied by usual accounting games. Fraudulent banking starts when the bank is 
taken over by the new shareholders with the intention to channel the savings of the 
depositors to the owner’s pockets or to recycle those funds in the group companies of 
the owners of the “target bank”. Even though the accounting games like aggressive 
accounting, fraudulent financial reporting, creative accounting practices or accounting 
irregularities may be labeled by the international standard setting bodies, a precise 
definition is still missing for the systemically conducted fraudulent banking activities 
for the regulators. Terms like “piping” are used in the daily language in Turkey to 
describe the connected lending or misapplication of bank’s funds to the own pocket of 
its legal owners. In the context of financial reporting, fraudulent financial reporting is 
the intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in financial 
statements done to deceive a financial statement audience. The term is used 
interchangeably with accounting irregularities93. A technical difference exists such that 
with fraud, when the financial information and material misstatements are used for the 
 
90 Quoted in: Gup, E (2004, p. 69). 
91 BCBS (2006, art. 808) 
92 Boatright, John R.: Ethics in Finance (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 33.  
93 Mulford W. Charles and Comiskey E. Eugene: The Financial Numbers Game, Detecting Creative Accounting Practices. New 
York: John Willey &Sons, 2002, p. 52. 
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y bank 
ollapse96. 
audulent financial reporting in some desired amount and/or in some desired direction.  
. The latter is much more important than the crude 
apital ratios of a “target bank”.  
                                                
material and legal disadvantages of the audience. In this context, a pragmatic definition 
of fraudulent banking is given below: 
 
“Fraudulent banking is a process by which the proceeds of the depositors of a “target 
bank” are converted to assets financially unsound group companies or dislocated to 
connected dummy companies established by the owners themselves or by the screening 
people to overcome of prudential banking requirements and existing accounting 
framework via misstated financial statements in such a way that the activity 
fundamentally destroys the overall safety and soundness of the banking system as a 
whole”.  
 
In this respect the wording “target bank” connotes the rational intention of concealment 
to defraud the bank, and it constitutes the hub of the deceitful actions to be taken by the 
owners of the bank. These actions are to be likened to that of a dirty smoke, a real 
“externality” to the very existence of Basel II’s aim of sound and safe banking. 
 
The target bank is directly involved in breaching the legal lending limits, taking 
excessive risks through adverse selection while exploiting the capital basis and deposit 
protection schemes designed to bypass as much market discipline and misuse the 
wealth of a nation accumulated on the books of the banking system. The consequence is 
obvious in Turkey, 22 commercially bankrupted banks were taken over by the Savings 
and Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) in recent years with a non-performing loan of 
worth 45 billions USD on their books94. This means that the 25% of the GNP worth 
188 billions USD by the year 2003 was completely lost or transferred to the personal 
use of the former owners at the defrauded banks95. This cost had to be carried over to 
the taxpayers or refinanced from the funds of the IMF. This is the reason that the 
regulatory bodies in Turkey have always been cautious, regarding the size and 
percentage payout from the deposit protection regime. The regulators made it clear at 
the time that shareholders and managers would not be left unharmed in an
c
 
While the supranational organizations, the World Bank, the IMF and the BIS are still 
searching for explanations of the banking crisis, this sub-section will try to gain insight 
into this fraudulent banking game and highlight the grey areas where accounting is 
being perverted and where the shareholders with the managers are cutting corners. The 
fraudulent banking activities involve actively facilitating several structures or by using 
fr
 
To promote market discipline, banks must currently make their accounts available for 
inspection; avoid creative accounting practices and the structures used for “rogue 
banking” practices. Banks, under the Pillar 3 regime, need to convince the market that 
they possess the financial staying power. Respectively, the reference to transparency at 
Pillar 3 should not only be limited to the main risk types, but also include structures 
banks use for tactical advantage
c
 
94 The word “Bankrupted” refers to the intended, covered and rational actions of the owners as given in our definition. 
95 Estimation by IMF. 
96 Tattersall, John (editor): A Practioner’s Guide to, The FSA Regulation of Banking. London: City &Financial Publishing, 2002, 
pp. 364-365. 
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 existing 
cilities are revolved. In sum, the granted loan amounts are never recovered.  
s up with the defaulted, 
on-performing bills of exchanges or drafts of the target bank. 
tional companies, even though the loans were subject to certain 
vel of country risks. 
                                                
 
For example, establishment of fictitious or dummy companies can be a plan used by the 
owners of a bank or by the related persons, whose core business activity is solely made 
up by sucking up the funds of the target bank via misstated or even fictive financial 
statements. In such case, the bank loans are provided to the “dummy companies”, 
which in reality do not exist. At repayment, new loans are provided or the
fa
 
Certainly, there are legal lending limits for extending loans to group companies. In 
these circumstances, the target bank makes widespread use of the asymmetrical 
information and finds alternatively a correspondent bank in Europe, which is not aware 
of the credibility of those dummy companies97. For the funding of the dummy 
companies, “forfeiting” is used and the deal is shown as if the business transaction 
results from a real export/import facility. The credit lines of the target bank by the 
foreign bank in Europe are utilized and the target bank provides guarantee facility to 
the foreign bank in favor of the dummy company and for the “blanc” export/import 
deal. As expected, the target bank never repays the guaranteed commitment based on 
the provided loan amount and the funding bank in Europe end
n
 
Moreover, the use of back to back facilities requires further supervision and disclosure. 
In a standard back to back facility, to prevent any capital loss of a subsidiary company 
in a high-inflation country, the parent company prefers to deposit the capital amount in 
a bank at home (e.g. in Europe) which has also a branch in the country where the 
subsidiary is doing business (e.g. D-Chemical Europe and D-Chemical in Turkey). In 
this way, the capital of D-Chemical is deposited at AA rated bank in Europe and those 
funds are granted as loans to the subsidiary company in Istanbul. As domestic currency 
depreciates continuously, the foreign exchange losses including the interest expenses 
are recognized as non-operational losses under Turkish GAAP and the capital of the 
parent company is preserved via those back-to-back loans. As cash deposits back up the 
loans, the foreign bank is not exposed to any counterparty- or country risk from the 
facility provided. The solvency of the transaction is also refrained from 8% capital 
adequacy charges. This facility was used as a breakthrough to overcome the Basel I 
capital rules for interna
le
 
Domestic fraudulent bankers make use of these facilities to overcome the legal lending 
limits98.To overcome the legal lending limits, new dummy companies are established 
with the mutual agreement and consent of the owners of both transacting banks, Bank 
A and Bank B. Bank A grants loan to the group companies of Bank B and at the same 
time Bank B provides loans to the group companies of Bank A under same maturity, 
terms and conditions. As a result, the balance sheets are inflated with phony loans from 
both banks. On the other hand, the group companies are shown as “credible” and 
bankable to other banks even though the funded amounts never appear on the balance 
sheets as assets. Rather, the funds are allocated into the private accounts of the owners, 
 
97 This is reality of what the Pillar 3 stands for. 
98 According to the former banks act of No: 4389, Art 2a, “A bank may not incur an exposure to a natural or legal person or a 
group of connected clients, in excess of twenty-five percent of its own funds”. 
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cated offshore. Through the creation of false or misleading impressions of the 
s and the group companies get free of charge funds from 
e target bank while overcoming the 25% legal lending limits or concentration rules 
iquidity requirements by the central bank where the target 
ank creates a sterilized position via fiduciary agreements and received funds are not 
tly from the state. Besides, funding new acquisitions or of new 
rget banks through the loans provided by the state owned banks were a common and 
re 
onsciously postponed for the execution of write-downs. By not writing off the 
a good start for “safe and sound banking”, but 
nfortunately not enough to solve the “rogue banking issue” completely from the 
future risk definitions of the Basel committee as an independent chapter. To deal with 
lo
intermediary banks, the function of the market is distorted.  
 
Until now the focus will be redirected from bank’s lending activities to the customer 
side and in particular to the fiduciary transactions. In general, fiduciaries must make 
full disclosure and the duty of confidence is the basis of these transactions. However, 
the fiduciary transactions are rearranged in such a way that breach of the fiduciary 
duties becomes more common in Turkey. Breach of duties takes place when the funds 
of the customers are diverted to a foreign bank under fictive “fiduciary agreements” or 
by manipulating the standard account opening forms with falsified payment instructions 
of the account holders. The funds are channeled to Bank B in form of deposits from the 
target bank and are reallocated as loans from Bank B to the group companies of the 
target bank with the same conditions as the deposits. Bank B gets X bps commission 
from such cash secured loan
th
with respect to subsidiaries. 
 
As a result, target bank does not have to reserve regulatory capital by reverting to those 
funds to a foreign bank and getting that foreign bank to generously provide the offshore 
loans to its group companies. One additional “benefit” for the fiduciary agreements is 
the defeat of the reserve and l
b
reported to the central bank.  
 
Creative accounting practices do not only exist at private banks, but also existed at the 
state owned banks as well. Recent years brought increased awareness of the risks 
associated with state owned banks. Long ignored problems in state owned or controlled 
banks were causing major quasi fiscal and credit allocation problems. Often they had to 
operate under preferential supervisory regimes, thus distorting the competition via 
incentives provided direc
ta
political step in Turkey. 
 
On the other hand, many of the non-performing, doubtful loans at state banks we
c
unpromising loans, the bank had reported misstated earnings and financial positions.  
 
The structures analyzed here illustrate that financial fraud is not something new. Basel 
committee responded to these malpractices by setting the formal standards of disclosure 
to complement the minimum capital requirements and the supervisory review process. 
The Committee’s prescription is 
u
records of the emerging markets.  
 
As indicated at paragraph 813 of the International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards, “The Committee will consider future 
modifications to Pillar 3 as necessary in light of its ongoing monitoring of this area and 
industry developments”. In light of the structures disclosed above, Pillar 3 should be 
extended to prevent against “fraud risk” and the fraud risk should be included in the 
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closures to the mandate of local audit companies as documented 
 paragraph 816 100.  
ality, then there are not enough capital 
dequacy ratios for rogue banking practices. 
sures and hence challenges the achievement of 
sound and safe banking in general.     
.5 Closing Remarks on Basel II Accord 
nks do business around here’ from scratch by changing 
e “sprit of the capital laws”.  
d attitudes adopted 
y the regulators, board members and the employees of the banks.  
                                                
separate fraud risk assessment, there should be encouragement of the implementation of 
acts such as Sarbanes-Oxley or equivalent auditing standards like COSO99 rather than 
leaving the Pillar 3 dis
in
 
In Turkey where the international accounting standards have not received widespread 
official recognition, the exploitation of the banks via their owners or by the investors 
should be a major concern of the supervisory and regulatory authorities. In the absence 
of such high level standards, new attempts or conventions to sustain a long term global 
financial stability will continue to be an immature attempt. Considering the current 
banking system and capital markets’ reliance on the transparency of the financial 
statements, the effective surveillance by regulatory bodies is a much more important 
objective than the “capital” itself. If the failure in market confidence is in consequence 
of the missing leadership, ethics and mor
a
 
Challenges still lie ahead for Pillar 3 as underlying differences in presentation by banks 
to the market will remain and this will make cross-bank comparisons much more 
difficult. Key risk issues with regard to market turbulence and fraudulent practices will 
continue to be outside Pillar 3 disclo
3
 
In general, regulators should not act like innocent by-standers that happened to be at the 
scene. It is important to note that regulators were not just witnesses of the rogue 
banking practices or market turbulence in Turkey. Rather, their stance was quite 
“discrete” to the systemic crash of the financial system during the twin crises of 2000 
and 2001. This chapter aimed to analyze the spirit of the new accord and its three pillars 
in the context of fraudulent banking as well. Although the Basel committee does not 
prescribe extensively against the banking malpractices on the face of the pillar system, 
it assures to change ‘the way ba
th
 
One of the early effects of the Basel II framework has been to create a common risk 
language in the industry. At first sight, it is easy to understate the degree of cultural and 
behavioral change with the new coming rules, which will be expected at all levels of 
the bank from board to individual lending officer. Some past behavior patterns that 
contributed to the banking crises in Turkey are likely to be changed by the new Basel II 
framework. The extent of change will heavily rely upon the role an
b
 
More recently, Turkey has been experiencing a real estate driven boom where profits 
from real estate lending and increased value of the underlying collateral provide ample 
capital and justify future lending expansion in the sector. In such circumstances, there is 
 
99 Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 99 provides guidance to auditors in assessing the risk of fraud. For detailed information, 
pls. refer to Arens (et al): Auditing and Assurance Services, Prentice Hall, 2006. 
100 BCBS (2006, 816): Pillar 3 disclosures will not be required to be audited by an external auditor, unless otherwise required by 
accounting standards setters, securities regulators or other authorities. 
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egulation” in Turkey may be replaced by “un regulation”, which 
either party desires.  
hemselves to stand the difficult test of 
the market discipline constructed under Pillar 3.  
very little Basel II rules can do to prevent potential crises that may arise pursuant to the 
changing global liquidity conditions. Rather, banks and supervisors need to continue to 
be vigilant and professionally skeptical about the future outcome of their portfolio 
shifts. As a consequence of the forthcoming market failures, if the implementation of 
Basel II fails, the “der
n
 
In conclusion, Basel II will make the “invisible impact” by changing the “banking 
culture and behavior” in Turkey and through its new doctrine of risk quantification, 
supervisory and market disclosure requirements. In this sense, the regulators should be 
determined to stamp out the sins of the past and adopt an effective execution of the 
Pillar 2 regime, while banks should be preparing t
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Chapter 4: The Quantitative Impact Analysis of Basel II 
4.1 Introduction 
Basel II marks the inauguration of a decisive moment that will lead to a permanent 
shake-up of the Turkish financial system. Up until now, the thesis has examined the 
expected impact of the new framework based on attentive observations and arguments. 
To test the arguments of the Basel II study further and in order to support the arguments 
with evidence, Chapter 4 will target to assess how this “moment of truth” is going to 
affect the Turkish banking sector on a quantitative basis. The metrics of the 
quantification will be in terms of capital adequacy. It is perhaps helpful to begin with 
the general objectives of the quantitative impact studies at the international arena and 
then clarify the differences between the impact studies done on G10, EU and Turkey 
levels. 
4.2 Objectives of the Basel Committee’s Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS) 
The main challenge for Basel II is the fact that it should find practical answers to 
immediate issues, which may arise in the use of “best practice methods”. The best 
practice methods include the most sophisticated risk management systems, techniques 
and products that offer solutions to deal with current banking activities, where “simple” 
capital adequacy proposals cannot effectively or fairly capture and treat the risks 
associated. The new financial landscape and its materially distinguished participants are 
driven by incentives to balance “risk adjusted returns” on capital across the banks 
businesses. A parallel and comparative situation arises for the “risk focused” 
supervisors that are driven by “more risk sensitive” capital requirements. As a result, 
assessing the central implications of the new supervisory framework will be highly 
complex and the outcomes for individual banks will vary by their risk appetite and the 
composition of their portfolios. Clearly, there will be significant differences among 
banks and banking systems across the world. However, the Basel committee is 
determined to maintain the existing capital levels inside G-10 member states broadly 
unchanged by the introduction of the new accord. In relation, the main motivation of 
the Committee has been to ensure the financial soundness within its reach. To envision 
the road ahead, the Basel committee facilitates “Quantitative Impact Studies”, which 
provide key assessments on the gradual effect of all proposed approaches on the 
regulatory capital as submitted by the banks. In these studies, banks from different 
regulatory jurisdictions offer data to estimate further capital requirements or reductions 
against their existing risk profiles. To understand how the Committee gets to facilitate 
the QIS, it is worthwhile to outline the objectives of earlier studies as follows: 
 
1.  QIS 1 (July 2000):  
 
The first quantitative impact study was carried out right after the dramatic release of the 
original consultative paper (CP1) in June 1999. The objective of the first QIS was to 
assess the likely effects on regulatory capital requirements of credit institutions. This 
was an early attempt to create a snapshot on the relative effect on capital with the new 
framework and its impact was much less as each successive QIS pursued much more 
specific objectives and had in turn a more extensive impact than its predecessors101. 
 
 
 
101 Chorafas , D. N. : Economic Capital Allocation with Basel II, 2004, p.13. 
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2. QIS 2 (April 2001):   
 
Conducted by 138 banks in 25 different countries, the purpose of the study was to 
assess the impact of different risk weights and other variables on banks' minimum 
capital requirements. As one might expect, there were substantially different effects 
across banks. For instance, the capital requirements of internal rating based approaches 
ranged from an increase of capital by 125% to a reduction of capital by 30%. The 
variability was on account of the wide range of PD values, which reflected pro-cyclical 
behavior of ratings and hence capital requirements. The result of QIS 2 set out further 
proposals in CP2, which led to higher overall minimum capital levels than the 
Committee was targeting initially. Based on the results of QIS 2, there was no incentive 
for banks to adopt the more risk-sensitive IRB approaches. Major international banks 
also raised their concerns over the large gaps between the banks’ internal models and 
the Foundation IRB approach. The response of the Basel committee was the 
recalibration of the Benchmark Risk Weights (BRW). In November 2001, the 
Committee made several modifications as follows: 
 
a) LGD estimates were differentiated among various types of collateral and 
security structures. 
b) The BRW formulas did not any longer contain the 1.5 “scaling factor”, which 
was a constant number to increase the required capital irrespective to the 
credibility of the borrower. 
c) The confidence interval for IRB methods was increased to 99.9% of the “Gauss 
Curve”. 
d) Asset correlations, namely the cross default specifications of several corporate 
and SMEs were recognized in the BRW formulas up to a maximum of 20%. 
 
According to Crouhy /Galai & Mark, the proposed recalibration formula resulted in 
capital savings for SMEs up to 20% compared to that of large corporates with the same 
probability of default and exposure size. One important conclusion of the works at CP2 
was that the current Basel II framework still required more than twice capital for the 
investment grade companies than the models used by the International Institute of 
Finance, which acted on behalf of large global banks. Furthermore, the Basel formula 
required less capital for the non-investment grade companies by a factor of 0.7, which 
did not reflect the true nature of risks inherent with non-investment grade credit102.   
 
3. QIS 3 (October 2002):  
 
In October 2002, the Committee launched a comprehensive work involving more than 
200 banks from over 43 different countries. The third study had been the “crash test”, 
paving the way for Basel II through recalibration of norms and weights. The objective 
was to allow the Committee to gauge the impact of Basel II proposals on minimum 
capital requirements. The study included results on both global and European basis, 
stretching up to the national impact studies103. In sub-section 4.4, the method and 
 
102 Crouhy, M. /Galai, D. / Mark, R. : The Use of Internal Models. In : Scott, H. (ed.) : Capital Adequacy beyond Basel, 2005, p. 
212. 
103 BCBS (2002, pp.1- pp. 15): Overview Paper for the Impact Study. Basel QIS3 results are available on the internet at 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/qis/qis3.htm. European Commission documents are available as: Third Quantitative Impact Study, Review 
of the Capital Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms, EU Results.  
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results of the QIS 3 will be detailed as it provides a global benchmark for the QIS 
Turkey (QIS TR-1).   
 
4. QIS 4 (End 2004-2005):  
 
Before the release of Basel II framework in June 2004, the Committee gauged its 
impact based on the QIS 3 data. However, banks' abilities to estimate the parameters for 
the more advanced approaches of Basel II have improved significantly since then. 
Furthermore, certain studies conducted by the Committee were based on 
approximations because data was not always available. Consequently, several member 
countries launched impact studies on a national level and field tests based on the Basel 
II framework during 2004 or the first half of 2005. 
 
5. QIS 5 (October 2005): 
 
The Basel committee announced its decision to review the calibration of new 
framework in spring 2006. In order to ensure that this review was based on the most 
recent, high-quality data and to evaluate new proposals for the recognition of “double 
default” and trading book exposures, the Committee undertook a QIS 5 between 
October and December 2005. 
4.3 Third Quantitative Impact Study (QIS 3) 
 
Of these five quantitative tests, the most important has been the QIS 3. In the aftermath 
of QIS 3, many analysts said that the universal banks in Europe passed the capital 
adequacy test on the strength of their banking books. The results of the QIS 3 paved the 
way for Basel II to be finalized by the end of 2004. 
 
4.3.1 QIS 3 Methodology 
 
Two possible types of methodology were in principle possible. The first type was the 
“complementary samples analysis”, which was based on each participant, submitting 
the impacts in accordance with one of the three possible approaches (Standardized, F-
IRB, or A-IRB). The submitted approach would possibly be adopted at the participant 
bank by the year 2007. The second type was the “constant sample analysis”, which was 
based on having an identical sample of participants submitting impacts for all three 
possible approaches. The constant sample analysis aimed to identify the differences of 
impact among the three approaches, in terms of the minimum capital requirements at 
each participant bank. The results were produced as if the entire system chose a 
universal approach (Standardized, F-IRB or A-IRB). The Basel committee chose to 
perform the constant sample analysis. Banks were split between two groups (Group 1 
and Group 2) and banks from both groups were invited to present impacts for all 
approaches. However, not all banks in each group provided data for all the three 
possible approaches due to technical limitations at banks. So, the results of the 
 
 
 
quantitative impact study must be handled and used with care104. In the study, “Group 1 
(G1)” banks were large and internationally active banks, with Tier 1 capital in excess of 
3 billion EUR. “Group 2 (G2)” banks were relatively smaller, generally less complex 
and not internationally active banks. A total of 188 banks from G10 countries and 
further 177 banks from 30 other countries participated in the study. Of the 30 non-G10 
countries, the participants were 15 EU member states and 5 EU accession candidates 
including Turkey.  
 
Independent of the Basel committee’s QIS 3, the European Commission (EC) 
performed a study that chose to use the “complementary sample analysis method”. 
Calculations were currently made on weighted averages, where results were weighted 
by the size of the bank. In this respect, EC’s results were regarded more effective in 
reflecting the accurate impact than the Basel-conducted QIS 3105. After the first run of 
results published in May 2003, the Basel committee decided to make few changes to 
the proposed rules, which had been included in the Basel committee's third consultative 
paper (CP3). The effect of these changes was incorporated in the QIS 3, and 
consequently in the results presented in the next sub-section. EC assisted the Basel 
committee in the QIS 3 exercise with regards to the results of the EU member states, 
and the enlarged area comprising banks from six additional countries, which were 
either acceding or belonging to the European Economic Area. EC published its 
independent assessment in a separate document. Upon several checks, the quality of the 
data and analysis were found to be of “good quality” by the Basel committee and of 
“very good quality” by the EC. The QIS 3 was an imperfect and static exercise, but it 
provided a sufficiently reliable basis to form deductive conclusions for the 
implementation and calibration of the new Basel framework.  
 
4.3.2 Results of QIS 3 
 
QIS 3 spawned a wealth of reports aggregated by country and group of countries. Table 
4.1 presents a comparison of the results for G-10, EU, EU+6 and Turkey as EU 
accession candidate. 
 
Table 4.1: Overall Average Change in Capital Requirements compared to Basel I 
 Impact Group Standardized IRB Foundation IRB Advanced 
G10 - Group 1 11% 3% -2% 
G10 - Group 2 3% -19% - 
EU  -  Group 1 BCBS  6.0% 
EU       8.54% 
BCBS   -4.0% 
EU         1.9% 
BCBS -6%,  
EU     -3.67% 
EU  -  Group 2 BCBS  1.0%,   
EU      -1.07% 
BCBS   -20.0%,  
EU        -23.8% 
BCBS  -22.5%,  
EU      -17.0% 
Other Group 1&2, 
EU+6 G2 Banks 
BCBS   12%,  
EU        3.09%  
BCBS    4%, - - 
Turkey only +11.5% - - 
   
Source: BCBS (2003, QIS 3 Global Results); European Commission (2003, QIS3 EU results); CEPS 
Task Force Report No: 51, April, 2004. Turkish results are published by the BRSA in December, 2004 as 
QIS TR-1. 
                                                 
104 European Commission: Review of the Capital Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms, Third Quantitative 
Impact Study: Methodological Annex, July 2003.  
105 CEPS Task Force Report 51 (2004, p. 17) 
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When analyzing and interpreting the data represented in Table 4.1, one has to bear in 
mind that the variability of the individual bank results inside a specific country was 
high due to the diversified nature of business at banks. Under the Standardized 
approach for example, the maximum and minimum values varied from -15% to 84% 
for G10 (Group 1) banks, and for “Other Group” the values stretched from a -17% to 
+103%106. Consequently, the results should only be used as representative for Group 1 
and 2 banks with care.  
 
It is also important to note that the results presented here are from earlier stages of the 
Basel II implementation, where the published results were at times based on estimates, 
which then got corrected by the regulators. In addition, certain Credit Risk 
Management (CRM) techniques were not used completely or the data was missing with 
respect to some securitization structures. Hence, the overall results were heavily 
overstated by reason of the missing data on collaterals and the conclusions drawn here 
should only be used as a snapshot of the conditions at the time of the study.  
 
Furthermore, the final version of the new accord dated from June 2006, introduced a 
series of important changes to the QIS technical documents. Therefore, the impact 
studies should be elaborated as the “proof testing” of the different versions of Basel II 
revised documents. 
 
When the above reservations were set aside, the integrated results in Table 4.1 of the 
BCBS and the EC were overall in line with the expectations and objectives of the Basel 
committee, except the aim of keeping the general capital levels same as before inside 
the current banking system. The reason was obvious as there was not any “level zero 
effect” on the overall capital levels for any groups of countries and any methodology 
used. With this exception in mind, the results in the table above could still yield to 
general statements about the impact of the new accord on different banks in G10, EU 
and in “Other Country” zones, including Turkey107.  
 
The key conclusions of the impact studies can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. For large and internationally active banks in Group 1, the message was clear. 
The memorandum to the global large banks was, “You better choose the most 
risk sensitive method and save your capital”. Both G10 and EU results directed 
those banks towards even more sophisticated methods to save more capital, if 
the banks could also validate their framework to the national supervisors. The 
global results depicted that the opportunity cost of using Standardized approach 
was the destruction of value on account of 12% additional capital charge. Such 
cost was truly unsustainable. 
 
2. Group 2 banks (smaller but specialized banks by product, region and client 
groups) could adopt IRB approaches and substantially lower capital rates down 
to 23.75%. Table 4.1 indicated countries, whose banking systems had a 
relatively high stake on IRB approaches because higher proportion of retail 
business, particularly the mortgage and SME lending facilities would be the 
 
106 BSBC (2003, p. 3): Table 1. 
107 Other countries include 24 countries including China, Russia, Singapore, Australia, Tanzania and Turkey, EU+6 includes all 
new members of the EU. 
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most capital generating areas of Group 2 banks108. In particular, Group 2 banks 
by definition focus more on domestic and retail markets. The results indicated 
that institutions with the largest exposure on retail portfolio would tend to take 
the most significant advantage in reducing capital requirements. 
  
3. The average decrease of capital requirements for EU banks was around 5.3%, 
ranging from an increase of 2% for banks using the Standardized approach to a 
decrease of 8.7% for banks using the A-IRB approach in measuring credit risks. 
For banks applying the Standardized approach, the increase of capital 
requirements stemmed solely from the operational risk charges, amounting to 
10.3%, which were not counterbalanced by possible reductions in credit risk 
charges. For banks using the IRB approaches, the reduction of credit risk 
charges far outweighed the additional charges for operational risks. For the 
smaller EU banks using the Standardized approach, their capital adequacy 
remained well above 10% even after allowing for the 10.3% reduction. Only a 
few banks, which make up 0.2% of the total bank assets in the EU, might 
experience certain difficulties. But raising additional capital or mergers with 
more capitalized banks could overcome those difficulties. 
 
4. In contrast to the strongly capitalized banks, banks in “Other Country” category 
fell under the lower end of the capital saving spectrum. The new framework 
would be too costly for those banks if banks were to adopt the less sophisticated 
Standardized approach, which would result in an additional capital charge up to 
12%, of which 11% was due to the recognition of operational risks. 
 
5. In the scope of the QIS 3, there were not any Turkish banks using the IRB 
approach to assess minimum risk-based capital requirements for credit risks. 
For Turkish banks, the vote for the Standardized approach would result in a 
disproportionate decrease of 11.5% in the capital adequacy ratio. The adoption 
of the Standard approach would alarmingly underestimate the risks in a crisis-
prone country, such as Turkey. 
 
6. The results in Table 4.1 also revealed that the capital requirements increased in 
all sub-groups using the Standardized approach, as opposed to the IRB 
approaches. Generally, the operational risk calculations would require 
additional capital allocated by the banks worldwide. This additional capital 
requirement for operational risks could then be offset by the incentives provided 
by the implementation of the IRB approaches for the credit risks. 
   
7. The “portfolio contribution” results demonstrated that real capital savings could 
be achieved in the treatment of credit risks as a result of the diversification 
benefits attributed to the retail and the SME portfolios. Interbank exposures 
increased very little by 1-2% while the change in the sovereign portfolio was 
almost zero.  
                                                 
108 PriceWaterhouse Coopers, 2004, p.34. 
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4.4 Quantitative Impact Study on Turkish Banks (QIS TR-1) 
 
Quantitative impact studies have not been repeated since the initial QIS TR-1. As the 
EU accession process for Turkey continued to move in parallel with the Basel II 
process, the Turkish regulatory authorities directly aimed to establish the linkage with 
CRD by participating in the Basel committee’s quantitative impact studies. The Turkish 
regulatory body has been directly involved in the QIS 3 process by requesting 
participation of six private Turkish banks in the quantitative impact studies. 
Furthermore, as of December, 2004 the BRSA in Turkey released the results of its 
Domestic Impact Study on the new Basel capital accord. In general, the Basel 
committee considers it of highest importance that the impacts on minimum capital 
requirements of the new framework are correctly assessed. To ensure this, the 
Committee took first steps in relation to both the strict control of the data quality and 
the methodology used in QIS TR-1. The aim of the QIS TR-1 was to gather reliable 
information from banks in Turkey on the impact of the new capital proposals on banks’ 
existing portfolios. More than 23 banks of different size, levels of complexity and 
possessing 95% of the total assets of the Turkish banking sector participated in the QIS 
TR-1 session. QIS TR-1 results confirmed that the new Basel framework as in the form 
of its 2004 version, produced capital requirements broadly consistent with the Basel 
committee's expectations and objectives. To conduct the analysis locally, the regulatory 
body had to accept certain methodology and national discretion, which will be 
explained in the next sub-section. 
 
4.4.1 QIS TR-1: Main National Discretions and Methodology 
 
In implementing the QIS TR-1, the regulatory body in Turkey made several 
assumptions and allowed national discretion with respect to the risk weights and the 
treatment of different portfolios under the new Basel framework, which were as 
follows: 
 
1. Public entities owned by the Undersecretariat of Turkey were safely assumed to 
carry the same risk weights as the Treasury of Turkey.  
2. Participant banks were mandated to deduct all their investment sums in 
insurance subsidiaries from their capital base. 
3. Participant banks applied a 0% risk weight for exposures denominated in 
domestic currency, to sovereign debtor or to central bank, including sovereign 
guarantees and government bonds that were used as collateral. This treatment 
also included FX-indexed local currency bonds109.  
4. Short-term, interbank claims denominated in domestic currency, were subject to 
either 20% risk weight or risk weights implied by their external ratings. Also, 
short-term interbank claims maturing by less than three months were subject to 
lower risk weights in comparison to long-term interbank claims.  
5. Rating Agencies: The accepted rating agencies by the Turkish regulator were 
the Moody’s, S&P and Fitch.  
                                                 
109 FX indexed bonds are actually local currency bonds, whose interest and face values are indexed to a foreign currency. This is 
an instrument founded by the Treasury of Turkey, to inject foreign exchange based instruments to the market, in times where the 
forex demands shoots up severely. 
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6. Retail portfolio:  
The Retail portfolio was broken down into three sub-portfolios: 1) SME retail, 
2) Residential mortgages and 3) Non-mortgage retail. Under Standardized and 
Simple Standardized approaches, SME and Non-mortgage retail portfolios were 
weighted as 75%. The Residential mortgage portfolios were weighted as 35%. 
7. Corporate portfolio: 
a) Corporate portfolio was divided into two sub-portfolios: 1) SME corporate 
and 2) Non-SME corporate. Most of the existing corporate portfolio was unrated 
by an external rating agency and the collateralized portion of facilities was less 
than 15% of the total exposure amount. Hence, the impact of any risk mitigation 
on the calculation of additional capital requirements would be relatively small.  
b) According to the Basel committee, the unsecured portion of the corporate 
portfolio was subject to 100% risk weight, whereas the protected part of the 
portfolio was assigned the risk weight of the protection provider.110 In that 
regard, the Committee recognized a new range of eligible guarantors as 
protection providers, such as sovereign entities, PSEs, banks and securities 
companies with a lower risk rating than the counterparty. Entities of group 
companies (subsidiaries and affiliated companies) rated above A- were also 
recognized as credit protectors. QIS TR-1 took into consideration all these 
aspects when treating the secured and unsecured portion of corporate exposures.  
8. Sovereign portfolio:  
Sovereign portfolio was the largest segment of a bank’s portfolio in Turkey, 
including traded government t-bills and bonds. As Turkey is a member of 
OECD, these portfolios were weighed as 0% risk to date. Under the new Basel 
framework, the instruments held under this portfolio were subject to 100% risk, 
if the instruments were denominated in a foreign currency. The domestic 
currency denominated sovereign debt instruments were free of any capital 
charge at national discretion, provided that the supervisor was assured that the 
coverage of the governmental debt instruments in local currency was robust. 
9. Bank portfolio:  
The national supervisor in Turkey was to apply the risk weight implied by the 
external rating assessment of the bank. Under this option, the unrated banks 
were to be applied a risk weight of 50%, where a preferential risk weight of a 
lesser notch might be applied for claims under three months, again subject to a 
floor of 20%. In the QIS TR-1, claims under three months were generally risk 
weighted as 20% and the foreign exchange denominated claims on banks, 
maturing in longer than three months, were risk weighted according to the 
external rating agencies. Therefore, the bank portfolio was in a more fragile 
situation in terms of extra capital requirements than before. 
10. Equity and related interests portfolio:  
Equity exposures were defined based on the economic substance of the 
instrument, where the direct and/or indirect stakes on the companies were 
represented. The equity holdings were subject to risk weighting of 100% or 
should be deducted from the capital, in accordance with the materiality levels 
clearly defined in paragraph 35 of the new accord. 
11. Trading book positions:  
The trading book consisted of positions in financial instruments and 
commodities held either with trading intent or for hedging purposes. QIS TR-1 
                                                 
110 BCBS (2006, p. 48). 
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included term trading-related repo and reverse repo transactions including the 
derivative instruments, where banks would be required to calculate the 
counterparty credit risk charge for OTC derivatives, repo-style and other 
transactions booked in the trading book. The concept of “counterparty risk” was 
introduced to the Turkish banking and regulatory practice for the first time via 
Basel II111. 
 
QIS TR-1 can be regarded as the equivalent version of QIS 3, in terms of its 
methodology, except the impact study of IRB approaches was not feasible for Turkish 
banks at the time. Therefore, the results in QIS TR-1 were given for the standardized 
approaches; 1) Simplified Standardized approach (SSA) and 2) Standardized approach 
(SA) as referred in the Table 4.2 below. The core element of the QIS TR-1 was a 
comparative analysis of the changes in risk weighted assets (RWA) resulting from the 
switch-over to the new framework introduced by the Basel II accord.  
 
Table 4.2: Approaches used in QIS TR-1 
Level of the 
 Method  and Risk MARKET RISK CREDIT RISK OPERATIONAL RISK 
SIMPLE   Simplified Standardized Approach Basic Indicator Approach 
Standardized Approach 
MODERATE Standardized Approach Standardized Approach Alternative Standardized 
Approach 
Foundation Internal Ratings Based 
Approach 
ADVANCED Internal Models  (Value-at-Risk) Approach Advanced Internal Ratings Based 
Approach 
Advanced Measurement 
Approach 
Source: BRSA, QIS Assessment Report, December, 2004. 
 
SSA could be perceived as the “pure” continuation of the old Basel accord, as the risk 
weighting for all kinds of risks associated with corporate credit were weighted as 
100%. The rating of the obligor was based on the scoring of the ECA, which was scaled 
from grade 0 to 7. The degree of granularity and accuracy in capturing credit risks and 
weights were significantly missing with the old accord as discussed in Chapter 3, sub-
section 3.2 “Limitations of Basel I”. Furthermore, the old accord did not recognize any 
currency or maturity mismatches on the securitization structures. For the mortgage 
backed commercial loans, there were not any advantage as the old accord did not 
distinguish between risk mitigating factors in its capital calculations. 
 
SA on the other hand was relying on the rating of the obligor by reputable external 
rating agencies, which were accepted by the Turkish regulatory body.  In fact, one of 
the most striking points of the SA introduced by Basel II was the consideration of the 
external ratings for the calculation of risk weights for outstanding exposure types. In 
addition, SA in the new Basel framework would define the exposure at risk as the 
residual credit risks after risk mitigations have been accounted for. For the usage of risk 
mitigations, there were two methods: 1) Simple method and 2) Comprehensive 
method112. Please also refer to Chapter 3, sub-section 3.4.3.2.1, “Standardized 
Approach” for the two methods. In sum, all kinds of credit risk mitigation instruments 
and techniques were recognized in the capital charge calculations. Although the IRB 
approaches were not included in QIS TR-1, the comparative analysis between the QIS 
                                                 
111 QIS TR-1 Evaluation Report of BRSA, 2004, p. 34. 
112 The simple method of the risk mitigation is not to be confused with SSA method for capital calculations.  
TR-1 and QIS 3 would be able to highlight the pitfalls in the Turkish banking sector. In 
the next sub-section, the thesis will analyze the results of QIS TR-1 compared with the 
QIS 3.  
  
4.4.2 Results of QIS TR-1: A Comparative Analysis with the QIS 3 
 
This sub-section will aim to assess the impact of Basel II on the capital adequacy 
requirements of the Turkish banks. According to the results of the QIS TR-1, as 
depicted in Table 4.3, Turkish banks differ significantly from the “Other Country” 
banks in the QIS 3.  
 
Table 4.3: Contributions to Changes in Cross Country Capital Requirements according to  Standardized 
Approach in Core Portfolios113. 
 
 
Portfolio   G 10 G 10 EU EU Other Turkish 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 & 2 Banks 
Corporate 1% -1% -1% -1% 0% 2.04% 
Sovereign 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 3.05% 
Bank 2% 0% 2% 1% 2% 0.46% 
Retail -5% -10% -5% -7% -4% -0.68% 
SME -1% -2% -2% -2% -1% -2.80% 
Securitized Assets 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
Other portfolios 2% 1% 2% -1% 3% 5.93% 
Overall credit risk 0% -11% -3% -11% 2% 8.00% 
Operational risk 10% 15% 8% 12% 11% 3.50% 
Overall change 11% 3% 6% 1% 12% 11.50% 
Source: BCBS, BRSA, EC  
 
The results of QIS TR-1 indicated that aggregate minimum risk-based capital 
requirements would increase 11.5% for the 23 participant banks when switching from 
the Basel I to a Basel II framework. This means that Turkish banking industry was 
faced with an overall increase of 56.7% in risk weighted assets coupled with a decrease 
of capital adequacy ratio down to 17.33% from 28.84%”. 
 
In the Standardized Approach (SA), the capital requirements for credit risk were 
adjusted significantly at each category listed above. Accordingly, the new credit risk-
based capital requirements in Basel II would lead to an increase of 8% across all 
participant banks in Turkey. When the operational risk requirements were taken into 
consideration, the increase would stretch up to a sizeable 11.50% in Turkey. In 
essence, the increase in the capital requirements with SA was due to higher credit risks 
in Turkey than in “Other Country” banks in QIS 3. Naturally, higher credit risks led to 
the increase of risk weighted assets, whereas the “Other Country” banks were more 
impacted by the introduction of operational risk charges in the SA of the new Basel II 
framework. The reason for lower operational capital requirements for Turkish banks 
was due to lower operational costs, relatively less weighting of the operational costs in 
the overall risk weighted assets and the lower profitability of the Turkish banks, which 
                                                 
113 The countries include in this category are: Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czech Republic Chile, China, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Thailand and Turkey 
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produced lower gross incomes relative to their competitors in the world. The impact of 
the Basel II framework on Turkish banks can be outlined more specifically as follows: 
 
4.4.2.1 Impact on Specific Portfolios 
 
The main impact observed in the recent studies was with regards to the minimum 
capital requirements of the equity portfolio and the trading book positions. In particular, 
Basel II introduced the sovereign portfolio risks associated with extensive amounts of 
Turkish Eurobonds, which were on the trading books of banks. Substantial amounts of 
Turkish Eurobond positions had to be reported during the QIS works and such positions 
and transactions caused severe increases in the capital requirements of the banks. Even 
though the domestic currency governmental debt instruments were weighted as “zero 
risk”, the existence of Turkish Government Eurobonds denominated in USD and in 
EUR could not be overlooked. As such, foreign currency denominated positions were 
significant risk contributors at the portfolio level and acted as main stimulant for 
additional capital requirements. QIS TR-1 revealed that the capital requirements of the 
sovereign portfolio and the trading book consisting of those debt instruments increased 
by a factor of almost 8.7 and 2.5, respectively.   
 
Under SA, a decrease of risk weighted assets was only pronounced for the retail and 
SME portfolios, because the risk contributions were traditionally much less leading to 
much smaller capital charge to the average capital adequacy ratios. Although Basel II 
decreased the risk weighting of retail assets down to 75%, the effect on the mortgage 
backed retail portfolio on the capital savings was relatively low, as the mortgage 
backed loan market in Turkey was not as developed as in Europe. Hence, the impact of 
capital savings for more developed markets than Turkey was significantly higher, 
where the mortgage backed residential retail loans in those markets benefited from a 
low risk weighting of 35% with the new accord. Peer group banks in the QIS 3 
reflected significant reductions in capital requirements for retail and SME portfolios, 
when those portfolios were bundled together.  
 
While bank portfolios benefited from the use of external agency ratings, the increase in 
risk weighted assets was due to the recognition of short term domestic currency money 
market receivables for the first time. In the new framework, those transactions were to 
be assigned a risk weight of 20%. As a result, the capital requirements of the bank 
portfolio increased by almost 0.5% compared with the old accord.  
 
4.4.2.2 Impact on Competition 
 
Under the Basel I accord, Turkish banks had been quite inefficient in the intermediation 
of deposits into corporate loans. Besides the inefficient lending practices and pricing 
techniques at the facility level, each facility was conducted with marginal amounts of 
spreads. This of course hardly justified the finest efforts of carrying a corporate loan 
book with 100% risk weight. Basel II is expected to offer an incentive for capital relief 
when banks apply “best practice” risk management and encourage more portfolio 
sensitive pricing at the beginning of transaction origination. More “risk sophisticated 
banks”, which are quick to optimize their portfolios with the new rules, will obtain a 
significant advantage in profitability and competitive position over the late adopters, 
who may end up operating under a higher capital charge for the same credit risk profile. 
The better pricing methods based on RAROC models that offer more efficient 
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allocation of capital will likely increase the take-over and consolidation activity among 
Turkish banks as well as foreign bidders, mainly from the European Union. 
 
4.4.2.3 Impact on Loans due to Lack of External Ratings  
 
Under the Standardized approach to credit risk, it is suggested that all exposures to 
unrated sovereigns, banks and corporates are covered with a 100% risk weight. Very 
few companies in Turkey have external agency ratings; consequently, an external 
ratings-based approach does not promise much of a capital relief for Turkish banks in 
comparison to Basel I at this moment. As the strongest Turkish banks are currently 
rated from B to B+, the lack of ratings for corporates may actually be a blessing in 
disguise. If rated, most corporate borrowers and particularly SMEs may come out 
below B- and therefore carry an even higher 150% risk weight. At the same time, 
corporates and SMEs that do not have an external agency rating would have less capital 
charge under the SA.  
 
The initial feedback from the large private banks indicated that many would lean 
towards adopting IRB approaches for credit risk because QIS TR-1 was conducted 
under SA, which meant an immediate increase of 8% for credit risk-based capital 
requirements. Since most exposures were unrated and hence carried a 100% risk 
weight, the IRB approaches could generously provide capital relief for banks with an 
internal credit scoring system. The major private Turkish banks have already 
implemented credit scoring systems and are regularly calculating explicit one-year 
probability of default (PD). The most appropriate approach for banks that have already 
obtained credible PD estimates from their customer databases would then be the F-IRB, 
where internally generated estimates of PD are combined with supervisory values for 
other factors, such as LGD, EAD and Maturity. Given the data, it might even be 
feasible to adopt the A-IRB where internal LGD, EAD and Maturity, in addition to PD 
estimates would be calculated.  
 
4.4.3 Effects of Basel II on a State Owned Bank in Turkey (QIS TR-1) 
 
This sub-section will examine the drastic effects of Basel II proposals on minimum 
capital requirements of a state-owned bank, namely HalkBank. Halkbank is specialized 
on SME (small and medium sized enterprises) lending and hence, the lending policy 
and practices will be highly influenced by the new requirements under the new Basel 
framework when measuring the credit risks associated with SMEs. In particular, the 
QIS TR-1 assessed the capital adequacy ratio of Halkbank, based on its lending policies 
and portfolio management systems and the impact of the large marketable securities 
position on capital charges. QIS TR-1 also revealed key insights with regards to the 
credit risk-based capital requirements on SME portfolio with the Basel II accord.  
 
QIS TR-1 used figures in the Euro denominated and inflation-adjusted financial 
statements of Halkbank dated June 30, 2003. As depicted in Figure 4.1, capital 
adequacy ratios of Halkbank decreased dramatically from 134.9% under the Basel I 
accord to 27.7% and 25.6% under Standardized approach of the Basel II accord and 
Simplified Standardized approach, respectively. The slight difference between SA and 
SSA was as expected due to the assignments of risk weights to banks by external rating 
agencies in the SA. The overall effect of Basel II on Halkbank’s capital adequacy ratios 
was enormous, according to the QIS TR-1. 
 
According to the QIS TR-1, Halkbank recorded a vast amount of pronounced increase 
in its risk weighted assets, resulting in an eventual decline of its capital adequacy ratio 
by 79.4%. Importantly, the main source of the capital erosion was on the site of its 
credit portfolio, which was mostly composed of loans to sovereign and sub-sovereign 
institutions. Other sources of reduction in capital adequacy ratio were the application of 
the operational risk- and the trading book capital charges. The negative marginal 
contribution of the credit risk assets to the capital adequacy ratio was about 99.6 points 
overall. Besides the sovereign portfolio, the SME retail and SME corporate portfolios 
also contributed to the decline of the capital adequacy ratio. Unlike its peers in the 
Turkish banking system, QIS results of Halkbank stood out to a greater extent for its 
specific portfolios. 
  
Figure 4.1: Change of Capital Adequacy Ratio under Basel I, Standardized and Simplified     
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Source: BRSA, QIS TR-1, December, 2004, Halkbank’s QIS Reports. 
 
The main results for Halkbank emerging from the comparison of Basel I and Basel II 
accords in QIS TR-1 are outlined as follows: 
 
4.4.3.1 Impact on Sovereign Portfolio 
 
The largest and most notable increase in the risk weighted assets related to credit risk 
was kept in the sovereign portfolio. According to Basel I, the membership in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was the ground for 
determining a country’s creditworthiness. Therefore, as in the case of Turkey, OECD 
membership generously served the Turkish banks and the governmental institutions to 
enjoy lower borrowing costs due to the preferential capital charges under Basel I 
accord. Under the new framework and in compliance with the national discretions114, a 
lower risk weight could be applied to exposures extended to sovereign debt 
denominated in domestic currency and funded in that currency. By national discretion, 
Halkbank applied a risk weight of “0%” to domestic currency exposures held as 
government bonds. After the economic turmoil in February 2001, the Turkish Treasury 
exchanged the incurred losses of Halkbank completely with the illiquid, non-
marketable government securities. As of June 30, 2003, the outstanding balances on 
Treasury bills and government bonds portfolio of the bank were absorbing 77% of its 
total assets. The breakdown of the sovereign portfolio of Halkbank displayed that the 
                                                 
114 Refer to section 4.4.1, “QIS TR-1 Main National Discretions and Methodology”. 
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government securities held in foreign currency were about 31.1% of the total securities 
portfolio of the bank. As the new framework obliges the foreign exchange denominated 
sovereign debt instruments to charge extra capital, the existing sovereign portfolio’s 
contribution to the decrease in the capital adequacy ratio was highest in relation to the 
other asset types. 
 
4.4.3.2 Impact on SME Portfolio 
 
Halkbank was founded to extend loans to artisans, tradesmen and SMEs especially in 
economically underdeveloped parts of the country. Loans to SMEs by Halkbank had 
been increasing over years as depicted in Figure 4.2. Under the Basel I accord, loans 
extended to SMEs consisted of 9.8% and 69.1% of Halbank’s total loans and total risk 
weighted assets related only to the credit portfolio, respectively. Thus, SME loan 
portfolio had the second largest percentage share in the credit risk weighted assets in 
QIS TR-1 results of Halkbank and absorbed substantial amounts of capital.  
     Figure 4.2: Loans Extended to SME’s by Halkbank 
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As the above graphics suggests, 73.8% of the total SME loans are subject to 50% risk 
weight under the old accord. These SME loans are collateralized to a great extent with 
real estate mortgages. The rest of the portfolio is secured with disallowable collaterals 
such as personal guarantees and mortgages with lower priorities. Therefore, the 
existence of weak credit risk mitigants in terms of Basel II results in the higher amount 
of risk-weighted assets on the SME portfolio. 
 
According to the Basel II accord, exposure on retail claims may be risk-weighted at 
75% bucket. In implementing the new Basel framework, 62.8% of the SME loan 
portfolio was subject to 75% risk weight, especially due to the SME loans treated as 
retail and the amount of the total risk weighted assets of the SME portfolio increased by 
62.3% compared to the old accord. In compliance with the directives of BRSA, 
Halkbank slightly benefited from this national discretion by including only 2.0% of the 
SME loans into the 50% risk weighted assets. 
 
4.4.3.3 Impact on Retail Portfolio 
 
The percentage share of the retail non-mortgage portfolio within the risk weighted 
assets under the new accord was another important result that came out of the QIS TR-1 
for Halkbank. Under Basel II Standardized approach, retail portfolios benefited from a 
lower risk weight of 75% compared to the generally applied 100% risk weight under 
Basel I. To qualify as retail credit, all claims have to be on individual person/s or small 
 88
 89
businesses, the maximum exposure to counterparty must be below EUR 1 million, and 
the pool must be sufficiently diversified.  
 
4.4.3.4 Impact on Bank Portfolio 
 
Claims on banks are risk weighted differently under the new capital regime, as the 
option to use external agency ratings for rated banking counterparties was introduced. 
BRSA in Turkey decided to implement the so-called “Option 2” during the QIS 
exercises. Please refer to Chapter 3, Table 3.2. for the options. Since under Option 2 
risk weights of bank claims depend on the rating of the respective bank, only banks 
with a double-A rating or higher ratings enjoyed the 20% risk weight. Other 
investment-grade banks (i.e. banks with a single-A or triple-B rating) as well as unrated 
banks will have a 50% risk weight. Also according to the national discretion announced 
by the BRSA, claims on banks with an original maturity of 3 months or less, funded in 
the domestic currency are 50% risk weighted. As in comparison to the old accord, the 
risk weighted assets for claims on banks increased by 25.8% in the Standardized 
approach. 
 
4.4.3.5 Impact on Corporate Portfolio 
 
As far as Halkbank’s corporate portfolio was concerned, corporates have an 
undifferentiated risk weight of 100%, regardless of their credit quality. Under the Basel 
II Standardized approach, credit assessments of the corporate claims determined by 
external rating agencies can be risk weighted with the help of external ratings. The 
standard risk weight for unrated claims on corporates is 100%. At national discretion, 
the BRSA decided to implement 100% risk weight, regardless to external ratings of 
corporates, as if the external ratings would not have any material impact on the 
corporate portfolio by switching from the old accord to Basel II.  
4.5 Closing Remarks to the Quantitative Impact Analysis of Basel II 
 
The results of the QIS TR-1 analyzed in this chapter suggest that a multitude of factors 
contributed to the overall drop and dispersion of risk-based capital ratios in Turkey. 
Those factors may be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Recognition of the sovereign risk for the first time in Turkey, coupled with the 
sub-investment grade rating disadvantage of Turkey. 
2. Recognition of the huge amount of government debt instruments in the trading 
books of banks, which result in additional capital charges.  
3. Acknowledgement and recognition of the non-performing, past due loans 
consistently as sub-prime rated borrowers. As the banking books of the Turkish 
banks are loaded with those loans and the provisioning was not materially 
affected, this standard will be a significant capital driver in the near future, for 
those banks, which do not want to disclose or eventually take any corrective 
action for the resolution of bad debt portfolios. 
4. Awareness of the existence of higher risks associated with the corporate 
portfolios, where there are usually exposures related to counterparties with 
credit quality below B-. 
5. Missing internal and external ratings of Turkish banks. There are still banks on 
the market which are not rated by Moody’s or S&P. 
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6. Insufficient and ineligible collateralization, especially for non-SME corporate 
and non-mortgage retail loans. This fact will have very strong influence on the 
loss given default figures at the facility and portfolio levels. 
7. Existence of higher operational risks especially for the public banks in general.  
 
All of these factors will cause for a concern in consideration of the pre-Basel II capital 
adequacy ratio level, which was 28.84% in Turkey. The impact study gives us a hint 
and the ratio will drop to 17.33% level with the introduction of Basel II. All in all, to 
sustain the pre-Basel II ratio level, Turkish banks have to inject more than 10 billions 
EUR of new capital into the system. This fact currently makes the supervisors relatively 
reluctant about the fast implementation of Basel II in Turkey. This detail also implies 
that there are not any incentives for banks in Turkey to adopt the new Basel framework, 
if banks in Turkey preferably choose to remain with the Standardized approach for the 
calculation of minimum capital requirements. The optimal approach may depend on 
individual bank’s profile, but the perception in the market suggests that the biggest 
banks are the most likely to move towards more sophisticated IRB approaches, as they 
want to preserve capital due to competition. In the case of state-owned banks, the 
negative effects of Basel II Standardized approach are apparently disastrous. The state-
owned banks require immediate, long lasting solutions to stop the erosion of their 
capitals.  
 
During the QIS TR-1 analysis in this chapter, sufficient evidence was found to suggest 
that the price or availability of external capital in form of syndications and bond issues 
might be affected by the new Basel capital regime. In particular, sovereign syndications 
and bond issues will be the ultimate candidate to experience adverse transitional effects 
where higher margins are likely to be imposed for Turkish sovereign risk. Furthermore, 
some experts have expressed significant concerns that the new Basel capital regime will 
also lead to a sharp increase in borrowing costs for banks in Turkey. This chapter has 
been in line with these observations, even though the defendants of Basel II 
Standardized approach continue to claim the opposite. Especially, for the syndicated 
loan market, where Turkish banks are most active on the funding side, higher margins 
and decreased liquidity may severely affect the intermediation by the global banks as 
well. As long as the country external ratings do not get any better, Turkish banks may 
continue to suffer from this “country risk” disadvantage under the new regulatory 
environment and the contracting liquidity conditions. 
 
Nevertheless, the QIS TR-1 encourages one to strongly think about the following facts. 
The impact of Basel II on an individual financial institution will depend largely on the 
composition of its business, and the approach that it eventually takes to the calculation 
of regulatory capital. Banks that engage generously in lending to SMEs and those that 
lend to retail customers should see falling capital requirements for credit risk. These 
reductions will be material in some cases, but partially offset by an additional capital 
requirement for operational risk. The part of the banking sector, which is dominated by 
the institutions that engage in retail lending, can expect minor falls in the regulatory 
capital, which will support the soundness and safety principle of the Turkish financial 
system. Further improvements can be achieved by shifting towards more sophisticated 
approaches of Basel II, namely the A-IRB and F-IRB. By becoming more risk sensitive 
in the calculation of capital requirements, banks can also opt to facilitate credit risk 
mitigating techniques, if the competitive edge is to be created and sustained. If banks 
are determined to firmly remain in the business of “sovereign debt and governmental 
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financing”, they are most likely to witness increased merger and acquisition activity in 
Turkey.  In fact, the share ownership of Turkish banks by foreign banks, in terms of 
total assets has quadrupled, since the finalization of the QIS TR-1 in 2004.  
 
One caveat to the QIS TR-1 was that few institutions had the systems in place to 
identify comprehensively those exposures that would be eligible for lower capital 
requirements pursuant to credit risk mitigation. Consequently, QIS TR-1 submissions 
of exposures would have been as if they did not benefit from any collateral or credit 
protection. The BRSA expects that closer to the date of Basel II compliance, systems 
will capture the information necessary to permit the assignment of lower risk weights to 
such exposures. Further discussions with banks also indicated that when a few 
institutions lacked data to adequately estimate parameters, they sometimes choose a 
conservative estimate, potentially creating an upward bias in QIS TR-1 results. 
Therefore, the information on the erosion of capital may be hindered in the future, 
when the potential loss given default would be decreased by the mobilization of 
stronger guarantee schemes. 
 
After reviewing QIS TR-1 results, the BRSA announced a “Road Map” and established 
“a cooperation platform” between the banks and the administrative organs at the heart 
of the regulatory units. In 2005, BRSA officially declared a program to implement the 
proposed framework along an extended timeline and with additional safeguards. The 
agency recognized that the results of QIS TR-1 would raise “minor” concerns if the 
new capital requirements were to be implemented immediately. However, as 
emphasized at the outset, these results were based on best efforts by the banks and 
without benefit of either a definitive set of proposals or meaningful supervisory 
validation of the institutions’ systems. Experience during the multi-year transition 
period to Basel II will provide better basis to assess quantitative implications of and 
make adjustments to the new Basel framework, or make other changes to minimum 
regulatory capital requirements, as appropriate. Some banks will not find the transition 
easy as the implementation costs are likely to be high and will be borne – in the first 
instance at least – by the financial sector. Some of the benefits, in terms of risk 
management, will be accrued throughout time, and the planning to progress towards 
more sophisticated approaches will ensure a brighter future for the Turkish banking 
sector. Some big banks have already started to take serious actions in developing IRB 
models and systems, but the question remains to be the same with regards to the 
validation framework. In the next section, the thesis will propose practical solutions for 
the “best practice” IRB implementation.  
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SECTION III: Implementation of the Basel II IRB 
Approaches 
 
Chapter 5: Implementing the Internal Ratings-Based Approach and 
Its Organizational Foundations 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This section represents further implications of the Basel II accord on banking 
supervision and capital requirements when implementing the new accord in an 
emerging market banking system, such as in Turkey. As initially seen from the results 
of QIS TR-1, “The Turkish banking industry is faced with an overall increase of 56.7% 
in risk weighted assets coupled with a decrease of capital adequacy ratio down  to 
17.33% from a level of 28.84%”115. This “free flow of capital adequacy ratio” within 
the context of a second quantitative impact stage is reemphasized again by a more up to 
date study (QIS TR-2), which was completed as of June 2007, and the outcome was not 
any different than the former studies, namely the QIS 3 and QIS TR-1. The results point 
towards a terrain loss of the capital adequacy ratio down to 13.68% from the existing 
level of 19.31% as reported in the second half of 2007116. The message of the second 
quantitative impact study indicated an erosion of capital by a factor of 30% if and when 
the Basel II Standardized approach is implemented. This means that one out of three 
banks will be faced with the complete loss of its capital in the case of Basel II’s SA.  
 
In ordinary banking terms, the restoration of the capital losses should be compensated 
through either re-pricing of risks or by the injection of fresh capital, if the banking 
system is to remain at the current capital adequacy ratio of 19.31%. In this respect, the 
current ratio may address the ambiguity of “over-capitalization” for the Turkish banks, 
whereas the capitalization rate of the Turkish banks should be interpreted within the 
context of existing higher systemic risks in Turkey. After all, the standard “cook ratio” 
of 8%, prescribed in the former accord may not be adequate to sustain a “safe and 
sound” banking system in Turkey. Hence, the Turkish banking system should not lose 
the chance of adopting more efficient and effective capital measurement and allocation 
methods, including the adoption of IRB approaches. Having said that, it is important to 
note that the IRB approaches themselves need to be recalibrated and crash tested in 
accordance with national discretions and globally during the testing phases of Basel II 
implementation. Only more risk sensitive and more precise capital saving methods may 
ensure the preservation of capital inside the Turkish banking system. 
 
Contrary to the resistance towards the adoption of IRB approaches as voiced by the 
participant banks in QIS TR-2, the Basel QIS 5 as of June 2006 reported that 382 
financial institutions in more than 32 countries in the world would confess themselves 
to the rituals of an IRB approach117. One can see, therefore, that many more banks 
around the world are aiming to adopt one of the IRB approaches, in comparison to what 
was previously reported within the results of the QIS 3 as discussed in Chapter 4. Even 
though the minimum standards and requirements are more extensive for the adoption of 
 
115 QIS-TR Evaluation Report of BDDK (2004, p. 34). 
116 BRSA Quantitative Impact Study II, 2007, p.5. 
117 BIS: Quantitative Impact Study 5, 2006, Basel  
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IRB approaches than the Standardized approach and the bar to cross over is raised to 
higher levels with the revised Basel II documents, ensuring those standards and 
requirements is becoming one of the key goals and objectives in the eyes of the Turkish 
risk managers and regulators.  
 
Putting IRB approaches into practice is easier said than done and hence represents a big 
challenge for the industry representatives and regulators in Turkey. The industry 
representatives are stretched even further when considering the timetable and the road 
map to Basel II as prescribed by the regulators in Turkey. Even though the shift to IRB 
approaches was envisaged as of March 2006, the timetable for a possible kick of a 
“regulatory validation” is postponed until the beginning of 2009118. In this respect, this 
“bonus time” for a possible switch to one of the two IRB approaches allows the 
banking industry to make sound conclusions for a “make or buy” decision for more 
sophisticated models and applications than internally available. This in turn creates a 
kind of “comfort zone” for the regulators to be a bit more open and transparent about 
their plans for future supervisory and regulatory activities in respect to the finalization 
of IRB approaches.  
 
Up to the present moment, the quantitative impact studies discussed in Chapter 4 
confirmed the necessity of IRB approaches for more risk sensitive measurement and 
allocation of capital. The author in addition believes that, under the systemic conditions 
in Turkey, the biggest challenge will be the detailed planning and transition of the 
existing organizational structures at banks. Respectively, this chapter will offer 
guidelines and suggestions for the “best practice” implementation at an organizational 
level. The requirements under Pillar 2 are not just meant to suggest that existing 
mechanisms, which have primarily met the fundamental needs of the existing 
institutions over the years, necessarily need to be immediately replaced. However, more 
than adequate processes need to be in place to ensure Internal Capital Adequacy 
Process (ICAAP) to be embedded in the institution’s business and organizational 
structures. ICAAP should not simply be regarded as an add-on that permits both 
supervisory and management functions to ‘tick a box’ and indicate that supervisory 
expectations nominally have been met. At the same time, it is not meant to be simply a 
“validation process” for the models and applications to be used. Rather, Pillar 2 is 
regarded as an itinerary to convince the regulators that the bank has established a 
robust and safe framework, organizational processes and structures to measure, 
manage and mitigate all types of risks. On the other hand, the result of the Supervisory 
Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) may in fact lead to additional capital 
requirements on top of Pillar 1 determined “threshold capital”, if the bank’s 
organizational framework is not found to be adequate and effective to deal with the 
nature of banking risks, including portfolio-level concentration risks compared to its 
peers. As a result, the progress towards the IRB approaches will lead to the direct 
streamlining of the risk management processes at both “facility and portfolio levels”.  
 
This chapter will aim to contribute to the fundamentals of IRB implementation within 
the boundaries of the following key principles: 
 
 
118 The decision was indicated very recently at the internet site of the BRSA. 
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1. The Risk Management Wholesale (RMW) reflects “client focused” business 
strategy. Business units are responsible for the selection of clients and managing all 
of the business activities with clients within approved limits. 
2. RMW sustains high level of risk expertise via industry analysts and loan product 
specialists. 
3. Though integrated, RMW diligently maintains its independence from commercial 
functions by the acceptance of the fundamental principle of “segregation of duties”. 
4. The approval of any risk sensitive product or solution should require the approval 
of authorized committees and direct involvement of risk professionals, conditioned 
upon the effective implementation of information and control systems to manage 
the associated risks. 
5. Risk Management structures, policies and procedures should be as transparent as 
possible, based on consistent principles, in written form and well documented. 
6. Risk and reward from a transaction are borne by the same business unit. 
7. Counterparty ratings are an indispensable tool for managing and monitoring 
credit risk of the bank, both at counterparty and portfolio level. 
 
In consideration of the three pillars in the Basel II accord, the new structure proposed in 
this chapter provides a high level overview of risk management function for the 
Wholesale Client Strategic Business Units (WCS) and is divided into the following 
sections: 
 
1. Key Issues in Implementing the IRB. 
2. Organizational Backbone of Basel II Compliant Risk Management Framework. 
3. The Role of the Group Risk Management functions.  
4. The Role of Portfolio Management functions. 
5.2 Key Issues in Implementing the IRB 
 
5.2.1 Overview of the Basel II Requirements for the Implementation of IRB 
Approaches 
 
The transition to IRB approaches basically requires a bank to demonstrate to its 
supervisors that its ongoing systems may differentiate and quantify risk in a consistent 
and reliable way at the outset and on an ongoing basis119. A qualifying IRB system, 
which comprises of  methods, processes, controls and data collection through IT 
systems, should differentiate between the risk of borrower default (obligor risk) and the 
transaction-specific default, called facility risk. A “rating system” is required for the 
assessment of credit risk, the assignment of internal ratings and the quantification of 
default and loss estimates. Before discussing internal rating systems in detail, it may be 
useful to summarize some of the key qualitative prescriptions from the Basel II 
accord120.  
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the European Commission issued 
bank solvency directives in which, under the Foundation and Advanced IRB 
approaches, counterparty ratings are a key factor to determine the minimum regulatory 
 
119 BIS, Framework (2006, parag. 388) 
120 Saita, F.: Value at Risk and Bank Capital Management – Risk Adjusted Performances, Capital Management and Capital 
Allocation Decision Making. London: Academic Press, 2007, p. 84, derived from BIS Framework, 2006. 
 95
capital that a bank has to maintain for credit risks. Consequently, all counterparties 
must be assigned a counterparty rating. Moreover, the information on which the rating 
is based upon, must be stored and that rating must be validated. As a consequence, 
sophisticated rating systems are needed to assist in the assignment of ratings for 
decision making purposes with respect to the management of credit risks. 
 
5.2.1.1 Rating Systems and Approaches to Rating Assignment  
 (Basel II Accord pp. 394-421) 
 
The focus in this thesis is the measurement of the credit risks. Credit risk encompasses 
all forms of counterparty exposure in relation to lending, trading, hedging, settlement 
and other financial activities. Counterparty ratings embody: 
 
• An assessment by the bank of the risk that the counterparty will default or will 
be unlikely to pay with respect to its financial obligations to the bank.  
• All the information such as financial, macro-economic, industry and 
management-related etc. that the bank has regarding its client is relevant for this 
risk assessment. 
 
The main purpose in the establishment of internal rating is to find an “indicator of the 
client’s creditworthiness” at the counterparty level. At a portfolio level, internal ratings 
are used to report the general trends regarding the quality of the bank’s credit portfolio. 
Furthermore, ratings are necessary for credit portfolio models, which help in the 
determination of economic capital and subsequent risk-adjusted profitability of the 
portfolio. 
 
It is possible to use multiple rating systems for different industries/market segments and 
asset types provided the criteria for assigning a borrower to a rating system is 
documented and appropriate. For example, the scope of these models can be divided 
into as follows: 
• Corporate models for wholesale clients and diversified groups 
• Non-corporate global rating models consisting of a bank, insurance, finance, 
asset securitization conduits, project finance, sovereigns, sub-sovereigns and for 
trade and commodity finance facilities 
• Regional rating models for specific client groups 
• Rating models for SME clients 
According to the Basel II requirements, “Ratings should incorporate all available 
relevant information. Scoring or other quantitative models can be used, but sufficient 
human oversight is needed to check that all relevant information, even outside the 
scope of the model, is properly used. Written guidance is needed on how models and 
human judgment may be combined”. 
However, in certain cases, there are “not any or very limited financial information” 
available for a financial assessment. Although it is not possible to use a rating model in 
such cases, a uniform verbal scoring must be assigned to each exposure. Again if there 
is not any or too limited financial information available, but where an external agency 
rating is available, the mapping between the internal scoring and the external agency 
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rating should be executed. If there are two different external agency ratings, then the 
lower of the two should be taken. 
An interesting case might be with respect to the “No or Limited Financial Info – but 
available Group Support”. In this case, an upward adjustment can be applied if the 
counterparty is part of a group or has a shareholder that is likely to support the 
counterparty to fulfill its financial obligations. The likelihood of support must be 
backed-up by tangible evidence and any proposed amendment to the initial rating 
should be explicitly explained in the credit proposal. 
In case of limited information to determine the rating of an obligor, and there exists a 
“third party guarantee”, which is given for the counterparty, a maximum score should 
be provided at a level, not exceeding the “acceptable risk” category121. Contrary to the 
existing credit practices today, the Basel II blocks the substitution of counterparty 
ratings with the rating of the guarantor. Under the new Basel framework, the guarantee 
is taken into account at facility level and mostly better rating of the guarantor is used 
with respect to both economic and regulatory capital requirements. 
 
5.2.1.2 Need for Bi-Dimensional Rating (pp. 396-399) 
 
A qualifying IRB rating system should be bi-dimensional. It should separately consider 
the risk of borrower default (obligor rating) and transaction-specific factors e.g., 
collateral or other guarantees. Hence the rating system should not be based on the 
overall expected loss of the exposure. For banks using the A-IRB approach, facility 
rating must reflect exclusively the Loss Given Default measure (LGD). LGD is defined 
as the “economic loss that the bank expects to suffer on a credit facility of which the 
counterparty defaults”. The LGD is expressed as a percentage of the expected exposure 
at default. In this regard, each credit proposal should contain the obligor rating and 
facility (LGD) rating. 
 
In light of the changing capital adequacy legislation, a bank may opt for the A-IRB 
Approach, when approved by the regulator. This approach will allow the bank to use its 
own estimates of LGD, EAD PD and maturity as building blocks for calculating 
minimum capital levels for credit risk exposure. In essence, assigning an LGD means 
comparing the net values of the bank’s collateral (or seniority when unsecured) to the 
expected outstanding at the time of default (EAD). The LGD rating corresponds with a 
percentage, assigned at origination or at review when it is referred to as the “expected 
LGD”. 
5.2.1.3 Rating Structure and Granularity of Rating Grades (pp. 403–408) 
 
Both borrower- and facility-rating scales should avoid excessive concentration within 
the same grade. For corporate, sovereign, and bank exposures, a borrower-rating scale 
must have at least seven different grades for non-defaulted borrowers plus one for 
defaulted borrowers. The grade definition must include both a description of the degree 
of default risk typical for borrowers assigned the grade and the criteria used to 
distinguish that level of credit risk. Concentration risk is the mortal enemy of good 
credit risk management, where banks preferably use limit systems to tightly control for 
 
121 The same rule applies for the cash collateralized facilities under limited financial information. 
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such correlation effects. It is far better and more practical to have that maximum 
exposure set by risk rating so that exposure and risk are more closely matched. 
 
5.2.1.4 Rating Criteria and Processes Documentation (pp. 410,418- 421) 
 
A bank must have specific rating definitions, processes, and criteria for rating 
assignment. Criteria must be documented and clear enough to allow third parties (e.g., 
auditors, supervisors) to replicate rating assignments. Rating procedures and 
responsibilities in rating assignment must be documented as well. The process 
descriptions are provided in sub-section 5.6.1.1 “Credit Approval Process Framework”. 
 
5.2.1.5 Rating Assignment Horizon (pp. 414 – 416) 
 
The Basel committee recognizes that “although the time horizon used in PD estimation 
is currently one year, banks are widely expected to use a longer time horizon in 
assigning ratings. A borrower’s rating must express the borrower’s essential ability and 
willingness to perform, despite adverse economic conditions”. 
 
As mentioned earlier, obligor ratings reflect the probability that obligor will default, but 
the critical question is: What is the relevant time horizon? Do counterparty ratings 
predict default risk over one year, over a complete business cycle or something in 
between? The answer to such questions lies in the extent ratings should be assigned and 
validated. The thesis will evaluate the choice of rating horizons in Chapter 6, sub-
section 6.6.1, but here are the two extremes in brief: 
1. Point in Time (PIT): PIT ratings represent the default probability in a relative 
short period, typically one year. PIT ratings tend to adjust quickly to changes in 
the financial conciliation of a counterparty and/or economic environment; hence 
these ratings are relatively volatile. Overall, PIT ratings tend to fall during 
economic downturns and rise during economic expansions. 
2. Through the Cycle (TTC): TTC ratings represent the probability of default 
taking into account a full business cycle. TTC ratings change only if there is a 
fundamental change in the counterparty’s situation, business and outlook. TTC 
ratings will not change due to business cycle patterns. Consequently, TTC 
ratings change less in frequency and magnitude than PIT ratings122. 
Important considerations for the choice of the rating horizon under IRB approaches 
emanate as follows: 
• It is naturally desirable that internal ratings based credit risk measurements are 
intuitively consistent with how credit risk is assessed within the bank. For 
example, when judging the credit risk of lending to counterparty, a bank does 
not limit itself strictly to one year, but considers explicitly potential downside 
risk. Higher and more immediate the downside risk is, more credit analysis 
focuses on the immediate future and consequently shorter the rating horizon will 
be. This is consistent with the approaches external rating agencies take. 
 
122 For PIT vs. TTC debate, Ranson, B.: Credit Risk Management. Texas: Sheshuneoff, 2005, chapter 5, pp. 14-40. 
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• Basel II requires that ratings or the default rates are “stressed”, which means 
that an economic or industry downturn is considered in the rating assignment123. 
• For reasons of transparency and the purpose of benchmarking to market 
standards, an IRB-compliant bank has to map its internal ratings to the ratings 
of renowned agencies like Standard & Poors (S&P), Moody’s and Fitch. 
According to S&P, its credit ratings are meant to be “forward looking” and their 
time horizon extends as far as analytically foreseeable. Ratings are held constant 
through the cycle, or alternatively, they may vary, but within a relatively narrow 
band. Similar to S&P, Moody’s holds a similar procedure when assigning 
agency ratings, however, its subsidiary, “KMV”, which is a  credit and portfolio 
risk management solutions provider, offers further depth on the selection of 
models and rating horizons in Chapter 6, sub-chapter 6.6.1, “Time Horizon”.  
Consequently, an IRB-compliant bank should apply the following rating philosophy to 
assess default risk124: 
• The credit authority assigning counterparty rating must take into account 
longer-term downside risk. The rating horizon of the rating grades should be 
between two and five years, where lower the default risk is, longer the rating 
horizon becomes. If default risk is high then the internal rating primarily should 
reflect this high (immediate) risk. However, if there is a low probability of 
short-term default the rating should reflect the medium term risk considering 
positions when business conditions might have become less favorable. 
•  Although in many aspects the internal ratings and agency ratings are 
comparable, this does not preclude, that internal grades and external agency 
ratings might be different on some aspects or for some counterparties. 
 
5.2.1.6 Use of Models (p. 417) 
 
This paragraph puts greater strength on the predictive power of the model and its 
combination with the human judgment to avoid possible idiosyncratic errors made by 
the formal rating systems. The bank must demonstrate that the data used to build the 
model is representative of the population of the bank’s actual borrowers and facilities. 
 
5.2.1.7 Use of Internal Ratings “Use Test” (pp. 444-445) 
 
 Internal ratings and default loss estimates must play an essential role in the credit 
approval, risk management, internal capital allocation and corporate governance 
functions of banks using the IRB approaches. It is recognized that the same estimates 
may not be used for all purposes (e.g., PD and LGD estimates for pricing purposes may 
differ). According to paragraph 444 of the new Basel framework, “Rating systems and 
estimates designed and implemented exclusively for the purpose of qualifying for the 
IRB approach and used only to provide IRB inputs are not acceptable. For example, 
pricing models are likely to use PDs and LGDs relevant to the life of the asset. A Bank 
                                                 
123 BIS, Framework (2006, parag. 434-435). 
124 Blochwitz, Martin and When (2006) have coined the term “Rating philosophy” as being, what is commonly referred to as 
either PIT or TTC ratings. Blochwitz, S. /Martin, M. /Wehni, C.: Statistical Approaches to PD Validation. In: Engelmann, B. 
/Rauhmeier, R. (eds.): The Basel II Risk Parameters –Estimation, Validation and Stress Testing. Berlin: Springer, 2006, pp. 289-
306. 
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must have a credible track record in the use of internal ratings information for at least 
three years prior to qualification”. 
 
When a uniform counterparty rating is proposed or reviewed, then in most cases a 
counterparty rating model will be applicable, e.g. a “corporate rating model” or “bank 
scoring model” etc. If a rating model is applicable, the relevant rating information for 
the credit proposal must be inserted into the respective model. The output of the rating 
model must be attached to the credit proposals for decision making purposes by the 
credit authorities. This “inclusion of the rating information” into the credit proposals 
should reflect the “sound and integral implementation” of the rating systems, before the 
approval of the regulatory authority. An IRB-compliant bank using the A-IRB approach 
must demonstrate that it has been estimating and employing LGD and EAD for at least 
7 years (parag. 472), whereas estimating and employing PDs require historical data for 
at least for 5 years (parag. 463)125. 
 
 5.2.1.8 Risk Quantification and Data Standards (446-451, 461-467) 
 
Generally, all banks using IRB approaches must estimate a PD to each internal 
borrower grade for corporate, sovereign and bank exposures and to each pool for retail 
exposures. Data collected beyond the implementation date must comply with the 
minimum standards, unless otherwise stated. Furthermore, banks on the A-IRB 
approach must estimate an appropriate LGD and EAD for each of its facilities, which 
must be backed up by historical experience and empirical evidence. The internal rating 
models for PD, LGD and EAD must perform powerful and highly accurate in-, and out-
of-sample. 
 
5.2.1.9 Corporate Governance and Oversight (pp. 438-440, 441-443) 
 
All material aspects of rating assignment and estimation processes must be approved by 
the supervisory board and the senior management. Management must ensure regularly 
that the rating system is working properly. Banks must have independent credit risk 
control units that are responsible for the design and implementation of internal rating 
systems, model tests, and reviews. The Internal Audit or an equally independent 
function must review the whole rating system at least annually. 
 
5.2.1.10 Double Default Framework and Rating Migrations (pp 435i-436, 469) 
 
Double Default refers to the default of both the obligor and the guarantor at the same 
time126.Banks using the double default framework must consider as part of their stress-
testing framework the impact of deterioration in the credit quality of protection 
providers, in particular the impact of protection providers falling outside the eligibility 
criteria due to rating changes. Banks should be aware of the impact of the default of one 
but not both of the obligor and guarantor on the risk and capital requirements at the 
time of default. Furthermore, banks should consider the rating migrations, due to the 
changes in credit quality, external ratings or the worsening of the credit cycle. In its 
 
125 Gaumert, U.: Core Principles of Ratings – Basel II and MaK confirm Organization of the Credits. Köln: Bank-Verlag, 2005, p. 
21, (in German). 
126 Peter, C.: Estimating Loss Given Default – Experiences from Banking Practices. In: Engelmann, B. / Rauhmeier, R. (eds.): The 
Basel II Risk Parameters. Berlin: Springer, 2006, pp. 144-175. 
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analysis, the bank must consider the extent of any dependence between the risk of the 
borrower and that of the collateral or collateral provider. In first versions of the 
document, Basel II restricted risk mitigation effects of guarantees. Currently, banks are 
using “substitution approach”. Under this approach, facilities that are partly guaranteed 
are split into two parts for the calculation, namely a guaranteed part and an un-
guaranteed part. For the guaranteed part, rating substitution is used when calculating 
the expected loss and capital required. If the rating is better than the rating of the 
obligor, the rating of the guarantor is used to calculate expected loss and the capital for 
the guaranteed part of the facility. If the rating of the guarantor is equal or worse than 
the rating of the borrower, the rating is not substituted. After calculating expected loss 
and capital separately for both parts, they are summed up to get the total figure for the 
facility. In the revised Basel II document, however, the bank can only lose money when 
both the obligor and the guarantor default at the same time under the double default 
methodology. In this case, the 1-year joint default frequency (JDF) should be used to 
determine expected loss and capital for the guaranteed part of the facility127. 
 
5.2.1.11 Validation (pp. 500-505) 
 
Banks must have a robust system in place to validate the accuracy and consistency of 
rating systems, processes, and the estimation of all risk components. Conceptually, 
validation encompasses a range of processes and activities that contribute to an 
assessment of whether ratings adequately differentiate risk among borrowers and risk 
components (PD, LGD and EAD) appropriately characterize the relevant aspects of the 
risks. Even though the Basel II framework does not specify what exactly constitutes a 
proper validation, the validation of internal rating systems lies at the center of the IRB 
approval process. Therefore, the determination of content and meaning of validation is 
left to the Accord Implementation Group (AIG)’s further research and proposals128. 
Fulfilling the validation requirements of any supervisor is likely to include reference to 
the “independence” of the validation process. Accordingly, the equivalent CEBS 
guidelines suggest that the validation processes and results should be reviewed for 
integrity by parties independent of those responsible for the design and implementation 
of the validation process129. In this regard, the establishment of the independent 
validation unit called, GRM Quantitative Consultancy (GRM QC), is proposed as a 
starting point for the resolution of validation issues.  
 
Since 2004 with the release of the Basel II accord, financial services industry has been 
facing major changes right across the business. Nevertheless, the problem is not exactly 
at the definition stage. The banking industry has to wait and see how the new rules will 
be interpreted if and when they are converted into the statements of discretionary 
“banking directives”. There are difficult decisions to be made before understanding the 
size and nature of the challenge, and there is every potential for making very expensive 
errors on the forefront of Basel II. Given this complexity, it is likely that many banks 
will find themselves in a situation, where getting their senior management fully 
engaged into the implementation of IRB will be difficult for the following reasons: 
 
127 Peter, C.: Estimating Loss Given Default (2006, p. 165). For technical details see BCBS and double default documents. 
128 Basel Committee Newsletter No. 4, “Update on work of the Accord Implementation Group related validation under Basel II 
Framework, Jan. 2005, pp.1-4. 
129 Cited in, Duncan, E.: Regulatory Priorities and Expectations in the Implementation of the IRB Approach. In: Ong, M. K. (ed.): 
The Basel Handbook, 2nd Edition – A guide for Financial Practioners. London: Riskbooks, 2007. 
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• Responsibility for change and the commitment to meeting the new standards are 
not always clear. 
• There is a substantial increase in the number of rules and their complexity, 
which place a barrier for a complete interpretation. 
• The implementation date for IRB approaches in Turkey, the end of 2009 has 
always seemed rather distant, while there are more urgent needs that call on the 
genuine resources. 
• Data cleansing itself constitutes a big deal of challenge.  
• Last but not least, a successful implementation requires a mentality change 
across all layers of the organization, which in itself is a major challenge. 
 
The experience richly acquired through the Basel II implementation programs like that 
of Barclays Bank for instance shows that to be an undisputed winner, there are a few 
critical areas of focus. In the next sub-sections, the thesis will evaluate the activities 
that a successful organization needs to prioritize and increase focus on130. 
 
5.2.2 Capital Management and Origination 
 
According to the Barclay’s Bank’s Basel II experience, there are two main stages to 
capital management at pre- and post-origination of risk assets. Pre-origination 
management of capital requires a thorough understanding of the impact of regulatory 
rules on target portfolios, and the multiple products associated with each segment. In 
order to be effective, each business line and product area must have a deep 
understanding of the regulatory capital effects of the new regulation, and the boundaries 
that they must work within. The business side can not be expected to do this alone 
because Basel II covers a broad range of issues with a formidable level of complexity. 
“A successful Basel II project team will ensure that each area of the business is in an 
emphatic position to react to the pre-origination issues”. This means that the whole 
change in the risk management and client management areas of a bank should be 
supported by a complementary change in the primary management philosophy of the 
Basel II implementing bank. The management should be indoctrinated towards the 
“creation of value”. At which facility the value is destroyed should be of great concern 
for the portfolio managers and this fact should be immediately reported to the 
management131. 
 
On the product side, the product teams will have to understand the capital implications 
of the facilities under the new rules. Accordingly, to preserve capital and to ensure the 
ongoing profitability, they should be allowed to act in order to change the risks 
associated with the customers and products. In the post-origination stage, there should 
be a possibility for the business side to reduce capital through risk mitigation, 
diversification or re-pricing of the facilities, if it elects to do so. The business needs to 
develop a culture, organizational structures and necessary mechanisms to off-load 
assets at a reasonable cost to reduce risk weighted assets and hence capital requirement, 
 
130 Wilson, I.: Implementing Basel II: A case study based on the Barclays Basel II preparations (2004, pp.1-10). 
131 For Risk Management and Shareholder’s Value in Banking refer to Resti / Sironi, 2007, pp. 651-735 and Rao, V. / Dev, A.: 
Capital Allocation Using Risk Management Tools, Economic Capital and Shareholders’ Value Creation. In: Ong, .M.K (ed.), Risk 
Management – A Modern Perspective. London: Elsevier Inc., 2006, pp.415-433. 
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when the market conditions do permit for this. The power and ability to change the 
balance sheet to release regulatory capital depends upon the views of the external 
stakeholders, such as: 
 
• Regulatory bodies  
• Equity Investors 
• Debt Investors 
• Rating agencies 
 
5.2.3 Risk Management 
 
The key purpose of Basel II is to align regulatory capital assessment more closely with 
the risks faced by the business. Banks have been managing credit risk for many years 
with differing on levels of sophistication. No matter what the current level of risk 
management capability, there are still areas that need to change for the better, in order 
to comply with the specific requirements of the IRB approaches. On the other hand, it is 
important to maintain the existing standards, which may be more rigorous or further 
advanced than Basel II, while ensuring that regulatory standards are met. There are a 
few areas that a bank should actively concentrate on in the early stages of the Basel II 
implementation for the successful compliance with the regulation. These can be 
summarized as the models, minimum standards, policy, governance and reporting 
issues. 
 
Even if the bank is successful in obtaining IRB status, there are significant maintenance 
costs that must be absorbed. Models have to be validated annually or more frequently if 
they fall outside pre-determined performance ranges. The whole risk infrastructure has 
to be able to keep up with any upgrading standards that the regulator can impose at its 
discretion. To implement the IRB, the bank needs to be extremely honest with it. If the 
bank has the budget and the will to move to IRB approaches, it must be able to satisfy 
the following: 
  
• Sufficient number of people of high caliber to enable and sustain the IRB 
framework 
• Process and systems change capability that can be sustained alongside all the 
other change that is planned by the business.   
 
If the bank can satisfy the above conditions then it is time to consider the advantages 
and disadvantages of shifting to one of the IRB approaches. Initially, the modification 
required to achieve IRB status is significant and comes with high costs attached. 
Secondly, the amount of energy and efforts the organization will invest in managing the 
change is significant. Finally, there is the risk of failure and the associated 
repercussions. Having deployed a considerable number of resources in building and 
maintaining a “candidate” system for IRB, the failure of the candidate system during 
the supervisory review and evaluation would mean a bank would have to revert to using 
the Standardized approach or something close to it, as agreed with the regulator. This 
would result in the loss of any capital advantage that was expected from the IRB 
approaches, and cause repercussions in the marketplace, such as share price devaluation 
and reputation risk that might lead to possible rating downgrades.  
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5.2.4 Program Management 
 
It is possible for the scope and complexity of change to be so pervasive at the bank that 
the change can not be achieved by a central project team alone. To achieve any success 
in IRB implementation, the common reservations must be ‘socialized’ across all the 
business areas of the bank. Accordingly, the buy-in of each business area must be 
obtained for the reasons of change, so that each business area will be ready to meet the 
challenge.  
 
The leadership of a program on this scale must be highly dedicated to the task, as the 
task at hand can not be carried out by the desk. Successful implementation relies upon a 
strong and visible leader with a clear sense of direction and an ability to understand the 
big picture that stretches from systems, governance, data, and process to individual 
business requirements side-by-side with the risk management requirements.  
 
A successful program will need to call on a significant number of highly specialized 
resources from each business area, but also of the ability to understand, at least on a 
high level the issues concerning business areas other than their own. While IRB 
compliance may be a medium-term goal for most banks in Turkey, the changes must 
start now. During a change program, it will be suicidal for banks to wait for the 
regulators to provide clarifications and interpretations on the standards and 
consultative papers of Basel II. Instead, the bank should create a team of experts, with 
specializations ranging from regulatory capital to modeling, data management, risk 
process and governance. Successful implementation will depend upon the available 
expertise at the bank! 
5.3 Organizational Backbone of Basel II Compliant Risk Management 
Framework132 
 
On the path to Basel II, to sustain a long term cultural shift in risk and capital 
management, the starting point for a bank will be the design of an organization with a 
strategic emphasis on the “Wholesale Banking” supported by a separate “Wholesale 
Clients Risk Management” (WCRM) within a multi discipline banking context (that 
usually includes retail banking, asset management, commercial banking etc.). Under 
this context the role of the risk management may be defined as follows:  
 
“Risk Management covers all risks including credit, market, operational liquidity and 
documentation related to credit facilities to be provided to Wholesale Clients (WCS) 
and involves the process from origination to approval and ongoing control, review, 
maintenance and optimization of exposures”.  
 
132 Sources consulted to complete this section: Edwards, P. /Bowen, P.: Risk Management in Project Organizations. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2005, 
Chapter 9: Building a Risk Management System; Lore, M. /Borodovsky, L. (Eds.): The Professional’s Handbook of Financial Risk Management. Oxford: 
Butterworth-Heinemann, 2000, Part 4: Capital Management, Technology and Regulation. Especially, refer to the article of Shyam V. for Implementing a firm-
wide risk management framework.  For the organizational transformation process as a case from Switzerland, Wuffli, and P.A.: Elements and Processes of the 
risk/return Optimization in a Bank Conglomerate – Case SBV. In: Basler Bankenvereinigung (Ed.), Risk Management in Banken. Bern: Paul Haupt Verlag, 1994. 
For the integration of risk management into the strategic management process, Hirszowics, Ch.: Swiss Banking Policy, 5th. Edition. Bern: Paul Haupt Verlag, 
2003 (in German) and Jovic, D.: Risk Oriented Economic Capital Allocation and Performance Measurement in Banking. Berne: Paul Haupt Verlag, 1999 (in 
German). For Basel II compliant Credit Risk Management, Ranson, B.: Credit Risk Management. Texas: Sheshunoff, 2005, Chapter 17 organizational and human 
resource issues of credit risk management. For sources from Germany to compare min. credit standards (MaK) in an organizational context: Henrich, M.: The 
MaK from the Perspective of a Bank. In: Hofmann, G. (Ed.): Basel II and MaK. Frankfurt: Bankakad. Verlag, 2002 (in German). Last but not least, a superb 
implementation of IRB is provided at Gaumert, U.: Core Principles of Rating. Köln: BankVerlag, 2005 (in German). 
 
The following chart provides a blueprint for a Risk Management organization where 
the structures can be extended and customized as appropriate to each country of 
operation, bringing into consideration its specific banking system. 
 
Figure 5.1: Wholesale Clients – Risk Management Organization and Core Functions 
 
Source: Author 
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By appending the Basel II based risk-, product- and facility types under the wholesale 
clients risk management functions as main ingredients of the organization, the author 
intends to re-emphasize the importance of the risk management function and the 
improved practices under the new Basel framework. While prudential capital adequacy 
rules are applied by each Turkish bank in an evolutionary nature, it seems clear from 
the existing organizational and functional developments to date that, IRB 
implementation as a major piece of Basel II will be securely and peacefully anchored in 
its “regulatory place”. However, it is also apparent that the IRB implementation still 
awaits further developments in the Turkish banking system when compared to the 
structure and functions illustrated in Figure 5.1. The wider scope of IRB 
implementation relies not only on modeling capability, quantitative and qualitative 
capital adequacy rules, but also on organizational structures and responsibilities 
combined with effective credit approval processes. The difficulty faced by bankers in 
Turkey has been compounded further by delays in finalizing the regulatory documents 
with regards to the Basel II framework, in particular the IRB approaches. Although the 
banks in Turkey are now more focused on the modeling, data, systems aspects of the 
new Basel framework, the Pillar 2 ICAAP and SREP of the new accord interestingly 
stress the equal (if not more) importance of corporate governance, the best practice uses 
and the risk culture at banks. If banks fail to satisfy the regulators on how as an 
organization and its functions they manage and mitigate risks, the regulators can 
increase the capital requirements of the bank. Please refer to details in Chapter 3, sub-
section 3.4.3.3 Pillar 2, “Role of Supervision”. Consequently, the organization 
structures and functions are the key for a successful implementation of Basel II IRB 
approaches.  
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For convenience and expediency, Figure 5.1 lays out the foundations of an exemplary 
IRB organization for a given business group, which is in this case the wholesale 
corporate banking group. In essence, Figure 5.1 suggests the basic organization of risk 
functions under the new Basel II framework. Intended as a blueprint for the new 
structure of risk management, the chart does not provide detailed information on the 
operational procedures and policies, all of which are subject to change with the new 
Basel II requirements and will be unique for each business domain of the bank. 
Therefore, more business-specific rules and guidelines should be established 
throughout the Pillar 2 process of a bank and disclosed in Pillar 3. Moreover, it should 
be recognized that the successful transition from the current situation to the structures 
as a result of the Basel II framework requires an actively managed change process. The 
transition management and business-specific issues are outside the scope of this thesis 
and sub-section.  
 
In addition to the organizational changes related to the management of all risks, the re-
design specifically involves relatively large-scale changes to the management of credit 
risks. The new credit risk structure represents a migration from a decentralized system 
to the one with primarily centralized approval and decentralized monitoring and 
control. This change is intended to create a more efficient, reliable and sophisticated 
credit function. Similarly, the measurement, monitoring and control functions remain a 
vital component of the “semi-independent” risk organization. The re-designed risk 
organization remains consistent with the BIS principles for best practices of Credit Risk 
Management (September 2000). All of these developments led to the concepts of 
“Group Risk Management” or to “Enterprise Risk Management” functions, that 
overseas the integrated risks for the entire institution. 
5.4 Group Risk Management (GRM) as the Final Decision Maker 
 
5.4.1 Organization of GRM and its Functions  
 
The mission of the Corporate Center Group Risk Management or Group Risk 
Management in short is to improve economic value for shareholders through 
maintaining a high quality risk portfolio and therefore ensuring the “targeted” rating of 
the bank. The GRM is responsible for formulating and setting the overall policy 
framework for credit-, market-, industry-, product- and operational risk for the bank. 
This should be done in close cooperation with the Strategic Business Units on the risk 
management side, such as the Wholesale Clients Business Units depicted in Figure 5.1 
in previous section. The GRM presides over all risk management activities of the bank 
and is primarily focused on the following activities: 
 
1. The development and approval of the high level risk policy. 
2. Management of risks on a high level by individual and portfolio basis. 
3. Institutionalization of prudent control mechanisms. 
4. Approval of large exposures. 
5. Management of intra strategic business unit issues. 
 
The daily management of all risk functions is handled by Wholesale Clients Risk 
Management Units. The organization of the Group Risk Management, involves the 
several functions, which will be discussed in the next sub-sections.  
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5.4.2 Group Credit Risk Management 
 
The credit risk management can be structured on the basis of the Advanced IRB 
approach, sustaining the future organizational and procedural requirements of Basel II. 
Even if Standardized approach or Foundation IRB is chosen or approved initially, the 
rating framework should be developed such that they can accommodate Advanced IRB 
in the future by allowing for the classification of facilities to different LGD scales. The 
preparation, write-up and the structuring of the incoming proposals can be executed by 
the Loan Products Group, which will be discussed in a separate sub-section in detail. 
 
For wholesale client proposals, the approval organization can be aligned along the main 
industry sectors that the bank should strategically choose. This is to ensure maximum 
efficiency and well informed decision making based on industrial sophistication. 
Proposals for final approval by a Head Office Credit Risk Committee should be 
analyzed and advised upon by the respective industry desk of the risk management 
function at the Strategic Risk Business Units (e.g. Telecom, Technology, Diversified 
Industries or Energy). Analysts at Risk Management Wholesale industrial desks 
complete a comprehensive risk review of each proposal and provide a written analysis 
and recommendation for submission to the relevant approval authority. Each Strategic 
Business Unit should be granted a delegated approval authority by the Managing 
Board, which should be in principle risk-weighted by the amount of the loan to be 
booked and also be based on the internal rating of the obligor. In terms of risk 
appraisal, the requests of the credit risk management at the Group Risk Management 
level will normally request the following items: 
 
• Does the risk profile of the portfolio match the specific parameters approved by 
the bank? 
• Does the bank use the counterparty policies with respect to all existing and new 
products?   
• Are these policies properly implemented and are adequate monitoring systems 
in place? 
• Rating verification, are the correct ratings assigned to the facilities and to 
clients? 
• Is the quality of the risk management process in harmony with the standards? 
 
As seen from the content of the above questions, the unit will operate independently or 
jointly with the business units under formal mandates. Higher transactional and policy 
approval authorities may be exercised via several committees. This will consist of 
several Group Risk Committees, which may be established upon needs of policy, 
provisioning, operational risk and other strategic issues. To give an example, Group 
Risk Committee (GRC) may decide proposals above the SBU delegated authorities. 
The Policy- Group Risk Committee (P-GRC) on the other hand may be mandated for 
the decisions on major credit policy, product programs, rating models, economic capital 
allocation issues.  The decisions of the GRC should be final and since the delegation is 
in full, the Managing Board or its individual members should not entertain appeals to 
GRC’s decisions. This is important from the “principle of independence” perspective. 
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5.4.3 Overall Risk Policy and Group Portfolio Management (GPM) 
 
As indicated before, the Group Risk Management is responsible for formulating and 
setting the overall policy framework for credit-, market-, industry-, product- and 
operational risk for the bank. In addition, the portfolio management unit is jointly 
established to ensure the ongoing development and the use of portfolio management 
techniques for optimizing the use of economic capital133. Specific responsibilities 
should include: 
 
1. Drafting high level portfolio policy and guidelines for the SBUs. 
 
2. Coordinating the development and implementation of Portfolio Management 
(PM) tasks in the SBUs. 
 
3. Consolidating the PM data obtained from the SBUs 
 
4. Monitor the integrity and consistency of data, including ratings, migration, 
exposures and losses caused by defaults. 
 
5.  Support expansion of rating models to capture all exposures. 
 
6.  Establish models for the analysis of the portfolio. 
 
7. Coordinating the development and implementation of Risk/Reward models 
(RAROC) for use by commercial units at the client level. 
 
The active portfolio management, activity data ownership, processes and portfolio 
optimization should be handled by the respective SBUs. In order to manage the balance 
sheet, the liquidity and the interest rate risks, an ALCO structure should be established 
mirroring the organizational structure. Risks other than credit risks fall outside the 
scope of the thesis, and hence are not discussed further here.  
 
5.4.4 Product Analysis and Modeling 
 
The Product Analysis and Modeling department consists of three groups; 1) Credit risk, 
2) Market risk and 3) Operational risk modeling groups. The Credit Risk Modeling 
Group is responsible for the analysis and validation of valuation models as well as the 
development and improvement of quantitative models for the measurement of credit 
risks within the bank. The activities of the credit risk modeling group should include: 
 
1. Development and implementation of methods for the measurement of present 
and future counterparty risk of credit and derivative transactions. 
 
2. Development and implementation of credit risk portfolio models. These 
models measure the credit risk in portfolios of loans and trading book 
 
133 For detailed concept ional issues of capital allocation and performance measurement, Ong, M.: Internal Credit Risk Models, 
Capital Allocation and Performance Measurement, 1999, pp. 93-163.  
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exposures in client groups. These models can be used to determine the 
adequate amount of economic capital the bank should hold as buffer against 
credit risk, but also to evaluate the profitability of individual transactions or 
groups of transactions on the basis of RAROC. 
3. Validation of models and systems being used for valuation and risk 
management of the bank’s commercial and trading activities as proposed by 
SBUs. 
4. Models, typically proposed by the front office, are independently evaluated 
and contrasted with alternative models. Approval of the model by the market 
risk modeling group is a prerequisite for trading authorization. 
5. Development of IRB models for mortgages and retail credits. 
 
Again, risks other than credit risks will not be analyzed in this thesis as it falls outside 
the objectives.  
 
5.4.5 Internal Ratings Ownership and Approval Authorities 
 
Each rating is owned by a GRM department responsible for the underlying theory, 
models, construction procedures, supporting data and validation. While changes to the 
rating methodologies are to be notified to the Group Risk Committee, approval on 
methodology changes is always at Policy-GRC level.  Furthermore, specific processes, 
responsibilities and authorities apply to the development, implementation, review and 
validation of the Internal Rating System and Models. Processes should be separately 
defined for: 
 
1. Corporate Lending: All lending to commercial, financial institutions and private 
clients which do not qualify as retail under the new Basel framework. 
2. Retail Lending: All lending to consumer clients and small businesses which 
qualify as retail credit under the new Basel framework. 
 
In a sense, Policy-GRC is the responsible committee for the approval of the overall 
structure and policies for the internal rating system and material changes. Key 
characteristics of the internal rating system to be approved can be outlined as 
follows: 
• Overall architecture and design of rating models (PD, LGD and EAD). 
• LGD definitions in relation to the LGD-scales used within the IRB bank. 
• Rating grade definitions and validation of the master PD scales associated 
with the rating grades. 
• Responsibilities and policies in the rating assignment process and review. 
• Responsibilities in validation. 
• Control and oversight structure. 
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5.4.5.1 Corporate Internal Rating System 
 
According to FSA in relation to the IRB approach, “An Internal Rating System 
comprises all of the methods, processes, controls, data collection and IT systems that 
support the assessment of credit risk, the assignment of exposures to grades or pools 
(rating), and the quantification of default and loss estimates for a certain type of 
exposure”134. All material aspects of the definition of an Internal Rating System and the 
following estimation processes must be approved by a competent committee, and it 
must be ensured on an ongoing basis that the rating system is operating properly. The 
rating system and models, after development and initial approval, have to be reviewed 
and validated annually. 
 
5.4.5.2 Development, Implementation and Review 
 
The GRM’s Credit Ratings & Portfolio Management (CR & PM) is the central unit that 
should be responsible for the development of group-wide rating policies jointly with the 
strategic business units and the proper documentation of the rating models and policies. 
Furthermore, CR & PM will be responsible for the coordination, initiation and support 
of rating model design and reviews and the preparation of rating validation activities. 
The model development and implementation processes must be thoroughly described. 
This includes the data selection process as well as the documentation of methodologies, 
assumptions and mathematical or empirical evidence. All data used to gradually 
develop models will have to be retained.  In that respect,  the requirements surrounding 
the use of internal ratings are exhaustively defined by Basel II and the development, 
testing and instructions for use of rating methodologies should be documented in such a 
manner that external parties (such as supervisory bodies, rating agencies) can review 
and evaluate them.  
 
Accordingly, FSA requires from the users of IRB approaches that “A firm's 
documentation relating to data should include clear identification of primary 
responsibility for data quality. A firm should set standards for data quality and aim to 
improve them over time. A firm should measure its performance against those 
standards. A firm should ensure that its data is of high enough quality to support its risk 
management processes and the calculation of its capital requirements”135.  
 
The impact of such directive will be clearly challenging for the risk management 
functions. The capital calculations for credit risks will become dependent on the quality 
of data. Moreover, the Basel II accord requires the capture and storage of numerous 
data elements, which are not necessarily captured accurately (or at all) within banks in 
Turkey to date, such as the exposure at default and loss given default estimates. 
Management should establish accountability and ownership of data quality within 
CR&PM and prepare for the “audits” of data quality, by the date of supervisory review 
and evaluation process for banks adopting IRB approaches in Turkey. 
 
                                                 
134 FSA, Handbook, definition of a Rating System, BIPRU 4.3.25 and BIS Framework, parag. 394. 
135 FSA, Handbook, Documentation of Rating Systems, BIPRU 4.3.23.  
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5.4.5.3 Validation 
 
Validation is defined by FSA as “A firm must have robust systems in place to validate 
the accuracy and consistency of rating systems, processes, and the estimation of all 
relevant risk parameters (PD, LGD, conversion factors and EL). A firm must be able to 
demonstrate to the FSA that the internal validation process enables it to assess the 
performance of internal rating and risk estimation systems consistently and 
meaningfully”136. The most critical activity of the IRB process, the validation is set out 
by the FSA at its broadest level. For example, the “accuracy of calibration”(i.e. whether 
outcomes are consistent with estimate) and discriminatory power (i.e. the ability to rank-order 
risk) of its rating systems are high level standards bank must have processes that establish 
whether its rating systems meet those standards137. To meet those standards for validation, the 
following processes can be suggested: 
 
• Data Collection and Cleansing 
• Model Development 
• Pre-Implementation Validation. 
• Model Implementation. 
• Model Testing refers to the evaluation of models and their implementation 
for internal validation and monitoring purposes. An independent consultant 
for validation is not required. 
• Model Implementation Testing. 
• Model Validation refers to the process of independently validating statistical 
models. The model validation process requires an independent consultant 
for validation. GRM Quantitative Consultancy (GRM QC) may be 
established for this purpose, which should be responsible for the 
organization of the validation process, including the selection of models for 
validation based on materiality and timing. 
 
Also, the GRM QC has the following duties under the new framework: 
 
1. It sets the minimum requirements for the validation. 
2. It checks whether all calculations in the review have been performed properly 
and requests additional analysis when the results of the required analyses make 
it necessary. 
3. It formulates the conclusions in the validation report resulting from the analysis 
and test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
136 FSA, Handbook, Validation of Internal Estimates, BIPRU 4.3.29 – BIPRU 4.3.38. 
137 Basel Framework, Validation of Internal Estimates, parag. 500-505. 
5.5 Risk Management Wholesale (RMW) 
 
5.5.1 Organization of RMW and its Functions 
 
The mission of Risk Management Wholesale will be to support Wholesale Clients 
Business Group’s commercial strategies by independently managing all risk 
professionals within Wholesale Client Risk Management and coordinating with the 
Group Risk Management to support enterprise-wide risk management. The Risk 
Management Wholesale structure represents a migration to a largely centralized 
approval authority with decentralized monitoring and control within distinctive industry 
desks. The RMW aims for the integration of Credit, Market, Liquidity and Operational 
risk management, commencing with Basel II core principles. An exemplary RMW 
organization structure can be illustrated as in Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2: Organizational Framework of Wholesale Banking Risk Management 
 
Source: Author 
 
The main responsibilities can be listed as follows: 
• Analyze and decide upon risk limits via risk officers in the branches and global 
risk committees. 
• Develop, analyze and decide upon policy and procedure papers in accordance 
with approval authorities. 
• Manage risk officers, approving local organizational structures, delegated 
authorities. 
• Analyze, approve and actively manage clients in financial restructuring and 
recovery. 
• Assist commercial and client units in structuring deals and reviewing portfolios 
to minimize exposure and maximize returns upon a request. 
• Monitor creditworthiness of clients and counterparties together with business 
units. 
• Develop and activate strategies to manage risk exposures down as appropriate. 
• Provide input into new product launches. 
• Monitor local regulatory and legal environment. 
• Monitor, control and report on risk exposures. 
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• Proactively identifies and manages any new or existing risks or risk processes 
not identified above. 
 
The Credit Risk Management team inside the RMW is a mirror image of the client 
facing wholesale account management teams. The positioning of risk professionals 
alongside the client and product business units is instrumental in the bank’s essential 
ability to manage its risks, providing local oversight into the exposures and risk 
processes within branches. While the client groups are involved in originating credit, 
market and trading risk patterns in diversified industry groups, the back-up risk 
frontiers of the bank should be in a position to reveal the necessary skills and 
management capabilities of the risks inherited from the business lines of the client 
groups. In terms of Basel II terminology and according to the IRB approaches, all 
exposures that must be classified as corporate, sovereign and banks (except equity and 
retail here) with different underlying risk characteristics are consolidated under their 
industry specific different exposure classes as organized above138. The classification of 
exposures in this way is broadly consistent with the established best practice methods 
of global banks. While it is not the intention of the Basel committee to ask for the 
application of the appropriate treatment to each exposure for the purposes of deriving 
their minimum capital requirements, banks must demonstrate to supervisors that their 
organization and their methodology for assigning exposures to different asset classes is 
appropriate and consistent over time. In this context, Basel II framework defined five 
sub-classes of specialized lending (SL) either in economic form or in substance139. 
These five-subclasses are defined as follows: 
 
• Project Finance: Plants, infrastructure, telecommunication, power plants etc. 
• Object Finance or Asset Based Lending: Fleets, ship, aircraft financing. 
• Commodities Finance: Exchange traded commodities, crude oil, and all self 
liquidating natures of commodities finance. 
• Income Producing Real Estate (IPRE): Office Buildings, residential 
buildings, hotels, warehouse projects. 
• High Volatility Commercial Real Estate: Land development projects 
including the construction financing, property financing with uncertain 
source of repayments, ADC projects in general (acquisition, development 
and construction). 
 
Further classifications are made with respect to the existence of revolving credit 
facilities for retail business and to the receivable purchase facilities arranged for retail 
and corporates. In this area, the Basel II mandated product or facility type descriptions 
too “tight” in comparison to the existing product lines of an ordinary bank in a global 
environment.  
 
5.5.2 Financial Restructuring and Recovery (FRR) 
 
The Financial Restructuring & Recovery is responsible for the management of 
distressed assets. The restructuring team supports the overall mission of the bank by 
maximizing the value of the distressed assets in accordance with bank’s risk 
parameterization. To achieve this ideal objective, it should take the following approach 
 
138 Basel II Accord Paragraphs 211-219 
139 Basel II Accord Paragraphs 220-228. 
depending on customer types: 
 
1. Restructuring credits: This should involve in sequence of importance to; 
• Secure and recover the largest part of the exposure. 
• Bring it back within acceptable risk levels within the acceptable time frame. 
• To the extent possible, without jeopardizing the client relationship as long as 
this does not negatively impacts the position of the bank. 
2. Recovery credits: This should attain the highest amount possible and be executed 
within the shortest time frame. . 
3. Ensure adequacy of the provisions for individual credits. 
 
Specific attention should be made to FFR’s current estimate on recovery rates and the 
portfolio management’s view on what alternative recovery strategies may exist in the 
markets either through selling, re-packaging or securitizations. 
5.6 Loan Products Group (LPG) 
 
5.6.1 Organization of LPG and its Functions 
 
Though LPG is a commercial function and independent from risk management, its 
heavy credit related responsibilities require active co-operation between the two. The 
mission of LPG can be summarized into three broad areas as depicted below. 
Figure 5.3: Credit Process Functions 
 
Source: Author 
 
In brief, the main activities of LPG are as follows: 
 
1. Credit Structuring. 
2. Assignment of obligor and facility ratings. 
3. Portfolio Management. 
4. Credit Administration. 
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he activities start with the origination, structuring, and execution of credit facilities, 
.6.1.1 Credit Approval Process  
efore drilling into the activities of LPG, it is critical to propose an effective credit 
• Origination and Structuring: 
rigination and Structuring process involves identifying credit needs of clients, 
Routing:  
outing means sending proposals possibly embedded with Credit Portfolio 
 Analysis and Decision: 
his involves receiving and commenting on the rating and the contents of the 
 Execution and Booking: 
ere, the responsibility lies on the Loan Product Groups. 
 Inspection: 
requent inspection is performed by the Credit Risk Inspection and Loan Review 
teams. 
T
which include customer and transaction analysis, drafting of credit proposals, revisions, 
execution of credit transactions (including documentation) and continue with ongoing 
monitoring of client credit quality (including proposing changes to obligor ratings). It is 
important to note that LPG is involved in the joint origination of deals with the client 
account management groups generally at the very early stages of the deal structuring. 
The thesis will provide guidelines on the execution of all activities in next sub-sections.  
 
5
 
B
approval process that will support the easy transition to the new Basel framework. The 
following diagram specifies the “high level” framework, which is proposed in this sub-
section for the credit approval process at a bank adopting the new accord. The different 
roles are performed by the Business, Product, Risk and Managerial Business Units. 
Accordingly, the new credit approval framework at a Basel II compliant bank can be 
based on the following processes: 
 
 
O
gathering relevant specialist opinions and drafting of credit proposals. The rating 
proposal requires the interim basis for the origination of the credit risk by the client 
business unit and the structuring/re-structuring of the credit risk by the Loan 
Product Groups in a jointly manner. 
  
• 
 
R
Management advice to the approval authority at the Risk Management functions. 
 
•
 
T
proposal after a comprehensive review by the analysts. Often the analyst is 
responsible for communicating the decision of the credit approval authority to the 
proposing unit and recording the approved rating in the credit application system of 
the bank. Here, the official responsibility lies on the side of the “Risk 
Management”. The authority to change the rating lies within the approval authority. 
Monitoring and functioning of the rating models and processes are the 
responsibilities of a Risk Management unit. 
 
•
 
H
 
•
 
F
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Figure 5.4: Credit Approval Routing Process 
 
Source: Author 
 
 Structuring  
s the following steps in structuring a deal: 
xperts and the 
relevant product specialists on client and proposed transaction.  
ll be done using the 
will include all required advice from client 
 in order that they may provide input regarding potential 
anagement division. All credit proposal packages need to meet high 
industry desks for analysis and recommendation and then to the 
5.6.1.2 Credit
 
The Loan Product Group take
 
• A thorough due diligence is conducted by credit structuring e
• Credit Structuring is to determine client’s repayment capacity for the proposed 
transaction and to do the appropriate financial analysis.  This wi
standard bank formats and risk analysis tools as required.  This includes proposing 
or reaffirming the clients’ rating. 
• Credit Structuring depending on the product prepare credit proposal package. 
The credit proposal package 
management groups. 
• Loan Portfolio Management Group should be consulted as early as possible in 
the structuring phase
portfolio issues including concentration risks, availability of risk weighted assets 
and indicative mark to market and mark to model information. Where applicable, 
advice from the Portfolio Management Group is embedded in the proposal prior to 
submission. 
• Credit Structuring would sign off on all counterparty risks within the Wholesale 
Credit Risk M
quality standards, and comply with all higher level risk management standards for 
processing. 
• Proposals received by “Risk Management Wholesale” are routed to the 
appropriate 
approval authority. The appropriate approving authority takes the final credit 
decision. These may be the Group Risk Committee, Wholesale Credit Committee, 
Industry Credit Committee, or the regional credit risk officer and all these groups 
may comment on local credit issues if appropriate. 
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actualization of the rating process. Each 
lient and/or asset is to be assigned an Obligor Rating, a Recovery Category, and a 
  Recovery Categories
 
5.6.1.3 Obligor Rating Assignment by LPG 
 
One of the main contributions by LPG is the 
c
Facility Rating.  
 
Table 5.1: Converting Obligor Ratings and Recovery Categories to a Facility Rating 
    
Obligor 
Rating 
rable 
r 
Unsecured Subordinated Cash 
Mrktble. 
Securities 
Tightly 
Monitored 
Full 
Coverage 
Partial 
Coverage 
Sec
Vulne
Liens -  Liens - 
ured  Senio
 A B C D E F G H 
AAA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
A+, A- 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3+ 
BBB+ 1 2 2 2 3+ 3+ 3+ 3 
BBB 1 2 2 3+ 3 3 3 3- 
BBB- 1 2 2 3 3- 3- 3- 4+ 
BB+ 1 2 3+ 3- 4+ 4+ 4+ 4 
BB 1 2 3 4+ 4 4 4 4- 
BB- 1 2 3- 4 4- 4- 4- 5+ 
B+ 1 2 4+ 4- 5+ 5+ 5+ 5 
B 1 2 4- 5+ 5 5 5 5- 
B- 1 2 5+ 5 5- 5- 5- 6 
Substand
ard. 
1 2 5 5- 6 6 6 7 
Do l ubtfu 1 2 6 6 7 7 7 8 
Loss 1 2 8 8 8 8 8 9 
So th
 
the above exhibit is the representation of paragraphs 396-400 of the Basel 
 accord. According to the matrix, separate exposure types combined with different 
is as follows:
urce: Au or 
The matrix at 
II
types of facilities in association of different security structures may result in multiple 
grades for the same borrower. In this respect, a two dimensional rating system would 
qualify even for F-IRB, when the supervisory estimates of LGD (1- Recovery 
Category) must be used for facility ratings. For banks using the A-IRB, facility ratings 
should quantify exclusively the amount of LGD. An Obligor rating captures the 
probability of a borrower or counterparty will default. The Recovery Category reflects 
the speculative level of a recovery where the bank is likely to experience in the event 
the borrower or counter party defaults. The Recovery Category is a function of whether 
a facility is secured or not and, if secured, the type and quality of the collateral.  The 
Facility Rating summarizes the Obligor Rating information and the Recovery Category 
into a single rating number as shown in the table below. The red and blue areas may be 
called as “the non performing loan” valley, which should be divested along the 
financial restructuring process. 
 
The interpretation of the matrix  
orrowers and security types consistently 
enerating adequate levels of cash flow from internal and continuing operations to 
 
The green fields are reserved for all sizes of b
g
generally assure the timely repayment of all obligations. While debts of these entities 
are being paid as agreed and reasonable repayment sources appear to be viable, below 
average performance factors may have resulted in strained, although still positive, debt 
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 area on the other hand is reserved for the borrowers, whose debt service 
overage from internal sources is very tight.  External sources of liquidity are available 
ed identically as 
pe 6 or above risks with the additional point that either, there is no documented 
s the 
anks to have minimum of seven borrower grades and just a single category of “default 
D) 
ystem and is defined as the economic loss that the bank expects to suffer on a credit 
on the proceeds/sale of the 
ollateral. The Net Collateral Value (NCV) is an indication of the expected recovery 
service coverage.  Negative trends are perhaps beginning to cause some minor concern. 
Requests for financial covenant relief may be increasing. Accordingly, semi-annual 
reviews are required. The green field may be described as the “land of acceptable 
risks”.  
 
The blue
c
but the company is not yet relying heavily on these external sources of liquidity. 
Sources of liquidity, while strained, remain adequate for now and identifiable solutions 
to the company’s problems are achievable. Negative trends in the company’s earnings 
or cash flow along with possible losses are accelerating.  If these trends continue at 
their current levels or worsen, the credit will warrant inclusion into a criticized or 
classified category. Besides 5- or substandard means, “Special Mention Assets” that 
have potential weaknesses and deserves management’s close attention. If left 
uncorrected, these potential weaknesses may result in deterioration of the repayment 
prospects for the asset or in the institution’s credit position at some future date.  As 
special mention credits, these assets may require quarterly reviews.  Special mention 
assets are not adversely classified and do not expose an institution sufficient risk to 
warrant adverse classification. Debt service coverage is uncomfortably tight and the 
company is relying heavily on external sources of liquidity.   Sufficient liquidity from 
external sources may be in question, however, and the ability of the company to resolve 
its operating problems is not immediately evident. These assets are usually sold in the 
secondary market to relieve risk weighted assets and preserve capital. 
 
If the asset has been placed on non-accrual status, or assets are defin
ty
evidence to prove that future payments of principal or interest can be made or that 
monetary default is not imminent, the red zone may be defined as the “land of Non 
performing loans” valley. Those loans may be sold to special asset management 
companies at best, with an average pricing of 15% maximum of their face value.  
 
Contrary to the paragraph 404 of the Basel II accord, which technically require
b
zone”, the best practice methods suggest us to use several obligor rating categories 
combined with several modes of default grades. The implementation comfort of the “7 
to 1” rule again is left to the discretion of the national supervisor. Basel II accord has 
also not specified any minimum amount of facility grades for banks using the A-IRB 
approach for estimating the LGD, which will be discussed in the next sub-section. 
   
5.6.1.4 Determining the Facility Rating (LGD) and the Exposure at Default (EA
 
Loss Given Default (LGD) is the second building block of a credit risk measurement 
s
facility of which the counterparty defaults. The LGD is the loss that will never be 
recovered in the economic sense. The LGD is expressed as a percentage of the expected 
Exposure at Default and depends on the collateral, defined by the definition of 
collateral (legal risk) within the national applicable law.  
 
With collateral the bank may have a priority claim 
c
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,   (1) 
ecovery Rate (RR) = NCV / EAD  (1a) 
e collateral type, then the NCV is the sum of 
e all NCVi  
 origination and review of the proposals, an LGD rating has to be assigned to 
ach credit facility. Assigning an LGD rating means comparing the net value of a 
t (UGD) x (Commitment – OS) (2) 
it facility. EAD is 
xpected to be larger than the current outstanding of the facility and hence the unused 
 and LGD Rating Classes 
ecovery of the Facility  Recovery Percentage  LGD Rating (Seniority) Class 
value (1-LGD) of the collateral, in case of default. The NCV is calculated by 
multiplying the Collateral Value (CV) with the Recovery Rate (RR) of the collateral 
type as follows: 
 
NCV = CV x RR
R
 
If the facility is covered by more than on
th
of Collaterali. If the facility is covered with 100% cash, then it is assumed that the LGD 
is 0%. 
 
Both at
e
bank’s collateral (or seniority when unsecured facility) to the expected outstanding at 
the time of default. Accordingly, the Exposure at Default, also known that “Outstanding 
at Default (OS)” is given by140: 
 
EaD = OS + Usage given Defaul
 
When nearing default, an obligor will start using more of the cred
e
portion of the facility is added to the amount outstanding. Under the A-IRB Approach, 
all collateral values must be evaluated considering the historical recovery rates. This 
means that, the bank’s past workout performance ideally covers at least one complete 
economic cycle, and it is never shorter than seven years141. Accordingly, the recovery 
rates are mapped to different LGD classes. This distinctive LGD classes may be 
displayed as follows: 
 
Table 5.2: Recovery Rates
R
 
Risk Free    100%     A 
Excess Coverage   > 150%    B 
Fully Covered    >90% < 150%    C 
Partially Covered   >50% < 90%    D 
Unsecured    0%     E 
Subordinated    31% <     F 
Source: Resti /Sironi (2007, p. 74) 
 
The LGD classes and the risk indicators for different facility types are combined into 
e so-called LGD ratings and each LGD rating has a LGD-percentage assigned. The 
                                                
th
proposing unit has the primary responsibility for the assignment of LGD rating to each 
facility. 
 
140 Araten, M.: Development and Validation of Key Estimates for Capital Models. In: Ong, M. (Ed.): The Basel Handbook, 2nd 
ed. London: Risk books, 2007, pp. 3-20. 
141 Resti, A. /Sironi, A.: Loss Given Default and Recovery Risk – From Basel II Standards to Effective Risk Management Tools. 
In: Ong, M. (Ed.): The Basel Handbook, 2nd ed. London: Risk books, 2007, pp. 61-98. 
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n Portfolio Management Group (LPMG) 
Management Group 
compliant 
ank becomes the backbone of risk and capital management activities. Its role and 
on 
fees. 
l charge. 
igorously focus on improving the credit quality of the loan 
ortfolio, driving up “pricing” wherever possible, and reducing the capital tied up in the 
r facilities falling within LPMG. 
• Enhanced participation in engagement and credit committees. 
hts for the disposal of assets. 
 
5.6.2 Loa
 
5.6.2.1 Organizational Background of the Portfolio 
 
With the advent of Basel II, the Group Portfolio Management of a Basel II 
b
duties are of utmost importance, and the application range varies from getting “advice” 
to the offloading of the existing risky assets on business portfolios. In particular, Loan 
Portfolio Management Group’s prime objective is to optimize the economic profit of 
the wholesale banking group’s loan portfolio, within the limits of Group Portfolio 
Management’s asset and capital management authorities. LPMG is a value center with 
profit & loss responsibility and its main value drivers can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Revenues generated by the interest, commitment fee income and participati
2. Provisions 
3. Capita
 
LPMG will therefore r
p
business. In this sense, the “decision rights” of the LPGM group can be extended to the 
following areas: 
 
• Pricing fo
• Separate capital allocation and unilateral rig
 
Figure 5.5: Organization of the Loan Portfolio Management Group 
 
Source: Author  
 
n the above diagram, the Portfolio Manager for a specific loan book 
hould be in a desired position to develop and maintain the group's loan pricing, 
As described i
s
portfolio reporting, performance tracking tools. This should include working with: 
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• Group Portfolio Management functions to align the pricing with the in-house 
Management’s strategy and disposal teams, the senior 
plement all kinds of securitization structures if 
s seen from the organizational structure above, the new Portfolio Management Group 
• Credit Portfolio Management of diversified industries including public sector 
the several exposures 
ith respect to the processing of all credit proposals, the credit portfolio management 
l 
able 5.3: Responsibilities of Credit Portfolio Strategy and Management 
 
RAROC models. 
• Group Portfolio 
wholesale client management, the regulator and the central bank, the bank’s 
internal and external auditors.  
• Relevant product groups to im
and when necessary142. 
 
A
consists of the following functions: 
 
borrowers and financial institutions with relevant reporting and analysis 
• Establishment of Portfolio Strategy 
• Portfolio Execution and Disposal of 
• Management support 
 
W
and the portfolio strategy functions are the most important units. The relevant divisiona
responsibilities are fixed as follows: 
 
 
T
Department     Main Responsibility
 
redit Portfolio Management    - Credit Analysis in terms of RAROC, C Economic Capital and Loss 
of risk and return 
     - Product Management and Pricing 
 
ortfolio Strategy     - Optimizing the banking book portfolio in terms P
in       compliance with the portfolio parameters 
     - Identifying and implementing hedging and disposal strategies 
Source: Author 
 
5.6.2.2 Implementation of the Filter Criteria 
roup Portfolio Management (GPM) may agree with the Group Risk Committees and 
1. An economic loss for new facilities of a threshold amount or greater may be 
ating upper and lower bounds may be introduced to 
 limits may be introduced. For example, the economic 
tain notches, e.g. max. BBB-, according 
                                                
 
G
the Wholesale Client Groups on the parameters within which LPMG would seek to 
manage the loan portfolio. Those parameters may be defined as: 
 
accepted with the facilities. 
2. New borrower with a given r
the existing portfolio. 
3. Industry concentration
capital for a given industry will not be greater than a pre-defined percentage of 
the total portfolio economic capital.143 
4. Credit migrations may fall down to cer
to the risk appetite of the bank’s management. 
 
142 Basel II Accord, Paragraphs 538-683. 
143 For the treatment of Concentration risks, pls. Refer to Basel II, paragraph. 770-777. 
5. Portfolio economic capital should be less than a pre-defined threshold, e.g. 1 
billion USD by year-end 2008. 
6. Relationship economic capital may not exceed a certain level, e.g. 10 USD 
millions. 
 
Once the parameters have been set, there may be noticeable migration in credit grades 
to lower levels, and a fairly consistent picture showing industry concentrations in 
certain areas such as telecom and utilities. Consequently, the Managing Board may ask 
the Loan Products Group to actively manage the portfolio in order to remain within the 
pre-defined parameters. In this respect, the Loan Products Group Management becomes 
the driving force behind the risk policy of a bank. Furthermore, a conservative bank 
management would impose “Filter Criteria” to screen some of the deals or transactions, 
before taking them into the “deal pipeline”. 
Figure 5.6: Portfolio Management Process                             
 
 
Origination
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‘Actively Managed’ 
Portfolio 
 Execution 
 Filter 
20% ‘Hold’ Portfolio 
 
Source: Author 
 
The filter criteria may determine those deals which need to be referred to Group 
Portfolio Management who will attach its advice to these proposals.  The filter criteria 
may apply to the entire business of the LPG and will enable GPM to focus its resources 
where they are most needed, such as on the portion of the loan book which destroys 
value against the benchmark set. If the proposed facility exhibits one or more of the 
characteristics listed below, the deal should be referred to GPM that will provide 
further guidance. The guidance by the GPM will generally be a short instruction on the 
two main issues as follows: 
 
1. Economic Loss or Profit of the transaction: 
 
All deals referred to GPM which may destroy value by moving beyond the norms 
set by the filter criteria will need to be signed off from the client management group 
before processing through credits department.  Value destroying deals, which are 
signed off, will be monitored by the GPM. If decided, the execution team has 
responsibility for the execution of the disposal programs devised by the portfolio 
managers. The arsenal of risk mitigation and disposal instruments includes cash 
sales, Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLO’s) and credit derivatives. Depending 
on the market, some of these instruments may not be available, such as in Turkey 
the use of credit derivatives and other structured products may be either limited or 
in existent.  
 
2. Portfolio Parameters: 
 
When proposed facility causes a breach of one or more of the portfolio parameters, 
GPM will investigate and may require exposure to be freed up through the 
cancellation of limits or the sale and hedging of assets. Portfolio parameters can not 
be standardized among banks, since they are strategic in nature and manifest the 
key core competence of the bank in doing its business. Therefore, the group-wide 
portfolio parameters are reviewed as the business of the bank evolves and should 
not be perceived as a cause of restriction by individual business units and product 
groups.   
Figure 5.7: Dynamic Portfolio Management Filter Process 
 
No 
Deals Flow from the Credit 
Structuring 
Does the facility  
Generate an Economic  
Loss  ‘predefined amount”? 
Does Counterparty have 
a Rating? 
GPM Analysis  
And  
GPM Advice Issued 
Does Facility relate 
to Industry Sector with 
Concentration > “predefined %”? 
Is the final hold  
“Predefined amount” or greater 
Yes 
Proceed to  
RMW/Group Risk Committee 
Is the facility 
Expected Loss > “predefined amount”? 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
GPM Advice And  
LPG Transaction 
overview 
Yes 
 LPG Transaction  
Overview 
Revised Rating  
Source: Author 
 
Facilities which breach these filter criteria cannot be processed through the credit 
system, unless there is a GPM exception or advice. As mentioned in previous 
discussions, a common reason that the business units forward value-destroying 
transactions to Loan Products or to Risk Management groups is to earn the associated 
revenues.  The “Filter” and the application tools used by the portfolio manager should 
make it clear that there is a substantial difference between transactions that add 
economic value at a portfolio level, and those that do not.  In addition, one can recall 
that many of the transactions showing an economic loss at the credit level also destroys 
value at the relationship level (i.e., the transaction’s non-credit revenues were 
insufficient to offset the credit loss). Analyzing the returns on these transactions 
reinforces the position that the solvency consumed by such transactions might have 
been deployed to better uses.  
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5.6.2.3 Performance Tracking Reports of PMG 
 
At this stage, a Pillar 3-compatible reporting example will be provided, in order to track 
performance among different transactions. The common denominator of the 
performance analysis will be the “value creation or destruction”. In the example 
depicted below, there is a substantial difference between transactions that positively 
add economic value at the credit level, and those that do not. According to the Value of 
Transactions under GPM report, 84 transactions, currently reach up to 46% of the total, 
showed an Economic Loss.  Of these, 18 (10% of the total) added value at the 
relationship level (due to the transactions generating offsetting non-credit revenues), 
while 66 (36% of the total) destroyed value at the relationship level versus 32% in the 
last report.  In addition, recall that 66 of the 84 transactions that outwardly showed an 
economic loss at the credit level also destroyed value at the relationship level (i.e., the 
transaction’s non-credit revenues were insufficient to offset the credit loss). 
 
Table 5.4: Value of Transactions under GPM 
In EUR (thousand) Transactions with 
Economic Loss at 
Credit Level 
Transactions with 
Economic Profit at Credit 
Level 
All 
Transactions 
Progressed 
to RMW 
Number of transactions 84 97 181 
Credit RAROC (1) 2.8% 27.4% 14.7% 
Credit Economic Profit (2) -9,972 20,492 10,520 
Total RAROC (3) 8.6% 36.1% 21.8% 
Total Economic Profit (2) -2,495 30,985 28,490 
Economic Capital Consumed 129,856 121,240 251,096 
Solvency Consumed  164,835 326,141 490,976 
RWA Equivalent (4) 2,054,812 4,076,763 6,137,200 
Credit EP before Capital Charges (5) 3,663 33,222 36,885 
Per unit of RWA consumed (5/4) 18 bppa 81 bppa 60 bppa 
Previous report 8 bppa 79 bppa 59 bppa 
Total EP before Capital Charges (6) 11,140 43,715 54,855 
Per unit of RWA consumed (6/4) 54 bppa 107 bppa 89 bppa 
Previous report 69 bppa 119 bppa 105 bppa 
 
1. Breakeven RAROC = 10.5% = Cost of Capital (i.e., there is a loss when RAROC falls below 10.5%).  
2. Economic Profit is per annum, not a Net present Value over the lifetime of facilities. 
3. Difference between Credit and Total RAROC is that the latter incorporates transaction’s non-credit revenues (bundled or 
anticipated). 
4. Solvency times 12.5 
5. Credit Economic Profit plus 10.5% of Economic Capital.  
6. Total Economic Profit plus 10.5% of Economic Capital. 
 
Source: Example Report by a Global Bank using Moody’s KMV Portfolio Manager (predecessor to 
RiskFrontier)  
 
Analyzing the returns on these transactions reinforces the view that the solvency they 
consumed might have been deployed to better uses. Clearly, not all transactions that 
show an economic loss at the credit level are created “equal”.  Some include bundled or 
anticipated non-credit revenues that buy & sell strategies might unlock without using 
the balance sheet permanently. The case can be made, however, that the weakest 
transactions should never make it to Wholesale Credit Risk Management. On that point, 
it is also worth mentioning that GPM can not address whether such transactions would 
have damaged the relationships involved. 
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5.7 Closing Remarks to the Organizational Foundations of IRB 
Implementation 
 
This chapter is motivated by the basic milestones of the paragraph 392 of the Basel II 
framework, which is that the Bank’s overall credit management practices must also be 
consistent with the evolving sound practice guidelines issued by the Basel committee 
and the national supervisors. More specific procedures and guidelines will be 
established in the next chapter that deals more with the rating and portfolio 
methodologies, systems and data foundation during the implementation of IRB 
approaches. It is recognized that the successful transition from the current classical risk 
management of the banks to the structure described in this chapter requires an actively 
managed change process.  
 
Transition management issues are to be addressed outside of this thesis. In addition to 
organizational changes related to management of all risks, the re-design specifically 
involves relatively large scale changes to the management of credit risk. The new credit 
risk structure represents a migration from a decentralized system to one with primarily 
centralized approval and decentralized monitoring and control. This change is intended 
to create a more efficient, reliable, and sophisticated credit functions and risk oversight 
methods. Despite the organizational and process changes, the credit granting principles 
of the banks in Turkey are unchanged at this moment. Similarly, the core industrial 
competence inside the risk management business units is used in a very limited sense. 
The measurement, monitoring, and control functions remain as vital and challenging 
components of the new, inter-dependent risk organization proposed in this chapter, and 
it is consistent with the BIS principles for best practices of credit risk management 
(September 2000). Under the BIS principles, the key features of the new, proposed 
credit risk organizational structure and processes should include: 
 
1. Establishment of Industry and Product specialists. 
2. A streamlined approval process supported by high technology and risk systems. 
3. Maintenance of local risk oversight via regional risk officers. 
4. Establishment of a system that measures, monitors and manages economic 
capital. 
5. Establishment of independent model, process and validation units. 
 
Alignment of the risk organization with the bank’s commercial structure ensures that 
risk officers and analysts can add value to commercial functions. Today, the bank staff 
acts passively with respect to the incoming deals. The new organization includes 
immediate appointment of industry specialist teams and committees with regional 
responsibilities. Industry teams are centralized to support a knowledgeable and 
consistent decision making even at origination. To support the unique risk requirements 
of the trading operations, trading product specialists are to be appointed with local and 
regional responsibilities and are located near the trading activities. In the sprit of Basel 
II, there is much more to be done.  
 
The proposed Basel II structures provide a platform for the shift from the traditional 
risk management ‘policeman’ role to one of risk consultant, providing value-added 
feedback to the commercial units. 
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The approval process should also be restructured to support consistent, knowledgeable, 
and timely decisions. The Basel II implementation creates more transparency, 
accountability and challenges the entire business and risk “culture” of the banks 
globally. Current progress in the risk culture and organization at Turkish banks will not 
be sufficient to meet regulatory compliance with Basel II. Standards will be expected to 
rise over time, and the successful bank needs to have the right culture in place to ensure 
that policies and processes drive continuous improvement.  Banks need to look back at 
the organization over the last years, since the enactment of Basel II, analyze the areas 
where progress has been made, test the capabilities to spread progress in other areas and 
check if further improvements will be required for the future. Cultural change can be 
very difficult to manage quickly and effectively, but it will determine the degree of 
success in the organization.  
  
Maintenance of independent risk oversight via the regional risk officers remains a 
critical component of the new infrastructure. Successful migration to the new risk 
management organization is dependent on the swift implementation of the wholesale 
client commercial strategies, in line with the bank’s transition plan, including a set of 
activities as follows: 
 
• Culling of the existing portfolios and asset classes 
• Implementation of Loan Product Group function 
• Deployment of effective loan pricing tools, RAROC and economic capital 
models 
• Reduction of activities in non-core markets (geographical and/or products) 
through clear exit strategies. 
 
The biggest challenge in transitioning to the new risk management organization lies 
with the harmonization and calibration of models, systems, data and parameters used by 
the bank for each business unit and product groups. Having established the 
organizational foundations and high-level principles for the implementation of the new 
accord, the next chapter will start building bridges for the parameterization, modeling, 
data and system aspects of the IRB implementation. 
 
Chapter 6: The Implemention of Basel II IRB with Moody’s KMV 
(Kealhofer, Macquown and Vasicek) Approach 
6.1 Introduction 
 
For the enhancement of risk management as well as the financial stability of the 
Turkish banking system, meeting the regulatory requirements of Basel II is a key driver 
of changes in the credit risk management practices of banks. However, the banks which 
will reap the rewards from the significant investment towards sound risk management 
systems are those that adopt international best practice and that are equally focused on 
enhancing the ongoing management and strategic direction of the business. The latter 
requires an equal focus on the economic capital and active portfolio management. 
While economic capital differs highly from regulatory capital, the same risk drivers 
(PD, EAD, and LGD) as well as additional portfolio considerations on migration and 
concentration risks provide the building blocks for the calculation of both. 
 
While no single financial institution is typical, the five steps, or stages, can be identified 
that financial institutions typically experience on their way to advanced credit risk 
management. 
 
Figure 6.1: Building Blocks of Credit Risk Management from Moody’s KMV perspective 
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Source: Moody’s KMV 
 
The achievement of the full benefits of Stages 4 & 5 is partly dependent on ongoing 
developments inside the financial system in Turkey, especially the development of 
structured finance and derivatives markets would enable sufficient pricing flexibility in 
the application of risk based pricing. However, the internal capabilities to take 
advantage of these developments and to achieve still meaningful benefits from single 
obligor risk measurement in the absence of such market instruments, are derived in 
Stages 1-3.  
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It is worth noting that the building blocks for addressing the Basel II IRB requirements 
are also addressed in Stages 1-3, with the difference between the foundation and 
advanced IRB (F-IRB and A-IRB) being essentially the degree of data underpinning, 
data reliability and bank specific focus, underlying the estimation of the core risk 
components (PD, EAD, and LGD). 
 
While historically, deteriorating credits have been a source of severe underperformance 
of bank portfolios, many institutions struggle to introduce a framework for effectively 
measuring and managing this risk arising from the nature of credit portfolios, i.e. the 
credit portfolio distributions tend to be highly skewed and fat-tailed due to 
concentration and credit deterioration, which make it difficult to measure expected 
losses/provisions and the uncertainty around these, resulting in unexpected losses and 
extreme losses due to correlated tail events144. Issues such as lack of data or the 
difficulty of cultural adjustment to Basel II have posed non-trivial obstacles on the path 
to improvement. Please refer to Chapter 5 for details on the organizational foundations 
that need to be in place for a successful implementation of the IRB approaches. 
Towards Basel II IRB compliance, it is of key importance for Turkish banks to seek 
solutions that offer an integrated and objective framework to help meet the growing 
needs of the bank to implement ever more sophisticated approaches to credit risk 
management. Equally important is the Pillar 2 considerations that shift focus towards 
more effective portfolio management and economic capital. Indeed, some regulators 
warn that the overall capital requirements may be the Pillar 1 capital plus Pillar 2 for 
some banks, as discussed in detail in Chapter 3, sub-section 3.4.3.3 Pillar 2: Role of 
Supervision.  
 
In order to develop a comprehensive, but appropriate, solution for the Turkish banks, 
the thesis will focus on three core dimensions; 
 
1. Data  
2. Systems / Processes and  
3. Methodologies 
 
These 3 dimensions prove extremely powerful in providing the structure for banks’ Gap 
Analysis of F-IRB or A-IRB and will be pivotal to the phasing of the solution sought in 
this thesis. 
 
During the field research, it became apparent that a consultant or a solution provider 
can only assist the Bank to develop a solution, which has the potential to be compliant, 
but it can not guarantee the compliance at any level of Basel II. Therefore, Turkish 
banks need to understand that compliance is determined primarily by the bank itself and 
it should reflect the following: 
 
1. Underlying data foundation, and quality of the ongoing collection and storage 
process,  
2. Ongoing manner and rigor with which the bank applies the processes and 
systems developed to assess the core risk components (PD, EAD, LGD) and,  
 
144 In probability theory, Kolmogorov's zero-one law, named in honor of Andrey Nikolaevich Kolmogorov, specifies that a certain 
type of event, called a tail event, will either almost surely happen or almost surely not happen; that is, the probability of such an 
event occurring is zero or one. 
3. Ongoing manner, in which the bank utilizes the resulting risk measurements in 
making its credit decisions and managing its business.  
 
With that in mind, it is important to briefly highlight the key competences of Moody’s 
KMV solutions as part of the implementation project. 
  
Figure 6.2: Industry Landscape of Basel II Solution Providers 
 
Source: Datamonitor 
 
As illustrated in the diagram above, Moody’s KMV is the world’s leading provider of 
quantitative credit analysis tools to banks in the credit risk measurement and credit risk 
portfolio analytics. The company creates products and services based upon a 
sophisticated application of modern financial theory and statistical analysis transferring 
these into key insights to manage credit. Its scope of offering involves only the credit 
risk aspects of the portfolio and is regarded a niche provider in this highly specialized 
and in-depth field. Moreover, it has assembled the largest public and private company 
default and loss database in the world, containing 33 years of information on over 
8,000+ public and 250,000+ private company default events for a total of 
approximately 49,000 public and 2.8 million private companies, healthy and distressed, 
around the world. Also, Moody’s KMV has over 3,000 LGD observations globally on 
public & private firms; rated & unrated debt; loans & bonds across 23 years. Because 
of this rich data set, Moody’s KMV is in a unique position to create credit risk models 
of unparalleled breadth and depth around the globe.  
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This ability to make use of vast amounts of timely and forward looking information 
allows for frequent updates as well as validation and calibration/recalibration of its 
models with new data and research on an ongoing basis. As part of the Basel II and 
discussed in Chapter 5, sub-section 5.2.1.9 Corporate Governance and Oversight, bank 
must ensure that the rating system is working properly and the models and systems 
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have to be reviewed by an independent function or internal audit at least annually. By 
reviewing its solutions regularly, Moody’s KMV is committed to support its client 
needs for up- to-date systems and models when it is necessary.    
  
In the absence of data, some solution providers bucket risks or simply ignore key 
aspects of it such as granularity, differentiation power among good and bad credits as 
well as frequency of information. Some also expand their scope towards software, 
systems, and consulting, which tend to lack focus on the complex nature of capturing, 
analyzing and reporting credit risks. As the implementation workflow unfolds, data 
standards required by the Basel II accord will be stressed in more detail as appropriate. 
In brief, Basel II requires that data collected beyond the implementation date must 
comply with the minimum standards, unless otherwise stated, as detailed in Chapter 5, 
sub-section 5.2.1.8 Risk Quantification and Data Standards. In a sense, banks need to 
back up the validity of their models and assessments with underlying data foundation. 
As mentioned, Moody’s KMV has the most extensive data in the world that is used in 
the prediction of default and loss estimates as well as quantitative analytics capability. 
Consequently, the thesis will examine the capabilities of Moody’s KMV solutions and 
provide suggestions for the implementation of those solutions on the path towards the 
Basel II IRB compliance.    
6.2 Scope of Work 
 
In the field research, it has been observed by the author that international banks 
typically proceed in a phased manner to ensure that each successive phase of the Basel 
II IRB project is yielding the desired results, and to provide scope for changing or 
altering the tasks for the subsequent phases depending on the progress. The exact nature 
and duration of each phase depends to a considerable degree on the specific data, 
infrastructure, models to be implemented and cultural environment of each bank, and 
thus varies considerably. In the context of the thesis, this chapter proposes an indicative 
scope of implementation work and phasing based on the experience of Moody’s KMV 
with banks globally.  
 
The indicative phases include:  
 
Phase 1: Bank-specific Gap Analysis   
Phase 2: Data Foundation  
Phase 3: Internal Rating System Infrastructure – RiskAnalyst  
Phase 4: PD Models (such as EDF models) 
Phase 5: Single-Obligor Assessment Processes 
Phase 6: Development of an IRB Validation Framework 
Phase 7: External Models for Benchmarking 
Phase 8: Roadmap to A-IRB 
Phase 9: Portfolio Analysis & Economic Capital Management - RiskFrontier 
 
This chapter will outline the key elements of the solution intended to assist banks 
achieve their desired F-IRB and A-IRB status in appropriate time frame as well as 
implement an Economic Capital model. 
 
The solution follows a logical progression starting with the Gap Analysis at Phase 1. 
Following Phase 1, it continues laying out the basic data infrastructure in Phase 2, and 
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proposing the implementation of RiskAnalyst in Phase 3, the industry leading internal 
rating assessment platform. RiskAnalyst will facilitate ongoing data collection and 
storage, obligor assessment including spreading and forecasting, facility risk 
assessment, and the application of the risk quantification tools. 
 
An effective internal rating system will always be based on a mixture of quantitative 
models and expert judgment scorecards, reflecting the fact that some industries / 
segments will not produce enough default observations to enable development of 
statistically validated models. In such industries / segments expert judgment scorecards 
based on a recognized rating methodology, provide the most appropriate solution. The 
application of the proven rating methodology provides the confidence only otherwise 
obtainable from a full statistical validation. Further, a rating methodology consistent 
with that underpinning recognized external ratings, is likely to maximize the potential 
for a valid linkage to the default experience associated with the rating agency ratings 
history. RiskAnalyst offers a robust rating platform to deploy many rating models based 
on different data foundation, statistical models as well as expert judgment.   
 
In addition, a series of powerful PD models (e.g. the EDF models) in Phase 4 will be 
examined for use in benchmarking and providing independent assessment of obligor 
risk. Any departments in the bank that actively trade corporate credits (such as Treasury 
or Capital Markets) may also use the EDF tools, as primary models to perform more 
effective and timely evaluation of risks. PD models and validation of such models will 
be discussed comprehensively in Phases 4-7. After Phase 7, the bank will be positioned 
to reach F-IRB (Foundation IRB) stage, and be able to apply these tools and process 
effectively in the ongoing credit management process. In Phase 8, the thesis will 
explore the further steps to comply with A-IRB and introduce the Moody’s KMV 
LossCalc that provides LGD estimates for different debt types under different seniority, 
collateral, country and industry conditions. Finally, Phase 9 will start taking into 
consideration the portfolio, aggregated risks and the determination of economic capital.   
 
The phases outlined above represent the concepts involved in enhancing credit risk 
management within the bank that goes beyond the Basel II IRB and stretches further to 
Pillar 2 portfolio and economic capital considerations. However, the actual timing of 
the work in the phases is likely to overlap, reflecting the inter-related nature of the work 
and concepts. In this context, to make the understanding of the following sub-sections 
easier, it is worth to highlight some dimensions to gain insight into the basics of model 
building and testing. 
6.3 Phase 1: Bank-specific Gap Analysis 
 
An essential starting point for an implementation project of any scale is the 
development of a clear understanding of the current credit risk environment within the 
bank, and the resulting gaps which need to be prioritized and bridged to enable 
successful achievement of the project objectives. This would involve a review structure 
addressing such dimensions as: 
 
1. Data: The underlying data held by the bank relating to financial statements, 
previous default and loan loss experience, facility terms, collateral data. 
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2. Systems / Processes:  The existing risk rating process, credit application, 
approval and monitoring processes, IT/systems infrastructure, internal 
management reporting processes to the senior executives and the board on all 
aspects of business credit risk. 
 
3. Methodologies: Single obligor credit risk measurement, portfolio capital 
allocation decisions covering counterparty concentration risk, industry 
concentration risk, etc. 
 
In Turkey, without a large number of established default-bankruptcy data, estimating 
the “true economic default” and “true economic losses from default” patterns become 
much more complex and highly subjective exercise. In this sense, the Re-aging 
(counting of the past days due) of the existing facilities become a real problem from the 
point of defining delinquent exposures for IRB purposes. With paragraph 458, Basel II 
provides clear definition and conditions on re-ageing per facility, which is usually 
abused by the banks in Turkey by showing off the past-due accounts as if they are non-
delinquent. Same misusage applies to the treatment of overdrafts. Usually overdrafts 
extended over 180 days are not seen as “default”, even surprisingly financed by other 
“bad debt credit card financing institute”. Basel II would put an end to the disaster of 
credit card defaults in Turkey, as banks are obliged to have rigorous internal policies 
for assessing the credit worthiness of customers who are offered overdraft accounts 
through pp 459. The Gap Analysis therefore, should include a review of the actual 
default situations in detail within the local banking system. Only when the local 
definition of default is determined through actual observations, banks can determine the 
transition/adjustment from local default experience to Basel II definition of default145.  
 
A key component of the Gap Analysis would be to understand how defaults occur 
within each bank. Turkish banking system is rapidly growing, and has evolving 
economic structures that are quite different from the majority of the banking systems, to 
which the BIS frameworks are being applied. Without this understanding, offering the 
standard “here are the tools/skills the leading banks have but good luck” type analysis 
will simply create a misleading, and ultimately unrealistic objectives for the banks, as 
the standard analysis do not necessarily focus on the economic reality surrounding 
them.  
 
The Gap Analysis should also assess each bank’s expertise, processes, systems and 
sometimes personnel spanning senior credit practitioners, rating specialists, data and 
modeling specialists, loss specialists, portfolio specialists, systems specialists and 
industry- and product-related business units as stressed in Chapter 5, sub-section 5.2, 
Key Issues in Implementing the IRB. Furthermore, ICAAP will determine the 
effectiveness of the Basel II implementation at the bank through use tests. The typical 
use test candidates will involve the monitoring and capital management functions on 
business unit (product and industry-related) and group level. Please refer to Chapter 3, 
sub-section 3.4.3.3.1 for details on the ICAAP. In the absence of this expertise, 
processes, systems and personnel, most Turkish banks are expected to seek solutions 
 
145 Basel II, Requirement 7: Risk Quantification, Paragraph 452 defines the default as 90 days due. According to BRSA, to change 
the credit risk environment, the industry should start from the definition of default. As new loans are extended at the end of 90 days 
and the repayments are prolonged, the outstanding credit exposure is accepted prematurely as a “non-defaulted” loan. Contrary to 
Basel II, paragraph 453, the bank never puts the credit obligation on non-accrued status.  
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externally for knowledge and experience transfer, which will ultimately benefit them in 
the long run.  
  
During Gap Analysis, interviews with key members of the senior management should 
also ensure a better understanding of the strategic framework for the banks. The 
outcome of the Gap Analysis is in fact deeply impacted by the strategic profiles of the 
management of the banks. The management’s propensity to take measured risks, desire 
for the capital efficiencies, and the net income stability will help to provide the banks 
with assessments of the credit risk gap, which are better understood and explained. The 
approach will also assist the banks to better assess the costs and the benefits of 
obtaining various tools/skills within the context of strategic resource allocation and the 
bank’s specific vision. It is quite common for this Gap Analysis phase to be undertaken 
prior to the commencement of the implementation project, and form a basis for the final 
project specifications and design. This enables the proposed solution to be more 
effectively designed and executed earlier on in the process.  
6.4 Phase 2: Data Foundation 
 
A Basel II-IRB solution needs to have the ability to bring acknowledged industry best 
practice to the assessment of all risky industry segments, irrespective of whether they 
are high default in nature, and thus generally data rich, or low default in nature, and 
thus data poor. The appropriateness of the data available is critical to the long term 
effectiveness of all risk management processes. This is particularly true of data on 
default events and recovery issues, which are difficult to collect retrospectively. Good 
data infrastructure should encompass data relevant to the assessment of single obligor 
risk, including an appropriate level of financial statement data and defaults, facility risk, 
based on an appropriate level of facility and collateral data, LGD and EAD, based on 
loan loss and recovery experience and historical rating performance of the relevant 
obligor and its facility.  
 
Under Basel II ‘Risk Quantification’ requirements, a bank may use data on internal 
default experience for the estimation of PD and internal loss estimates for the 
estimation of LGD. Minimum data requirements of PD and LGD are 5 and 7 years, 
respectively146. There is a significant challenge in capturing sufficient data (sufficient 
history, quality, quantity, breadth, and detail) to develop internal models in Turkey as 
identified in the latest Banking Sector Basel II Progress report.147 In this report, major 
banks reported that, 56.8% of problems to be associated with PD, LGD and EAD-
related data, either insufficiency, incompleteness or simply unavailability of the needed 
data148. To meet the Basel II IRB’s minimum data standards is of key importance for a 
successive framework at the organization, as stresses by Chapter 5, sub-section 5.2.1.8 
Risk Quantification and Data Standards.  
 
Although estimates of LGD and EAD based on a bank's own data are not required for 
F-IRB purposes, the scarcity of such loss related information and the typical difficulty, 
where banks have to go back to collect such data historically means, that it is extremely 
 
146 Basel II, Requirement 7 Risk Quantification, Paragraph 463,466 for data to be used for PD estimation and pp.472 for LGD 
estimation. 
147 Banking Sector Progression Report towards Basel II, Fig.2 Main Issues and Problems, BRSA, December 2006 
148 For examples of required data types, refer to Appendix VII. 
important to make an early start on the structured and disciplined collection of such 
data as it arises. Often banks do not have enough data to actually build reliable models, 
but if they have data, much of it is not immediately suitable for modeling purposes due 
to some quality issues. Therefore the initial step involves the cleansing of the data to 
ensure, it is in a form useable for modeling and the subsequent assessment of whether 
there is sufficient to proceed after cleansing. 
Figure 6.3: Standardized Data Cleansing Process 
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 This phase should not only include data cleansing and capture but also reporting that 
outlines the characteristics of the data set for further model development. By examining 
this data, banks will be able to determine which models may be needed, which models 
would be possible to construct, and which areas would need further data gathering.  
 
To start with, an analysis of the industry / segment structure of the bank's obligor 
portfolio, both in terms of performing and defaulted obligors need to be undertaken in 
this phase. This analysis is critical to determining, which segments in the bank's 
portfolio can support statistically based PD modeling, and which would more 
appropriately be addressed using methodology based Rating Estimate Templates. The 
key to this issue is the number of defaults available to support PD modeling. When the 
size of defaults is insufficient or incomplete, then banks tend to use scorecard modeling 
approach using a Rating Estimate template.  
 
Where only limited data are available, the use of pooled data across institutions is also 
recognized by Basel II149. However, a bank must demonstrate that the internal rating 
systems and criteria of other banks in the pool/consortium are comparable with its own. 
In most countries, banks sought to establish Data Consortium to support the 
development and maintenance of probability of default and LGD models. Moody’s 
KMV’s Credit Research Database (CRD) Initiative is one of them and it started in 1996 
to source credit risk data and to solve data consolidation problems of several banks in a 
given financial system. In the absence of sufficient, complete and available data, the 
Data Consortium should: 
 
1. Satisfy the need for more credit risk data:  
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149 Basel II , Requirement 7: Risk Quantification, Paragraph 461-462. 
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Generally, participation in consortium will improve banks’ infrastructure for gathering 
credit risk data and leverage their own data to draw additional credit risk data from the 
pool. Internal models developed with more default and recovery data tend to be more 
powerful, accurate and consistent across different sectors, size, and industry across 
time periods. Therefore, the Data Consortium can enlarge available data while 
maintaining ‘own credit experience’ requirements150. Participants draw more default 
data from the pool and get complete copies of the non-default data for benchmarking. 
This enhances their data in model development and overcomes concentration and bias 
in the internal models that they develop. The consortium should also establish group’s 
infrastructure to capture on-going credit experience data for annual testing151 at the 
same time use Basel II default and loss definitions152. The consortium should serve to 
increase market transparency in the spirit of Basel II153. Consequently, Data 
Consortium needs to comply with Basel II as the starting point for default definition 
where default event occurs when: either or both of the two following events have taken 
place as defined by Paragraph 452.  
 
• The Client considers that the obligor is unlikely to pay its credit obligations 
to the Client in full, without recourse by the Client to actions such as 
realizing security (if held). The elements to be taken as indications of 
unlikeliness to pay include: Non-accruals, charge offs, account-specific 
provisions arising from a significant perceived decline in credit quality, 
credit-relates economic loss, troubled debt restructuring or bankruptcy.  
 
• The obligor is past due more than 90 days on any material credit obligation 
to the Client (“90DaysPastDue”). Overdrafts will be considered as being 
past due once the customer has breached an advised limit or been advised of 
a limit smaller than current outstandings (“Overdraft”). 
 
In daily praxis of a global bank, following events may trigger a default: Cheque Return, 
Watch List, and Past Due above 90 days, Debt Restructuring, Demand for Payment, 
Experts Definition, Provision, Writing Off, Bankruptcy and Assets Liquidation. 
 
To ensure accurate default capture, the detection of default events in the pool should be 
automated with accordance to the default definition above through specific algorithms. 
After proper identification of default events, it is also important to filter through the 
pools for minimum two consecutive annual financial statements where the most recent 
statement date is 24 months immediately prior to default. This is of key importance in 
the development of models as well as validation since defaults are only useful if 
matched with financial statements that have the financial variables/factors, which 
may/may not have predicted a default event.  
 
In preparation of A-IRB, the Data Consortium should also filter for recovery 
transactions tracked for defaults. This requires capturing data regarding the amount, 
timing and source of the recovery cash flows and comparing it to perceived value at 
 
150 Basel II , Requirement 3:  Rating System Design, (v) Use of models, Paragraph 417. 
151 Basel II , Requirement 3 Rating System Design, Paragraph 429 
152 Basel II , Requirement 7 Risk Quantification, Paragraph 452, 456 and 460 
153 Basel II , Requirement 7 Rating System Design, Paragraph 418, 420 and 421 
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various points in time. In turn, this recovery data can be used for estimating collateral 
‘realization rates’, which are the building blocks of ‘ultimate recovery rates’. 
 
2. Increase the availability of high-quality data in the market:  
 
Good data is the foundation of superior risk rating systems. Requirements stated in 
Basel II is one manifestation of encouraging banking supervisors to ensure data quality 
in their markets, to sustain financial market stability. National supervisors will be 
looking to assess the banks in their ability to identify the nature of each risk, explain the 
ways to quantify and mitigate such risks and apply best practice in doing so. Hence, 
high-quality data will be in the minds of national supervisory during the SREP. Further 
details on the SREP can be found in Chapter 3, sub-section 3.4.3.3.2.  
 
A common reason for data holes is the inadequate policies and procedures for tracking 
pre-default and post-default financial statement information. Data Consortium should 
implement a set of rules in accurately capturing financial statements, spreading policy 
and procedures.  
 
To prove up to date and well specified rating systems are present, formal and 
statistically significant tests must be performed on financial statement data to ensure it 
is of high quality, in sufficient numbers, with sufficient breadth (time, size, industry…), 
from portfolios similar to where the model is used, with default events that are 
regulatory compliant, and with defaulters matched to the prospective quantitative 
inputs. However, most Turkish institutions face challenges in this area as highlighted in 
the banking progress report.  
 
Another common reason for banks’ systems to have data holes is that links between 
loan data and borrower financial performance data are mainly non-existent or 
inaccurate. In this respect, Data Consortium should perform initial linking and check 
links at each submission by banks. It should advise banks on expanding and 
maintaining links and provides periodical feedback to participants so that long term 
data quality can be achieved throughout the industry.  
 
To create a market discipline referred in Chapter 3, sub-section 3.4.3.4, Pillar 3, 
Discipline of the Market, the Data Consortium should have in place extensive data 
quality controls/rules that will apply to participant banks and encourage the 
improvement of data quality after each data submission to the pool. This is not an easy 
task as it involves extensive knowledge of local accounting and credit principles 
coupled with credit default and loss data experience in standardization across a wide 
variety of participant bank systems. Apart from collection of data, data sampling rules 
should also be in place to create the optimal data samples for internal model 
development. Finally, it is important to note that the Data Consortium adheres to the 
confidentiality needs of participant banks as well as the regulatory body, e.g. BRSA. 
Generally, obligor names and identifiers should not necessarily be required for 
participation and participating bank data should be further anonymized when received 
to protect confidentiality of participant. 
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3. Promote benchmarking:  
 
In the absence of benchmark PD and LGD models in Turkey, pooled data in a 
consortium can be used in the development of such benchmarks for further model 
validation and calibration purposes. Although not a primary driver to Data Consortium, 
it can serve in the development of external benchmark for internal PD and LGD 
models. As part of the validation of internal rating systems under Basel II IRB, banks 
can back-test their internal models as well as benchmark them against externally 
available data or models.154 Accordingly, Data Consortium ought to have a reporting 
function where reports by size, industry, and portfolio can be obtained, for 
benchmarking purposes. 
6.5 Phase 3: Risk Analyst as an Internal Rating System Platform  
 
Basel II compliance with minimum requirements requires banks’ credit risk 
management practices to be accepted by the National Supervisors155.  
 
Each supervisor will develop detailed review procedures to ensure that, banks’ systems 
and controls are adequate to serve as the basis for the IRB approach, determined by the 
SREP. Please refer to sub-section 3.4.3.3.2 in Chapter 3. The term “rating system” 
comprises all of the methods, processes, controls and data collection and IT Systems 
that support the assessment of credit risk, the assignment of internal risk weights and 
the quantification of default and loss estimates156. The main idea behind the imposition 
of the IRB systems is a meaningful differentiation and reasonably accurate estimation 
of credit risks. In this respect, RiskAnalyst™ platform has been used by institutions 
around the world to rate millions of credits and many of these institutions received 
approval from regulatory supervisors on their credit risk management practices.  
 
An effective internal rating system should facilitate the development of credit strategy, 
planning and reporting framework, which are the main responsibilities shared by the 
GRM and RMW functions of the organization as proposed in Chapter 5, sub-sections 
5.4 and 5.5. Identifying the most risky borrowers, pricing for risk, and measuring 
regulatory and economic capital can not be achieved without an accurate internal rating 
system. Without it, it is also very difficult to really take advantages of active portfolio 
management that entails buying and selling of portfolio of assets, which lies with the 
LPMG in Chapter 5, sub-section 5.6.2. In this spirit, MRAAG, Moody’s KMV Risk 
Advisor Advisory Group, helps ensure that RiskAnalyst solution utilizes industry best 
practices to produce credit risk assessments for single obligors. MRAAG is a 
consortium of financial institutions that implemented RiskAnalyst solution across their 
organizations and perform regular meetings in the year to suggest enhancements to the 
solution and exchange ideas. Consequently, the thesis will explore the implementation 
possibilities of this solution in this chapter.  
 
RiskAnalyst sets the foundation for consistent and accurate risk analysis on commercial 
borrowers by collecting, analyzing and storing financial statement data. The tool’s 
 
154 Basel II Working Paper No.14, ‘Studies on the Validation of Internal Rating Systems’, Key Components of Validation, Figure 
1. Validation Components, February 2005 
155 Basel II, Minimum Requirements for IRB Approach, Requirement 1 and 2, Paragraph 388 and 392 
156 Basel II, Minimum Requirements for IRB Approach, Requirement 3 Rating System Design, Paragraph 394 
centralized database powers the configurable and highly organized framework that 
brings together the inputs required by an internal rating system. These inputs can aid in 
rating model development/evaluation and internal auditing. RiskAnalyst organizes data 
at both the borrower and facility levels forming the basis for portfolio analysis.  
Figure 6.4: Rating Summary Dialog Box of RiskAnalyst™ 
Source: Moody’s KMV RiskAnalyst User Guide 
 
Basel II ‘Rating System Design’ requirements detail that the rating system must have 
two dimensions157. This requirement was also discussed in Chapter 5, sub-section 
5.2.1.2 when identifying the key organizational issues relating to the foundations of a 
Basel IRB-compliant bank. Similarly, when assessing the risk associated with 
providing credit to borrowers in RiskAnalyst, there are two dimensions to the risk 
assessment: 1) the risk that the borrowers will default (obligor risk) and 2) the risk 
associated with any recovery of obligations from the borrowers if they default (facility 
risk). RiskAnalyst includes two key modules to assess these risks, which are the 
Borrower and Facilities modules. The borrower rating in Borrower module provides an 
assessment of the credit quality of the firm, which produces a score/grade that can be 
mapped to PD. The LGD rating in the Facilities module considers transaction features 
and any associated credit risk mitigants, compliant with F-IRB. If the A-IRB approach 
is the goal, RiskAnalyst can also be customized as such to accommodate the 
requirements of internal LGD and EAD models. Schematically, the Ratings Summary 
below details the Borrower grade, PD, EAD and LGD produced by the RiskAnalyst 
system. 
 
A good rating system separates borrower risk from facility or transaction risk. In 
general, facility risk-based rating systems tend to create a huge ‘bunching’ into a few 
rating categories as illustrated in the figure below. This is mainly due to facility risk 
based rating’s focus more on the structure of the deal and collateral. In RiskAnalyst, the 
distinction has been made between borrower and facility risk and scored separately. 
This works well in terms of the credit risk management activities since there is usually 
little one can do about the borrower risk, but negotiations can take place extensively 
with the bank’s customers with regards to the structure and collateral of the transaction. 
 
                                                 
157 Basel II, Minimum Requirements for IRB Approach, Requirement 2, Paragraph 396 
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Figure 6.5: Key Characteristics of Good Internal Rating Systems158 
 
Source: Moody’s KMV  
 
RiskAnalyst’s rating framework is powered by a set of calculation engines linked to a 
centralized database that bring together in a consistent manner the data elements 
required by best-practice internal rating systems. These data elements help improve the 
credit process and can be used to support further model validation and development 
work in the future. 
 
RiskAnalyst solution consists of several components: 
1. Data Capture with model deployment and archiving 
2. Borrower Rating - Predefined Financial Templates and Rating Templates for 
several industries, banks and insurance companies 
3. Facility Analysis - Built-in Basel II Foundation IRB, LGD calculations or 
customized LGD templates 
4. Set of construction tools to aid model maintenance and tuning (customization 
capabilities)  
 
6.5.1 Borrower Rating 
 
The borrower module is designed to enable the usage of three different complementary 
methodologies for the assessment of borrower credit quality: 
1. Internal quantitative default probability (PD) models 
Many commercial lenders (particularly those working towards Basel II IRB 
compliance) seek to develop and deploy quantitative models based on their own 
internal data (internal rating models), which if able to perform at acceptable levels of 
accuracy, are often considered to better reflect the characteristics of their portfolio and 
credit culture. 
 
 
 
                                                 
158 Brammer, M, Moody’s KMV, “Five Characteristics of a Good Internal Risk Rating System”, CreditRisk.net, p.7 
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2. External quantitative default probability models, such as EDF models 
Some lending institutions also use validated quantitative PD models, such as the ones 
developed externally, within their credit risk system, as an alternative response to the 
problem of a shortage of default data. These models, which provide an absolute 
measure of risk defined as the probability of default, can be used to provide a valuable 
benchmark. This type of model is sometimes referred to as ‘external’ because it is 
developed, validated and calibrated to default using data external to the lending 
institution and because the factors, weights and calculations used within the model are 
not changed by individual institutions. These will be discussed further in Phase 4 in 
sub-section 6.6.2 of this chapter. 
3. Expert judgment based scorecards or rating estimate templates 
For those banks with limited historical obligor data, particularly on defaulted obligors, 
these models or scorecards may only derive a relative measure of risk, such as a bank 
grade, that may, after calibration, be mapped to an actual default probability. This type 
of ‘internal’ model / scorecard also offers the opportunity to include additional, 
possibly qualitative, risk factors (e.g. management quality) into the analysis, i.e. expert 
judgement based scorecards or rating estimate templates.  
 
In compliance with Basel II ‘Rating System Design’ requirements, a bank may utilize 
multiple methodologies/systems within each asset class159. Banks must not allocate 
borrowers across rating systems inappropriately to minimize regulatory requirements.  
It is important to highlight that RiskAnalyst platform allows banks to use multiple risk 
rating models and hence configurable utilities can be set to present the models 
appropriate to the type of asset class being rated. RiskAnalyst standard scorecard 
analyses are based on predetermined information by MRAAG, which are referred as 
‘case types’. Case types determine the inputs used in the models and their weightings. 
For each model for a given asset class (retail, corporates, banks, SMEs, etc) the 
underlying case types will be the source of input selection and model weightings. Given 
bank’s portfolio and the breakdown of asset classes, case types should be filtered for 
appropriate model selection. In addition, bank can filter case types by industry, country 
and company size to determine the appropriate case types for a given model. 
 
6.5.1.1 Financial Ratio Analysis 
 
In typical corporate lending, internal credit analysis begins with an analysis of key 
financial ratios, which might be as simple as a comparison of each ratio’s value to some 
absolute standard. RiskAnalyst supports this type of analysis but can additionally 
incorporate an analysis of trend across multiple periods, in terms of both the slope and 
volatility of the trend. It can also compare the value of a ratio with quartile values of a 
comparable peer group. These analyses are then combined to produce an overall ratio 
assessment where the outcome is the weighted sum of peer/trend analysis and absolute 
assessment as illustrated below. 
 
  
 
 
 
159 Basel II, Minimum Requirements for IRB Approach, Requirement 2, Paragraph 395 
Figure 6.6: Ratio Assessment Structure 
  Source: Moody’s KMV RiskAnalyst User Guide  
 
6.5.1.2 Peer Assessment 
 
This is the assessment of the ratio’s performance against industry values. The 
calculated value of the ratio for the current period is compared to the industry values to 
derive the company’s ranking. The set of benchmark fixed points need to be entered to 
rank against the peer group. As discussed in Phase 2, the data obtainable from the Data 
Consortium will be crucial in the effective use of peer analysis. Note that SREP 
involves the national supervisors to seek evidence where Trend and Peer Assessments 
of RiskAnalyst can assist such that the bank’s model is powerful or similar compared to 
the practices that its peers take on. Please refer to Chapter 3, sub-section 3.4.3.3.2 for 
the UK FSA’s comment on the use of peer comparison as a review tool when assessing 
the reasonableness of bank’s practice. 
 
6.5.1.3 Trend Assessment 
 
This is the weighted combination of the trend analysis and the volatility assessment of 
this trend. In this context, the raw trend analyses consider the trend of the ratio over the 
periods defined. Hence, this requires a sufficient history of financial statements. The 
volatility assessment is an extension of the raw trend analysis. The volatility 
assessment, in general, will be unfavourable if there are wide fluctuations of the values 
across periods. If the trend shows stability and relatively an even pattern of change, 
then the assessment will be favourable. Even the most favourable volatility assessment 
may have a small impact because the main function of the volatility analysis is to 
introduce conservatism to the trend values. The minimum of three historical values are 
required to perform such analysis. In addition, the peer trend assessment compares the 
average rate of change of the ratio value for the company over 3-4 years to the average 
rate of change of the median ratio value for the peer group, provided that this data is 
available. The collection of peer level data via the Data Consortium will be put in 
effective use at this level of analysis.  
 
6.5.1.4 Absolute Assessment 
 
For some ratios, not all, there are certain common industry standards that translate to 
company performing well or poorly. This assessment is included to counter the effects 
of making ratio comparisons in a very strong and weak industry. The absolute values 
used will vary across different scorecard templates provided in RiskAnalyst per 
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different asset classes. The benchmark fixed points for a given ratio are defined during 
modelling and entered in the tuning tool.  
  
6.5.1.5 Qualitative/Judgemental Analysis 
 
To support the need to take into account all the factors that may influence the level of 
risk, an effective internal rating model commonly include factors which relate to the 
domain and environment in which the company operates, for example: the quality of 
the company’s management, its standing within the industry, or an assessment of the 
riskiness of the industry itself.  
 
An effective rating system should balance the view of credit risk with the proper mix of 
objective factors (quantitative variables) and judgement (qualitative factors). 
Sometimes not all information can be captured by the financial statement of the 
borrower and rating framework heavily relying on these financial factors need to be 
adjusted with judgement and other subjective factors. That being said, the judgemental 
factors can also be a source for bias where caution needs to be practised to avoid 
optimism or conservatism160. Instead, a good rating system will reward the accuracy.  
 
6.5.1.6 Ratings Summary 
 
A scorecard consists of a set of factors grouped into sections corresponding to 
particular areas of analysis. Scorecard factors obtain data from Qualitative analysis or 
from Financial Ratio Analysis or other variables, such as industry, size entered in 
RiskAnalyst or an external program, such as EDF measures. Based on the input value 
the factors are scored, weighted to attribute to the overall score of the section. The 
section scores are weighted and summed to give a total model score. Finally, the total 
model score is mapped to a grade and a PD during calibration of the model. Most 
lending institutions have a grading scale with between 10 and 20 grades, or buckets, 
into which borrowers are placed. The internal rating score must be mapped, or 
calibrated, to this grading scale to determine the correct grade for each borrower. Some 
institutions allow certain users to override the final grade. RiskAnalyst supports 
overrides in a transparent, controlled and monitored way. Override grade are stored 
alongside system-generated grades, and are easily distinguishable from them.  
Figure 6.7: Scorecard based rating structure 
 
Source: Moody’s KMV RiskAnalyst User Guide 
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160 Basel II , Requirement 3, Use of Models, Paragraph 417 
 
Basel II requires the rating grades to be minimum 7 grades, as mentioned in sub-section 
5.2.1.3 Rating Structure and Granularity of Rating Grades of Chapter 5. The thesis 
provided a rating scale in Chapter 5, sub-section 5.6.1.3 Obligor Rating Assignment by 
LPG in Table 5.1 for illustrative purposes.  Once borrowers are assigned to grades, 
lenders need to convert their scale into an absolute measure of risk by mapping the 
grade to an equivalent probability of default (PD) measure161. This PD represents the 
average probability of borrowers in that grade to default within a certain time horizon, 
typically one year. This mapping can easily be represented within RiskAnalyst and 
displayed to the user alongside the borrower grade. This mapping should give the 
correct level of probability of default and hence Calibration is a key component for 
achieving an effective internal rating system. Right calibration better supports pricing 
than mere ordinal ranking of credits as illustrated below.  
 
Figure 6.8: Key Characteristics of Good Rating Systems162 
 
 Source: Moody’s KMV  
 
Under Basel II ‘Rating System Design’, banks must document the relationship between 
a borrower grade and its level of risk, particularly the grade’s PD and the criteria used 
to assign that PD. RiskAnalyst enables each bank to develop and enforce a borrower 
grade scale with specific definitions or categories of risk. This solution presents 
assessments from rating models on a continuous and relative scale that can be adjusted 
by the bank. Banks need to fine tune the mapping from grades to PD in order to avoid 
concentrations of borrowers in any risk grade163. Basel II also states that the excessive 
concentrations in risk grades to be avoided in the same paragraph. It is also very useful 
to compare this internally-derived PD with a default estimate produced by an externally 
validated model such as the EDF, and this can be displayed in RiskAnalyst as a 
benchmark. In Phase 4, the uses of benchmark models will be elaborated.  
 
                                                 
161 Basel II , Requirement 7, Paragraph 447, 461-467 
162 Brammer, M, Moody’s KMV, “Five Characteristics of a Good Internal Risk Rating System”, CreditRisk.net, p.2 
163 Basel II , Rating System Design, Paragraph 403: “A Bank must have a meaningful distribution of exposures across grades with 
no excessive concentrations, on both its borrower-rating and its facility-rating scales”. 
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Under Basel II ‘Rating System Design’164, banks must take all relevant, available 
information into account when assigning ratings to borrowers and facilities, which is 
also marked as one of the key issues when laying the organizational foundations of an 
IRB implementation in Chapter 5, sub-section 5.2.1.1, Rating Systems and Approaches 
to Rating Assignment. Information must be current. An external rating can be the 
primary factor determining an internal rating, but the bank must consider other relevant 
information. Respectively, RiskAnalyst can combine financial statement information 
and associated performance ratios with judgemental factors not found in financial 
reports. The update of these factors can be done as frequently as possible to get a 
current assessment. Banks can deploy risk rating models that incorporate external 
ratings and other risk metrics, such as EDF estimates in combination with additional 
information on the borrower to create a ‘composite’ risk rating. Furthermore, banks 
must meet the disclosure requirements of Pillar 3 to qualify for IRB. In that respect, 
extensive online and written documentation, explanation facilities, and portfolio 
reporting capabilities are available in RiskAnalyst to support bank’s internal disclosure 
effort, which GRM for credit risks and RMW will mainly be responsible as discussed in 
Chapter 5, sub-sections 5.4 and 5.5. A good internal rating system distributes insights 
across the organization, which involves a standardized and consistent framework for 
documenting the rating methodologies, which makes the rating process more efficient, 
but also allows everyone a better understanding of the actual risk presented by the 
borrower. In particular, the ICAAP should ensure with the use tests that the bank’s 
organizational framework will support this goal. Please see Chapter 3, sub-section 
3.4.3.3. 
 
Once analysis is completed, Archive module is used to create a record of that analysis. 
Archive Module stores and retrieves records of analyses for purposes to support 
internal audit functions, but more importantly to provide historical records of analyses 
for model development and validation purposes. The archive module will help the 
credit review function, as stated by Basel II ‘Corporate Governance and Oversight 
requirements, to review the design, implementation and performance of the models on 
an ongoing basis165. A good rating system should record the historical financial and 
judgemental factors per each borrower for performance tracking and this data archive 
becomes the primary source of validation and calibration needed to maintain the 
accuracy and effectiveness of the internal rating system. The importance of validation 
framework was highlighted repeatedly in Chapter 3, sub-section 3.4.3.3 as part of 
ICAAP and the responsibilities of the GRM for credit risks in Chapter 5, sub-section 
5.4.5.3. On borrower level all account-related information and judgemental evaluations 
are stored and linked with facility-related data, which allows consistent tracking. At the 
portfolio-level there is a comprehensive reporting functionality on the portfolio quality, 
historical trend assessments as well as identifying exposures across the risk-rating 
curve. Indeed, such activities form the key responsibilities of the LPMG and offered as 
part of portfolio strategy and planning in Chapter 5, sub-section 5.6.2 and in the 
organization of LPMG depicted in Figure 5.5.  With reference to Basel II ‘Risk Rating 
System Operations’ requirements, RiskAnalyst provides explanation reports combined 
with an intuitive analysis structure facilitating an understanding of the derivation of 
assessments via electronic case files and summary reports166. Banks can set and store 
 
164 Basel II , Requirement 3, Paragraph 397 
165 Basel II , Requirement 5, Paragraph 441 
166 Basel II,  Requirement 4, Paragraph 422, 424, 425 and 428 
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guidelines to revise and override the risk assessment. Banks can also set up and run 
stress-tests on a portfolio by utilizing data captured by and rating models deployed in 
the system. It also allows for projections forward under different scenarios that can 
facilitate the analysis of each borrower under stressed conditions167. Custom scorecards 
can be created by RiskAnalyst Tuner, which helps to edit and delete existing models, 
and manage ratio assessments.  
 
6.5.2 Facility Analysis 
 
Facility Analysis deals primarily with the question of “In the event of a default, how 
much do we expect to lose?” while the Borrower Rating asks the following question: 
“What is the likelihood that the borrower will default on an obligation?” 
 
The answer to the first question is driven by seniority, the quality of collateral, and 
guarantees, whereas the answer to the default likelihood is primarily driven by 
financials and non-financial information of the obligors. For banks adopting the IRB 
approach, Basel II advises that facility ratings must exclusively reflect LGD. This 
assessment can include any and all aspects that impact the value of a facility. According 
to this, RiskAnalyst Facility module’s LGD ratings assess the relative riskiness of a 
facility based on both financial and non-financial aspects as well as aspects associated 
with collateral and guarantees. This allows for a more comprehensive review of the 
recovery risk associated with the transaction. 
 
For each facility, RiskAnalyst calculates an Exposure at Default (EAD), which is an 
estimate of the outstanding amount on the facility should the borrower default. Then, 
the solution considers recoveries that could be obtained if the default event occurs. The 
expected recovery can be improved by using Credit Risk Mitigants (CRMs) to enhance 
the quality of the obligation. The CRMs commonly are the guarantees and collateral 
(collateral consists of charge on a borrower’s asset by the creditor). 
 
RiskAnalyst implicitly adjusts the exposure by segmenting it into portions covered by 
different collateral and guarantee types with any remaining exposure left as unsecured. 
It captures detailed information about each item of collateral and automatically applies 
the eligibility criteria to determine the appropriate haircut. By default, RiskAnalyst 
applies the Basel II Foundation IRB approach’s LGD requirements. If the bank applies 
the A-IRB approach, the collateral factors, eligibility criteria, haircuts together with 
adjustments for lending type and revaluation criteria, can be amended with internal 
estimates168.  
 
Expected Loss (EL) is the expected value of losses due to default. To assist validation 
and management on borrower level, solution aggregates EL and LGD per borrower by 
summing the LGD and EL amounts for each facility. To derive the LGD per facility, 
the solution breaks up EAD into 3 parts: guaranteed, collateralized and unsecured. LGD 
per each part is computed separately. EL is calculated in a similar way and then 
summed to get the aggregated values. Refer to the LGD and EL Aggregation below. 
 
 
 
167 Basel II, Requirement 4, Paragraph 434-436. 
168 Basel II, Paragraph 431 
Figure 6.9: LGD, EL Aggregation and Calculation Graphics 
 
LGD: 
 
 
EL Aggregation: 
 
 
Overview of Calculations: 
 
Source: Moody’s KMV RiskAnalyst Facility Module Guide 
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6.5.2.1 EAD Calculation 
 
Once the utilization, commitment and the Credit Conversion Factor (CCF)169 are 
specified by the bank as inputs, for both used and unused portion of the facility, EAD 
can be determined. CCFs are simply the numbers to convert off-balance sheet items 
into credit equivalents by recognizing the inherent risk in various types of items. If 
these items are not provided, then the bank needs to specify the EAD value. 
Alternatively, RiskAnalyst’s reference CCF values by facility type, original maturity 
and whether the facility is immediately cancellable are also available. RiskAnalyst 
applies the Basel II F-IRB’s EAD approach by default. The only data requirement for 
the bank will be the commitment and utilization. Under A-IRB’s EAD approach, banks 
will be allowed to use their own estimates of CCFs. Accordingly; RiskAnalyst allows 
banks to change CCFs and adjustment parameters as well as the facility types and other 
drivers that determine the CCFs.  
 
6.5.2.2 Treatment of Guarantees 
 
By default, RiskAnalyst considers guarantees first (before collateral), as specified in 
Basel II. The system sorts each facility’s guarantees first by their PD and second 
according to their LGD. There are complex rules governing which guarantees are 
eligible in Basel II and hence RiskAnalyst uses a set of eligibility criteria for 
guarantees, by default170. User can customize and/or extend on these default values. 
Haircuts are applied to a CRM to account for the risk of fall in value of CRM held due 
to default or during the close-out period. RiskAnalyst comes with haircuts for 
guarantees with values of zero, but users can customize this via entering the true 
expected realization of the guarantee. 
 
6.5.2.3 Treatment of Collateral 
 
RiskAnalyst provides a mapping from its own collateral types to Basel II equivalents. 
Under Basel II F-IRB’s LGD approach171, there are four types of collateral, which are 
recognized: Financial collateral, Receivables, Commercial and residential real estate 
(CRE/RRE) and Other Collateral. RiskAnalyst supports the distinction between eligible 
and ineligible where ineligible collateral is automatically removed from the 
calculations.  
 
Regarding Haircuts and Eligibility Criteria, RiskAnalyst uses a table for specifying the 
base haircuts for financial collateral as taken from Basel II F-IRB approach. These 
haircuts are based on the assumption of daily mark-to-market, daily remargining and 10 
business day holding period.  Basel II also states that for secured lending, a minimum 
20 days is appropriate and provides formulae for transforming the haircuts. RiskAnalyst 
uses Basel II F-IRB formulae to transform the supervisory haircuts172.  For non-
financial collateral, Basel II F-IRB specifies an over collateralization173, which are 
 
169 Basel II, Paragraphs 311-314. 
170 Basel II, Requirement Paragraph 140-142, 195, 302-305 
171 Basel II , Paragraph 287-290 
172 Basel II, Paragraph 166-169 
173 Basel II, Paragraph 295-296 
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transformed to haircuts using haircut=1/ (1-overcollateralization level). RiskAnalyst 
then uses these as the haircuts for non-financial collateral.  
 
After all haircuts are applied, RiskAnalyst deducts any prior liens and then caps the 
collateral valuation to the value of the limitation.  
 
Under Basel II F-IRB, a minimum collateralization level174 is specified for certain 
collateral types, e.g. CRE/RRE and Other Collateral. RiskAnalyst provides a table to 
specify such minimum collateralization levels as defined by Basel II to ensure there is 
significant coverage of the exposure. RiskAnalyst checks if the collateral has met the 
Minimum Collateralization Level through a series of calculations. Finally, RiskAnalyst 
will ignore collateral where the collateral LGD% is greater than the unsecured LGD% 
for the facility. Minimum %LGD levels are provided to a particular collateral type 
using best industry practices. These levels can be overridden by the bank with its own 
estimates. In general, solution allows all parameters to be configurable. Therefore, they 
may be amended to fit bank’s own estimates, provided that supervisors permit banks to 
calculate haircuts using their own estimates as advised under Basel II F-IRB175. 
 
The appropriate haircut for each asset to determine the portion of the exposure covered 
by the asset is applied automatically. Summing these portions determines the value of 
the basket after the weighted average haircut is applied176.  
 
6.5.2.4 Allocating Credit Risk Mitigants (CRMs) to Facilities 
 
In practice, it is common for complex relationships to exist between facilities and 
CRMs. To handle this, RiskAnalyst uses both algorithmic and user-specified 
approaches. Users can allocate CRMs for facilities automatically or manually by 
defining percentage of CRM to each facility. If users do not manually define this 
relationship, then RiskAnalyst uses an algorithm based on EAD weighting to apportion 
the CRMs.  
 
In the automatic allocation, it determines the facilities to which guarantee is allocated 
via finding the total EAD of facilities and then assigning a weighting based on the 
facility EAD/total EAD of facilities. Then, the guarantee allocation is determined by 
the weighting and the guarantee value. Having allocated guarantees, RiskAnalyst then 
allocates collateral similarly using the residual EAD that is after deducting the 
guarantee allocations.  
 
The manual approach can be used when a certain CRM is known to be tied to a 
specific facility. In best practice, this runs the danger of over-allocation of CRM to one 
facility while leaving other facilities only partially covered.  
 
Having determined the allocation for an individual guarantee, RiskAnalyst multiplies 
this by the guarantor’s LGD to calculate the LGD Amount. EL is simply the product of 
LGD Amount and the guarantor’s PD. For corporate guarantees177, it ensures that the 
 
174 Basel II, Paragraph 295-296 
175 Basel II, Paragraph 154 
176 Basel II, Paragraph 150  
177 Basel II, Paragraph 302-305 
guarantor PD is at least 0.09% (equivalent to A-). This value is configurable by the 
bank based on guarantor type. In addition, it compares the guarantor’s PD and LGD to 
those of the borrower to determine eligibility, as stated in Basel II F-IRB approach. 
Having considered guarantees, RiskAnalyst considers collateral allocations as discussed 
above. RiskAnalyst then multiplies this by borrower’s LGD to calculate LGD Amount. 
EL is the product of LGD Amount and borrower PD. PD used in the LGD module can 
come from either the 1-year EDF measure or the PD derived from the scorecard total or 
grade in the Borrower module.  If any of the exposure is still left uncovered after 
applying all guarantees and collateral, RiskAnalyst considers this unsecured and uses 
unsecured LGD% to determine an unsecured LGD Amount. Based on the seniority, the 
LGD% is determined for the unsecured portion of the facility, in accordance with Basel 
II, which determines the LGD% of unsecured claims 45% for senior and 75% for 
subordinated. EL is then calculated as the product of LGD Amount and the borrower 
PD178. The sophisticated automation is illustrated below.  
Figure 6.10: LGD Calculation Algorithm 
 
Source: Moody’s KMV RiskAnalyst ‘Facility Module’ 
 
 
                                                 
178 Basel II, Paragraph 287-290 
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In summary, solution is designed to meet the requirements in the Foundation IRB for 
LGD. The solution can be customized to meet the advanced LGD framework by the 
bank, but Turkish banks have scarce data around the loan loss and recovery that makes 
the application of A-IRB difficult. However, proper capture of this data within a 
consistent platform such as RiskAnalyst can assist with the future development. For 
illustrative purposes, the thesis gave an example of Facility rating process in Chapter 5, 
5.6.1.4, determining the Facility Rating (LGD) and the Exposure at Default (EAD). 
Moody’s KMV LossCalc follows a more econometric, statistical analysis of the LGD, 
which may also assist in benchmarking internal LGD models. The thesis will discuss 
LossCalc model as part of the A-IRB roadmap in Phase 8.  
6.6 Phase 4: Probability of Default (PD) Models 
 
6.6.1 Time Horizon 
 
As indicated in Basel II, there may be many purposes of an internal model ranging from 
credit approval/renewal, loan structuring, credit monitoring on borrower and portfolio 
level, limit system, economic and regulatory capital, loss calculation to pricing179. 
There are several rating model types called “Point in Time and Through the Cycle” 
Ratings to start with PD Modelling180 as some considerations were also outlined in 
Chapter 5, 5.2.1.5 Rating Assignment Horizon.   
 
Table 6.1: Characteristics of Point in Time (PIT) and Through the Cycle (TTC) Rating Models 
 
Characteristics Point in Time Through the Cycle 
Historical Background 
Treacy & Carey (1998) first referenced
“point-in-time” ratings in their FRB
Bank Ratings Survey article 
 
 
Moody's (1995) first referenced 
“through-the-cycle” ratings in an 
article about the copper industry 
Behaviour Rating fluctuates with the borrower’scondition within the business cycle 
 
Borrower rating does not fluctuate 
with the borrower’s condition within 
the cycle (and changes only in 
response to enduring changes in 
credit quality) 
Time Horizon Generally 1 year Through the credit cycle, generally > 5 years 
Transition Matrix Off diagonals  are strongly populated Stable, most of the borrowers are on the diagonal 
Source: Moody’s KMV Modelling Services Group 
 
                                                 
179 Basel II Working Paper No.14, ‘Studies on the Validation of Internal Rating Systems’, Dynamics of Rating Systems, February 2005 
180 Crosbie, P. /Bohn, J: Modeling Default Risk, Modeling Methodology, MKMV Modeling Papers, 2005 and Engelmann, B. / Rauhmeier, R.: The Basel II Risk 
Parameters, Springer Berlin, 2006. For more technical issues; Servigny A./Renault, O.: Measuring and Managing Credit Risk, Standards&Poors, 2004. 
Depending on the purpose, through the cycle (TTC) or points in time (PIT) measures 
have both advantages and disadvantages on a practical level and hence most banks 
adopt a mixture of both where thesis will refer to these as hybrid models. If daily data is 
not available from capital markets or other sources on some borrowers, this will cause 
challenges for a perfect point in time rating. In the absence of sufficient historical 
default rates for rating classes over a cycle, this will also make it difficult for a perfect 
through the cycle rating181.  
Figure 6.11: Actual Rating and Perfect Rating 
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Source: Moody’s KMV 
 
According to the recent studies on validation, the assumption that the average default 
rate is stable over the time is not yet proven and threatens the feasibility of a perfect 
through the cycle rating182. Similarly, daily changing ratings in a perfect point in time 
measure can be unsuitable for business decisions from a relationship banker’s point of 
view with regards to longer dated instruments. The appropriate approach can differ 
from portfolio to portfolio and the asset type. Some aspects banks need to take into 
consideration can be expanded from the ones outlined in the sub-section 5.2.1.5 of 
Chapter 5 when building their internal PD models.  In general, there are two 
components to credit risk: Systemic and Idiosyncratic risks. Systemic risks are 
associated with economic conditions, the extent of exposure to the local and global 
economy. Mostly, bigger the company more exposure it has to the systemic portion of 
the risk. As experienced by large Turkish corporations and financial institutions, there 
is very little degree of isolation to global credit market turmoil and credit cycle 
becomes a reality.  
Figure 6.12: Public Default Database Statistics 1973-2006 
Quarterly Defaults/Bankruptcies
North American Public Companies 
1973 through June 2006 
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181 For details of PIT and TTC, refer  to: The Basel Handbook (2007, pp.267-297). Designing and Implementing a Basel II Compliant PIT-TTC Ratings 
Framework. 
182 Basel II, Working Paper No.14, Studies on the Validation of Internal Rating, Dynamics of Rating Systems, February 2005. 
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 credit markets 
llowed by a transition period in 2003 and a boom from 2004 to 2006. 
tal need to reflect all the available information, including the current environment”
Figure 6.13: Expected Default Frequency of Turkish Financial Services Industry 
 
Looking at the default and bankruptcy data above (Figure 6.12, for North American 
Public Firms as an example), there has been a recession in 2001-2002
fo
 
Banks in most economies including in Turkey responds to cyclical changes and tend to 
tighten their lending policy, during recessions like in late 1980s and early 1990s and 
more recently in 2000-2002. This results in liquidity shortage and reduced bank funding 
leads to additional defaults of companies which are highly dependent on additional 
liquidity. As correctly pointed out by Michael Gordy, “Even if you feel you need to 
stabilize economic capital, it would be a mistake to stabilize the inputs.  The inputs to 
capi  
183. 
 
Source: Moody’s KMV CreditEdge  
stressed PDs for the downside risk (see in sub-section 5.2.1.5 Rating Assignment 
                                                
 
To reveal the volatility in Turkey, 1 year default probability, EDF data in Figure 6.13 as 
taken from the Moody's KMV for Turkish Financial Institutions group reflects the 
current situation and provides a historical EDF values on peer level in the above chart. 
In early 2003, peer/aggregate level EDF percentiles (default probabilities) are very high 
reflecting the recessionary point in the cycle. As the global trend and cycle improves 
towards 2005, EDF measures improve significantly. Staring in mid-2006 stretching to 
end-2007, one can observe that credit quality started to deteriorate immensely for the 
financial peer group predictive of the volatility and liquidity problems experienced in 
the global markets today. Turkey being a country in large foreign debt leads to the 
increase of vulnerability of its financial institutions to the global credit and liquidity 
turmoil. It is worth stressing that, credit cycles are a reality and more so for local banks 
of countries in large foreign debt, such as Turkey. As liquidity of the Turkish banks are 
threatened with global liquidity squeeze, one can clearly observe the severity of the 
impact, this has caused on its large corporations in the below chart. For financial 
institutions and large corporations, which are highly exposed to the systemic risks, 
more PIT measures will provide predictive and early warning signals to take timely and 
forward-looking decisions. This flows well with the requirements of Basel II on the 
 
183 Federal Reserve, at the NYU/MCO Inaugural Credit Conference, May 2004 
Horizon of Chapter 5), which should capture the credit cycle changes and forward-
looking in nature.  
 
Figure 6.14: Expected Default Frequency of Turkish Industrial Companies 
Source: Moody's KMV CreditEdge 
 
When default rates drop, banks cannot underwrite loans based on a through-the-cycle 
average cost of funds and they can not ignore prepayment risk when rates fall. From a 
pricing perspective, banks need to measure Return-on-Risk and hence appropriate PIT 
measures should be in place. Finally, spreads do widen during recessions and high risk 
periods, where the dynamics of such credit quality changes need to be captured in a 
timely, precise and consistent way to charge premiums for possible losses. It is 
important to note also that the EDF measures offer a term structure from horizon 1 to 
10 years and 5 years for publicly listed entities and private firms, respectively. Thus, 
the EDF analysis can be used for banks that would like to know the risks beyond 1-year 
horizon, which is generally advised by the Basel II accord.  
 
In contrast, the purpose of the Agency ratings is to provide credit quality assessment of 
borrower over the long term. This type of TTC measures generally rank order all 
borrowers according to their overall long term credit risk and group the outcome of the 
ordinal scale into classes. Then, they use observations of the default behaviour of each 
class over the long term and assign the average yearly default rate to each rating class. 
The time horizon is generally over 5 years.  
 
Stable ratings result in stable expected loss and capital measures where provisions can 
be linked to Expected Losses. If losses are defined as average through the cycle, this 
would mean a stable provisioning system. Therefore, in good years, banks are saving 
for the bad years. In other words, in good years banks are not so inclined to go through 
a lending frenzy, the consequences of which will be felt when the boom is over. In 
general, this should reflect on a stable balance sheet for the institution, however, in 
reality, banks business strategies evolve with competition and as risk appetite varies 
across time, which make stability unlikely to be achieved on a long-term basis.184  
                                                 
184 Basel II Working Paper No.14, ‘Studies on the Validation of Internal Rating Systems’, Dynamics of Rating Systems 
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The choice of the model is also dependent of the asset type. For example, risk drivers of 
SMEs are not very cyclical (huge portion of risk is idiosyncratic). Idiosyncratic risk is 
driven by factors specific to the company, e.g. management failure, fraud, etc and 
independent from systemic developments.  Additionally, qualitative overlay includes 
the forward looking element of the rating and the calibration can be based on a long 
term average default rate (if possible through the cycle) for these types of credit. 
Depending on the asset type, the internal models may incorporate more than one model, 
with hybrid approaches between PIT and TTC. There are various approaches available 
to fit the business objectives, credit culture and portfolio composition of the bank. An 
example diagram is outlined below.   
 
Figure 6.15: Should We do PIT or TTC? 
• Credit  Edge
• Credit Monitor
• Spread based 
measures
• Agency 
Ratings
• Rankings
• RiskCalc, and 
tools heavily 
reliant of 
financials
• MRA and tools 
with a big non 
financial 
component
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Source: Moody’s KMV Modelling Services 
 
Upon analysis of the industry / segment structure of the bank's portfolio in Phase 2, 
both in terms of performing and defaulted obligors, the segments in the bank's portfolio 
that support quantitative PD models based on statistical analysis can be determined. 
The key to this issue is the number of defaults available to support PD modeling. Banks 
need first to review the gathered data and to see what models would be most 
appropriate to build. The bank must reach a balance between the granularities of model 
segmentation (i.e. number of models) vs. the available data. Building too many models 
when there may not be enough data (or exposure in the bank’s portfolio) is not 
generally justified. However, too few models may inadequately capture the risk 
characteristics of varying exposures. If the bank has an especially high concentration in 
some particular industry and there are enough defaults, they should opt to construct a 
model specifically for that sector since it is important to the bank’s business. Assuming 
that the data has been extensively cleaned, banks can perform the appropriate univariate 
mini-modeling of risk factors (drawn from a list of financial ratios). Then they will 
construct a model that performs well within a multivariate transformation. These steps 
are indeed similar to the approach used in the RiskCalc EDF models185, which are 
detailed under sub-section 6.6.2, ‘External quantitative default probability models’. 
Once the final model has been specified, banks need to validate and calibrate the 
model. In all cases, banks need to make sure that the risk factors that are chosen make 
sense in the local context, and that they are powerful in discriminating good and bad 
credits as rapidly as possible. One of the important stipulations of Basel II is to provide 
                                                 
TTC 
PIT 
185 Dwyer, Kocagil, Stein, Moody’s KMV RiskCalc 3.1 Model whitepaper, Section 3 Model, April 2004. 
 
documentation on the modeling methodology, as well as validation / calibration reports. 
Using bank’s internal data and experience, these models tend to be hybrid somewhere 
in the middle of TTC and PIT space.  
 
6.6.2 External Quantitative Default Probability Models - EDF Models 
 
Expected Default Frequency (EDF) measures will be assessed in this section since they 
have been used as either benchmark or primary models and built/validated and 
calibrated on external (external to the bank) data. EDF measures are calculated on firm-
level and are dynamic, typically the most forward looking indicator of creditworthiness. 
 
6.6.2.1 Model for Listed Firms: CreditEdge 
 
The default definition used is an economic one where the firm is regarded as defaulted 
when the market value (not the book value) of its assets falls below what it owes and 
the EDF is the probability that a firm’s future market value will fall below the book 
value of obligations due. This is a direct estimation of default probability as opposed to 
ordinal ratings or ranking based on the definition of Merton Model. It is cause and 
effect model where the forward looking nature comes from the estimation of the market 
value of assets using an extension of the option-pricing framework whereby equity is a 
call option on the underlying assets of the firm. Given the known equity price and 
capital structure of the firm, EDF measure can be updated frequently and gives an early 
warning in credit quality of the obligor.  
 
Unlike common misinterpretations of the EDF model, there is not any fixed weighting 
or over-emphasis applied to the Equity Value and its volatility. The equity portion of 
the asset value may have less and more impact on the EDF result given the market 
leverage (Default Point/Market Value of Assets) and the asset volatility.  
 
Figure 6.16: EDF Model Summary  
 
Source: Moody’s KMV Modeling Default Risk document  
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EDF drivers are based on the following variables186: 
 
1. Market Value of Assets (or Business Value) 
 
Market investor’ assessment of the future cash flows of the business. It is dynamic and 
forward looking. It is not directly observable but implied from the market value of 
equity and liabilities due at an event of default.  
 
2. Asset Volatility (or Business Risk) 
 
It is a measure of the variability in the firm’s future market asset value. Business risk is 
estimated empirically and calibrated to industry, size and country firm belongs to. It is 
not the equity volatility and hence is an estimate to capture the variability of both equity 
and liabilities of the firm. 
  
3.  Default Point 
 
It is a measure of liabilities due at event of default, i.e. the absorbing default barrier. 
This is an extensive empirical research, and function of the liabilities reported by the 
company. Generally corresponds to total short-term liabilities plus half of long-term 
liabilities for an industrial firm.  
 
Figure 6.17: Comparison of EDF and Agency Rating 
 
 
 
Source: Moody’s KMV ‘Power and Level Validation of EDF Measure’187 
 
A measure of the default risk of a firm that combines the 3 drivers is the Distance to 
Default188, i.e. how far the firm is away from default at a given time horizon. It is the 
number of standard deviations (variability) the Market Value of Assets, is above the 
Default Point. In other words, it is the market leverage scaled by the asset volatility of 
                                                 
186 Crosbie and Bohn, Moody’s KMV, ‘Modeling Default Risk’ whitepaper, Section 3, Measuring Default probability: A Practical 
Approach, subsection 3.1, December 2003.  
187 Dwyer, Moody’s KMV ‘Power and Level Validation of EDF Measure’ whitepaper, 2007.  
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188 Crosbie and Bohn, Moody’s KMV, ‘Modeling Default Risk’ whitepaper, Section 3, Measuring Default probability: A Practical 
Approach, subsection 3.2, December 2003.  
the firm. The DD buckets are mapped to EDF measures using an empirical distribution 
using the database of actual defaults going back 33 years and thousands of realized 
default information. This is where the EDF model sources its power – the fact that it 
has been validated and calibrated on 33 years of default data. Its predictive and forward 
looking nature comes from the ability to combine the available equity market data with 
capital structure of 49,000 firms worldwide. It has been used as an early warning tool 
across banks worldwide. Accounting based measures deliver “jump-to-default” 
surprises, as most of the deterioration is picked up in the last 4 months before default.  
Looking at the figure below, the EDF measure predicts default on average more 8-
11months ahead of the agency rating and does not suffer from sudden jumps to default.  
 
Also, looking at the power curve below, Moody's | KMV(MKMV) EDF measures do a 
better job of sorting more and less risky firms than do agency ratings at a 1-year 
horizon. This is true at all horizons up to 5 years, at which point the accuracy of the two 
is indistinguishable. 
Figure 6.18: Comparison of EDF and Agency Rating on the Basis of Power Curve 
 
Source: Moody’s KMV Research Group 
 
EDF measures are inherently more dynamic and absolute measures of risk. Most of the 
time, they are regarded as PIT measure, however, if implemented appropriately, banks 
can achieve more TTC measure of risk using EDFs as well.  
 
CreditEdge calculates the median EDF for firms within each agency rating bucket for 
each month. For example, for the current month, the EDFs of all firms in a BBB rated 
bucket are taken and the median EDF value is calculated, i.e. the “spot EDF-implied 
rating”. Then, MKMV calculates the EDF medians per rating bucket for preceding 59 
months, until the 60 median observations are obtained.  The median of 60 observations 
becomes the “5-year EDF-implied rating”. Both spot and 5-year median are available 
per rating bucket, which provides an approximate guideline as to the credit quality of 
companies within each rating grade. Below is an example from the CreditEdge system 
for a peer group. Please see below the trend for each rating bucket and their implied 
EDF values. 2003 refers to after the recession, 2004 to transition period and 2005 
expansion in the economy and markets where EDF median for each bucket is higher, 
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lower and lowest, respectively. Only recently in 2007, the EDF medians have started 
deteriorating, i.e. turning of the credit cycle is apparent. The question is how this 
valuable information can be put in use in terms of implementation is concerned.  
 
Figure 6.19:  EDF Data of Global Financials across Different Rating Classes  
 
Source: Moody’s KMV CreditEdge 
 
In general, when banks look at their default history to get a long-run average default 
rate for each grade, they discover that their data is insufficient to even estimate a TTC 
1-year PD estimate. As a result, for each grade, they find a similar agency rating grade 
and get the long-run average default rate or a long-run EDF measure for the grade. 
Then, they fix the boundaries of each grade and would not adjust them as they go 
through the credit cycle. The problem is that fixed long-term bands lead the practitioner 
see lots of up/downgrade signals from market data. The nature of credit risk is that 
there are clearly lower and higher default rate periods, where default rates for these 
rating bands will vary over time. Hence, flexible EDF to rating mappings avoid 
frequent grade changes as they are updated on a monthly, quarterly, semi-annually, etc 
and allow the ratings, in many asset classes, to incorporate forward looking data from a 
variety of markets, e.g. both debt and equity. For example, Vestel (a Turkish electronics 
firm) rated as B+ by S&P (till December, 2007) has shown significant deterioration in 
the past year as below.  
Figure 6.20: EDF Data of Vestel Electronics in Turkey 
 
Source: Moody’s KMV CreditEdge 
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Until March 2005, Vestel’s EDF and Rating followed similar trend as the Global B 
(All) EDF median, i.e. stable outlook because the firm is performing as an average B 
rated firm. After this date, firm’s EDF started to increase and became much riskier in 
mid-2006 and onwards, looking more like a CCC rated firm. As the firm’s EDF moved 
away from the B-rated peer, it became an outlier and bank’s systems must review this 
firm. Surprisingly, S&P rating stayed unchanged till December 2007, not picking up on 
the peer’s performance versus firm’s EDF. Certainly, this is just an example to 
highlight the uses of EDF measures in the context of rating systems for early warning 
signals and internal upgrade/downgrade actions. The quantitative analysis should be 
backed up by the relationship value and other non-quantitative factors that may justify 
the credit limits and the bank’s internal assessment.  
 
6.6.2.2 Models for Private Firms (RiskCalc country models) 
 
Given good prior knowledge about relationships and good data, statistical methods 
provide an ideal way to incorporate modelling expertise, quantitative information and 
or market factors.  In general, statistical models such as RiskCalc models as well as 
internal quantitative default probability models mentioned earlier are widely used to 
estimate private firms (firms with unlisted equity) credit risk where market information 
is missing.  
 
Figure 6.21: Phases of Model Development189 
 
Model Development Steps 
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Modelling 
Multivariate
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Source: Moody’s KMV Modeling Services Group 
 
Statistical procedures used to derive relationships between default events and financial 
figures. They also characterize credit risk by country, industry, size and/or sector, 
however, require large sample of financial statement and default to develop such 
models: development sample and validation sample. 
 
1. Data preparation: 
The data preparation and requirements has been discussed in Phase 2 of the 
implementation project, and will not be repeated here. 
  
2. Univariate Modeling: 
Univariate Modeling observes how financial ratios (e.g. x-axis data points for 
Liabilities/Assets in below chart) correlate with default events (e.g. y-axis data points in 
                                                 
189 Dwyer, Kocagil, Stein,  Moody’s KMV RiskCalc 3.1 Model whitepaper, Section 2 - Product, 3 – Model, April 2004.  
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below chart), and then fit a relationship to that observation. It captures non-linear or 
non-monotonic relation to default and smoothes observed data. The use of this method 
reduces the impact of outliers in development and avoids nonsensical results when 
using the model.  
 
Figure 6.22: Fitting the Actual Default Events to Model 
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Source: Moody’s KMV Modeling Services Group 
 
In this model, the relationship between each ‘candidate’ financial variables and 
observed default rates in the sample are analyzed and a mini-model for each is 
constructed. In general, variables that are readily available are intuitive to the user, not 
highly correlated with the other variables, and of course, strong relationship with the 
default activity is selected during modeling. 
  
3. Multivariate Modeling: 
In the next step, valid factors (model variables) are integrated using a logistic 
regression, which the functional form is outlined as follows: 
 
Figure 6.23: Functional form of Logistic model 
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Source: Moody’s KMV Modeling Services Group 
 
Multivariate modeling is widely accepted and understood intuitively. The importance of 
one factor depends on overall 'state’, i.e the observed default states. A number of 
financial variables are selected and the power of each is tested using the multivariate 
modelling, which allows rapid reduction of ratio list via backward, forward and 
stepwise regression. Ultimately, the weight of each model variable is chosen as such to 
best fit the observed default data. A series of regressions are being performed to build 
the most desirable combination of financial variables fit best with the observed default 
experience in the sample. For example, forward regression starts with a reduced list of 
factors and adds more factors until the variance is too high. Backward regression starts 
with a long list of factors and removes factors until the variance falls below a threshold. 
Finally, stepwise regression starts with a reduced list of factors and adds more factors 
until the variance is too high and checks at each step whether it can replace a previously 
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selected factor. Following the series of regressions, the performance is measured with 
power curves and Accuracy Ratios are calculated for all possible combinations of 
between, say, 6 and 10 ratios. Finally, the most powerful of these combinations are 
selected as the candidate models. A Powercurve as illustrated below measures how 
rapidly defaults would be excluded.  
 
Figure 6.24: Powercurve  
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Source: Moody’s KMV Modeling Services Group 
 
The relationship between the accuracy ratio and a power curve is illustrated as follows: 
 
Figure 6.25: Accuracy Ratio (AR) = B/ A+B 
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Source: Moody’s KMV Modeling Services Group 
 
The outcome of the multivariate analysis, 3-4 candidate models will be left to choose 
where further testing is performed in terms of: 1) Coverage of broad ratio categories, 
i.e. broad categories of leverage, liquidity, profitability, activity, debt coverage, growth 
and size should all be covered by at least one financial variable, 2) Power across 
industry, year, size, 3) Robustness and Stability (involves bootstrapping and k-fold 
analysis), 4) Correlation and 5) The use of most common ratios for the country. 
 
Through this analysis, the final model will be selected as the RiskCalc country model, 
which is in line with the accounting and regulation of the country as well as the local 
default definition.   
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Similar to CreditEdge EDF measures, RiskCalc EDF measure provides a mapping 
between historical Moody’s bond default rates per each rating bucket. The scale can be 
used as a starting point of the credit analysis process to determine an indicative rating 
estimate. In addition, users can also test a specific relationship between their internal 
rating and EDF measure and/or Moody’s ratings by sampling unrated credits. Since 
private firms do not have publicly listed equity, the market scrutiny will be missing in 
the assessment of the firm. In fact, the EDF measure will only be updated as new 
financial statements become available. To add forward-lookingness in the RiskCalc 
EDF measures, a Credit-Cycle adjustment is applied. The determination of the 
adjustment is based upon the current average EDF of the peer group in CreditEdge 
system versus the historical EDF average. Peer group is determined by industry and 
country specification. For example, if peers are doing worse off than historical average, 
the RiskCalc EDF will be adjusted upward (i.e. higher default probability) and vice 
versa. In a sense, RiskCalc with Credit-Cycle Adjustment is a ‘hybrid’ model and has 
been widely used as either primary or benchmark model by international banks for 
SME credit.  
 
There is not any RiskCalc Turkey model due to the data insufficiencies. The Data 
Consortium is highly crucial for the development of such models and is encouraged 
because it is able to capture forward looking nature, predictive power as well as 
granularity of EDF measures, which may be lacking in internally developed systems.     
 
6.6.3 Expert Judgment Based Scorecards 
 
Moody's has developed Rating Estimate Templates using industry specific rating 
methodologies, which can be an efficient tool for developing internal ratings for 
obligors in such industries. The templates enable the users to understand the key rating 
methodology dynamics by describing the key quantitative and qualitative factors that 
combined will reflect the logic of rating determination for the rated issuers in specific 
industries. The Rating Estimate Templates are fully consistent with the Moody's Rating 
Methodology publications for the respective industries. The Financial Metrics 
framework could be extended to estimating the credit risks (and the corresponding 
historical Probability of Defaults) for the unrated issuers belonging to the same 
industries. In order to make certain that the financial metrics tools be best used for the 
bank in its determination of credit risks for both rated and unrated companies, banks 
need to where possible, add adjustments to the Rating Estimate Template to better fit 
the Bank’s present investment portfolio. Similar model development steps described in 
RiskCalc can be applied, but the difference is that the selection of ratios is based upon 
the bank experts and its internal default experience. Plus, banks may overlay the 
elements of long-term economic and industrial dynamics to the credit risk estimation by 
taking advantage of the extended historical trend data within Moody`s. The framework 
seeks to provide very good matches between the actual and estimated rating of the rated 
companies within the industry using standardized quantitative and qualitative inputs. 
Still, depending on the degree of diversity and homogeneity of the rated companies in a 
specific industry, some biases may become unavoidable. Country of domicile, sub-
industry specialization, wide rating ranges within the industry, etc, to name a few 
possible sources of variance. Banks need to analyze potential “biases” that exist in the 
Rating Estimate Template framework based on the information from Moody’s 
Methodologies and statistical inferences, and apply adjustment factors for minimizing 
the biases when assigning the estimated credit risk rating to the unrated borrowers in 
the bank’s debt portfolio. The use of the Rating Estimate Templates does not mean a 
rigid and inflexible approach to assessing credit risk. It is recommended that the 
Templates are reviewed in conjunction with the bank’s portfolio, and then bank’s 
experts recommend enhancements. A key component of this ‘adjustment process’ is 
spending a significant amount of time going over default case studies and conducting 
interviews with senior executives of the bank.  Then further consider economic and 
industrial dynamics to refine the Templates and the rating output further. In cyclical 
industries, estimated ratings may over-estimate the credit strength of the rated issuers 
during an upturn and under-estimate during a downturn. When assigning credit risks to 
unrated borrowers, it is important to incorporate the general industry trend to reduce the 
over- and under- estimation. (See in sub-chapter 5.2.1.5 Rating Assignment Horizon of 
Chapter 5) 
Figure 6.26: Illustration of Sample Templates 
Estimated ratings based on the Risk Factor-equivalent ratings and Risk Factor weights
Risk Factors
Based on published
Industry Methodologies
Risk Factor Weights
Based on latest
Assessments by 
Moody*s analysts
Rating methodology mapping model for Gaming
Revenues
TOTAL 
ASSETS
CASH FLOW 
FROM 
OPERATIONS
# of Wholly-
Owned Casinos
Regulatory Risk 
Exposure
Development 
History
Pretax Income 
% of Sales
Pre-tax Income 
/ Average 
Assets Debt / EBITDA CFO / Debt
EBIT / Interest 
Expense
EBITDA / 
Interest 
Expense
Company Weight   10.00% 5.00% 10.00% 10.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 7.50% 7.50% 15.00% 15.00%
Mashantucket (Western) 
Pequot Tribe, CT 9/30/2005 Baa2 Ba B Ba Ba A A A Baa A
Harrah's Entertainment, Inc. 12/31/2005 Baa3 Ba1 A A Ba Baa Baa Baa B B Caa B Ba Ba
Mohegan Tribal Gaming 
Authority 9/30/2005 Ba1 Ba Ba Ba B B B Ba B B
Seminole Tribe of Florida 9/30/2005 Ba1 Ba B Ba A A A A A Baa
Aztar Corporation 12/31/2005 Ba2 Ba2 Ba Ba Ba Ba Baa Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba
Boyd Gaming Corporation 12/31/2005 Ba2 Ba1 Ba Ba Ba Baa Baa Baa Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba
Choctaw Resort Development 
Enterprise 9/30/2005 Ba2 B B B Baa Baa Baa Baa Ba Ba
MGM MIRAGE 12/31/2005 Ba2 Ba1 A A A Baa Baa Baa Ba B B B Ba B
Penn National Gaming, Inc. 12/31/2005 Ba2 Ba3 Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba B Caa B Ba Ba
Scientific Games Corporation 12/31/2005 Ba2 Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Baa Ba Ba
Seneca Gaming Corporation 9/30/2005 Ba2 B B B Ba Ba Baa B B B
Station Casinos, Inc. 12/31/2005 Ba2 Ba1 Ba Ba Ba Ba Baa Baa Baa Baa Ba Ba Ba Ba
American Casino & Ent. 
Properties LLC 12/31/2005 Ba3 Ba3 B B B B Baa B Ba Baa Baa Ba Ba Ba
Ameristar Casinos, Inc. 12/31/2005 Ba3 Ba2 Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba Ba
Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc. 4/30/2006 Ba3 B1 Ba Ba B Ba Ba Ba B B B B B B
Las Vegas Sands Corp. 12/31/2005 Ba3 Ba2 Ba Ba Ba B Baa Baa Baa Ba Ba Baa Ba Ba
Turning Stone Casino Resort 
Enterprise 9/25/2005 Ba3 B B B Baa Baa Baa Baa Ba Ba
BLB Management Services, 
Inc. 12/31/2005 B1 B B B B A Ba Caa B Ba Ba
CCM Merger, Inc. 12/31/2005 B1 B2 B Ba B B Ba B Ba B Caa Caa B B
Codere S.A. 12/31/2005 B1 B B B Ba Ba Caa Caa Ba B Caa B
Galaxy Casino S.A. 12/31/2005 B1 B B Caa B B Caa Caa B B
Greektown Holdings, LLC 12/31/2005 B1 B1 B B B B Ba B B Ba B Ba Ba Ba
Herbst Gaming, Inc. 12/31/2005 B1 Ba3 B B B Ba Baa B Ba Baa Ba Ba Ba Ba
Isle of Capri Black Hawk 
L.L.C. 4/30/2006 B1 B1 B B B B Ba Ba Ba B B B Ba Ba
MTR Gaming Group, Inc. 12/31/2005 B1 B1 B B B B Ba B B B Ba Ba Ba Ba
Waterford Gaming LLC 12/31/2005 B1 Caa Caa B A Ba B Ba B
Wynn Las Vegas, LLC 12/31/2005 B1 B2 B Ba B B Baa Baa Caa Caa Caa Caa Caa B
Chukchansi Economic 
Development Authority 12/31/2005 B2 B B B Caa Caa A B Caa Caa
Circus and Eldorado Joint 
Venture 12/31/2005 B2 B1 B B B B Baa B B B Ba B B B
Golden Nugget, Inc. 12/31/2005 B2 B2 B B B B Baa B Caa Caa B B Caa B
Hard Rock Hotel, Inc. 12/31/2005 B2 B2 B B B B Baa B B B B B B B
Jacobs Entertainment, Inc. 12/31/2005 B2 B3 B B B B Ba B Caa Caa B B Caa B
Little Traverse Bay Bands of 
Odawa Indians 12/31/2005 B2 Caa Caa B B A A A A A A
Peninsula Gaming, LLC 12/31/2005 B2 B3 B B B B Ba B Caa Caa Caa B Caa B
Pinnacle Entertainment, Inc. 12/31/2005 B2 B2 B Ba B Ba Ba Ba Caa Caa B B Caa B
Ritzio Entertainment Group 12/31/2005 B2 B B Ba A A A A A A
River Rock Entertainment 
Authority 12/31/2005 B2 B B B Ba Baa Ba Ba B B
Riviera Holdings Corporation 12/31/2005 B2 B2 B B B B Baa B Caa Caa B B Caa B
San Pasqual Casino 
Development Group, Inc. 12/31/2005 B2 B B B A A Ba B Ba Ba
Tunica-Biloxi Gaming 
Authority 1/1/2006 B2 B B B B Baa Baa B Ba Baa Baa
Wheeling Island Gaming, Inc. 12/31/2005 B2 Ba3 B B B B Ba B Baa Baa Baa Ba Ba Ba
155 East Tropicana, LLC 12/31/2005 B3 B3 Caa B Caa B Baa B Caa Caa A Caa Caa Caa
CasaBlanca Resorts 12/31/2005 B3 B3 B B B B Baa B Caa Caa Caa B Caa B
Copa Casino of Mississippi, 
LLC 12/31/2005 B3 Caa Caa B Ba B A A A A A A
Inn of the Mountain Gods 
Resort and Casino 4/30/2006 B3 B B Caa B Caa Caa Caa Caa Caa Caa
Majestic Star Casino, L.L.C. 
(The) 12/31/2005 B3 B3 B B B B Ba B Caa Caa Caa Caa Caa B
OpBiz, LLC 12/31/2005 B3 Caa1 B B Caa B Baa B Caa Caa Caa Caa Caa Caa
Trump Entertainment Resorts 
Holdings, L.P 12/31/2005 B3 Caa1 B Ba Caa B Baa B Caa Caa Caa Caa Caa Caa
Premier Entertainment Biloxi 
LLC 12/31/2005 Caa1 Caa B Caa Caa Ba B Caa Caa Caa Caa Caa
Resorts International 
Holdings, LLC 12/31/2005 Caa1 B3 B Ba B B Ba B Caa Caa Caa Caa Caa Caa
Resorts International Hotel 
And Casino, Inc. 12/31/2005 Caa1 B2 B B B B Baa B Caa Caa B B Caa B
Favorable outlier
Unfavorable outlier
Factor 2: Diversification
Factor 3: 
Development 
Profile Factor 4: Profitability Factor 5: Leverage & Coverage
Reporting 
Period
Current 
Rating
Indicated 
Rating
Factor 1: Size
Issuer
Names
 
Source: Moody’s  
 
Objective benchmarking require to seek a model/system that focuses on the credit risk 
fundamentals of the specific debts and the borrowers as the bank’s low default 
industries portfolio. The use of credit ratings and the methodologies of Moody’s is an 
attempt to try to attain as high a match as possible. The final result of the matching 
process is the development of the matrix where Moody’s ratings are aligned with the 
Bank’s to so that the model’s PD estimates can be mapped with Moody’s rating-level 
specific historical default probabilities. Regarding the qualitative overlay, the aim is to 
capture all aspects of the credit risk which are not covered by the financial variables 
and to include a forward looking element in the rating model. Provided that the 
qualitative scorecard has been in use for some years, i.e. availability of historical data 
points, the starting point is to use the already validated financial model as suggested 
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above and add a huge dataset for the qualitative overlay. Then, Power Curves for 
different stages of the model are prepared, in order to capture the increases to the 
discriminatory power of the rating model with each addition. For example, construct 
power curve for: 
 
1. Financial variables only 
2. Financial variables + Qualitative Overlay 
3. Financial variables + Qualitative Overlay + Support/Guarantees 
4. Financial variables + Qualitative Overlay + Support/Guarantees + Override 
 
Following the above exercise, the weights of the qualitative overlay need to be 
optimized to achieve the most discriminatory power of the overall rating model. 
 
Figure 6.27: An illustration of a Model in RiskAnalyst 
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Source: Moody’s KMV Modeling Services Group 
 
Sometimes not all information can be captured by the financial statement of the 
borrower and rating framework heavily relying on these financial factors need to be 
adjusted with judgement and other subjective factors. That being said, the judgemental 
factors can also be a source for bias where caution needs to be practised to avoid 
optimism or conservatism.  
6.7 Phase 5: Single-Obligor Assessment Processes 
 
The integration is required when more than one solution is used to address different 
segments. For example, this may arise where both an internal model has been 
developed and an external model is used for benchmark purposes. In all cases the 
results of the tools must be integrated into the overall assessment and decision 
processes. The days of having a rating just for the sake of saying you have a rating are 
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over, the "use test" is a key criteria for compliance under Basel II. Please refer to the 
commentary on the ICAAP “Use tests” in Chapter 3, sub-section 3.4.3.3.1. This phase 
should also include the design of the monitoring processes for the rating history 
database, in order to provide the feedback loop for subsequent reviews of the individual 
risk assessment tools. This is another key requirement under Basel II190 under the 
responsibility of GRM as mentioned in Chapter 5, sub-chapter 5.4. 
6.8 Phase 6: Development of an IRB Validation Framework 
 
To assist the bank to administer an ongoing validation process, a validation framework 
needs to be developed and provided to the supervisors as indicated in sub-section 
3.4.3.3 of Chapter 3. The framework should provide documentation and guidelines on 
the approach to be adopted in the ongoing validation process, covering such issues as 
validation principles being adopted, and guidelines for their specific application to such 
aspects as data, quantification methodologies for the various asset classes / segments, 
the control processes, and associated documentation. 
 
One benefit of the establishment of such a framework is that it will enable the bank to 
maximize the amount of future validation work able to be undertaken in-house. Further, 
to the extent that some involvement of external or independent validation experts is still 
required (see Internal Audit and GRM QC in Chapter 5, sub-section 5.4.5.3), the 
existence of a well applied validation framework will minimize the time required for 
them to complete their tasks.  
 
The following is a summary of the model validation approaches that are commonly 
used in the marketplace and some are referenced also in the Basel II Working Paper 
No.14191. A complete validation framework should not only include model, but also 
data, system and process validation, which the thesis discussed in Chapter 5, sub-
section 5.2.1.11, Validation. In addition to discussions in Chapter 5, the model 
validation will only be discussed here.   
 
Using actual data from the target population, the testing can evaluate both power and 
calibration. It can also be assessed relative to other available benchmark models or data 
sources, such as Agency ratings, RiskCalc or CreditEdge EDF measures. In general, a 
good assessment should also include an analysis across sub-populations, such as 
industries, size groups, and time periods. For example, how well does the model 
perform in industry x, size y and z periods? Finally, how well does the model perform 
overall? This question will filter the data population such that the validation sample is 
representative of the bank’s portfolio.  
 
Depending on the model in question and business objectives, the testing should also be 
done for different time horizons where clear distinction is made between PIT and TTC 
models. To avoid over fitting to the sample, there should certain controls and tests both 
in and out-of-sample.  
 
 
190 Basel II ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards’, Paragraph 264. Gaumert (2005, p. 15): 
Grundsaetze Ordnungsmaessigen Ratings, Basel II und MaK konforme Organisation des Kreditgeschaeftes. 
191 Basel II Working Paper No.14, ‘Studies on the Validation of Internal Rating Systems’, Rating and probability of default 
validation, February 2005 
Power curves and Accuracy Ratios are the base for the following tests: 
 
1. On overall sample and sub-samples: 
 
? Power by year 
? Power by industry 
? Power by Size (Turnover or Total Assets) 
? Power by Region 
? Power by Audit Quality 
 
2. Out of Sample Tests:  
 
Out of Sample Tests provide a test of model over fitting and measures the out-of-
sample performance. Some possibilities of these tests are illustrated as below.  
Figure 6.28: Testing Samples 
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Source: Moody’s KMV Modeling Services Group 
 
One type of out-of-sample testing is Walk-forward tests where the model is estimated 
on the data up to a certain point in the past and the future year is scored with this 
model. Then, the cutoff for the estimation is advanced by one year and the next year is 
estimated until the data is exhausted. Once the “out-of-sample” sub samples are scored, 
accuracy ratio and the power curve are calculated for each.  
 
3. K-Fold Tests: 
 
K-Fold tests measure how stable model performance is throughout the sample and can 
be used in the model validation process. For example, divide defaulting and non-
defaulting companies into k equally-sized segments.  Note that these k subsamples are 
temporally and cross-sectionally independent. Then, estimate the model on k-1 
subsamples and score the k-th subsample. This procedure can be repeated for all 
possible combinations and put the k scored “out-of-sample” subsamples together where 
the accuracy ratio and power curve are calculated.  
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4. Bootstrapping: 
 
 Figure 6.29: Bootstrapping 
 
50 defaults 200 defaults 400 defaults
 
Source: Stein, Roger M., 2002, Benchmarking Default Prediction Models: Pitfalls and Remedies in 
Model Validation, (Moody's KMV, New York)  
 
A sample of 20,000 non-defaulters with a varying number of defaulters was analyzed 
100 times using a bootstrapping technique. As more defaults are added the confidence 
of test is greatly improved. One can see, however, that even with 400 defaults, it can 
still do better. This highlights again the importance of Data Consortium in Phase 2. 
Additionally, more defaults allow larger ‘hold-out’ samples. In addition, model can be 
reviewed on the basis of model development methodology, major concepts, 
applicability and feedback from lenders and risk analysts. Most of these aspects were 
covered in the thesis in relevant sections. However, a few more can be added to gain a 
complete picture. For example, model can be tested in terms of early warning signals, 
i.e. is differentiation early enough to support corrective action? Another example would 
be the test for significance of the model i.e. is there sufficient data to trust any of the 
above results and why should we trust these? The importance of the data pooling 
initiative was discussed earlier in Phase 2. Finally, user acceptance needs to be tested, 
i.e. will users find the model intuitive? This is crucial in embedding a bank’s own credit 
culture.   
6.9 F-IRB Implementation Plan & Schedule 
 
This indicative high level work plan is dependent on a number of assumptions, 
including availability of data, IT and human resources and bank’s timely decision-
making process. The actual time and activity will differ with the requirements of each 
bank, so the work plan is just illustrative. 
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Table 6.2: F-IRB Implementation Road Map 
F-IRB Road Map – Activities (Phases 1 - Phase 7)  
Milestones Data  Process People Systems 
1  
Gap analysis 
 
 
 
 
2 Design the data 
structure 
(including loss & 
recovery data) 
 
Design a CRM solution Training Plan Specification for an 
IT system 
framework – 
RiskAnalyst 
 
3 Implement the data 
infrastructure 
 
Training - Fundamentals 
of credit 
Implement Borrower 
and Facility Rating 
System –RiskAnalyst 
 
 
4 Collect Data -  Borrower 
and Facility data 
Build Borrower Rating 
Models - Internal &  
External (EDF Models) 
Financial Analysis and 
Rating methodology 
training 
 Reporting - Custom 
Reports 
5 Collect Data -  Loss and 
recovery,  Collateral & 
guarantee  
 
Implement F-IRB 
Facility rating model  Train the trainers on new 
rating systems 
 
Basel II F-IRB 
Capital Calculations 
6  Validation Framework -  
existing Borrower rating 
models 
User training on new 
rating systems 
Regulatory Reporting 
and disclosure - 
Custom Reports 
 
7 Ongoing data collection Roll-out F-IRB approach 
 
 
 
   
 
Source: Moody’s KMV Credit Risk Specialist Group 
 
In order to provide a sense of the timeline associated with the F-IRB related component 
of the project implementation, the following indicative, high level work plan has been 
developed. 
 
Table 6.3: Timeline of the Implementation Phases 
 Phases 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Confirm Project 
Objectives 
 
                 
  
 
Phase 1 : Gap Analysis                     
Phase 2 : Data 
Infrastructure 
 
                 
  
 
Phase 3 : Internal Rating 
Infrastructure– Risk 
Analyst 
                 
  
 
Phase 4 : PD Models 
Internal or EDF Models 
                    
Phase 4 : Expert Models 
and Rating Scorecards 
 
                 
  
 
Phase 5 : Single-Obligor 
Assessment Processes 
                    
Training in Single-
Obligor Risk Assessment 
                    
Phase 6 : Development of 
an IRB Validation 
Framework 
                 
  
 
Source: Moody’s KMV Credit Risk Specialist Group 
6.10 Phase 7: Use of External Models for Benchmarking 
 
There are many ways to incorporate the external risk model (such as EDFs) into the 
bank’s overall rating framework. For example, the internal rating may be constrained 
by an external benchmark. Another approach would be where the credit officer would 
have to explain any significant discrepancies between the internal grade and the EDF. 
These all serve to provide a more robust and preventative assessment system for the 
customer’s risk. 
Figure 6.30: Linking PD’s to Rating Systems 
 
Source: Moody’s KMV 
 
The completion of Phase 1 to 6 should provide a robust coverage of the bulk of 
corporate credit exposures. The combination of EDF models along with the internal 
models will provide a Basel-compliant best practice framework for assessing the risk of 
borrowers. Pillar 2 requires that the banks present evidence such that the best practices 
are in place and that the sufficient processes, data and models are in use at their banks. 
Benchmarking, back-testing as well as stress-testing are components of the supervisory 
process in Pillar 2 as discussed in Chapter 3, sub-section 3.4.3.3. EDF models, in that 
regard, can serve in all those components because they capture changes in the credit 
cycles and are highly tested on extensive data and widely used by banks worldwide 
over years.    
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6.11 Phase 8: Road Map to A-IRB 
 
Using the same structure, the following table provides a roadmap of the activities 
required to be completed in order to prepare for A-IRB status. In order to highlight the 
incremental nature of the A-IRB process, and the linkage to the initial gap analysis, 
data design and collection, the F-IRB related activities are retained (shaded).  
 
Table 6.4: A-IRB Implementation Road Map 
A-IRB Roadmap – Activities (Phases 8) 
          
Milestones Data  Process People Systems 
1 Gap analysis 
 
 
 
2 Design the data 
structure 
(including loss & 
recovery data) 
Design a CRM 
solution 
Training Plan Specification for an 
IT system framework 
– RiskAnalyst 
 
3 Implement the data 
infrastructure 
 
Training - 
Fundamentals of credit 
Implement Borrower 
and Facility Rating 
System –RiskAnalyst 
 
4 Collect Data -  
Borrower and Facility 
data 
Build Borrower 
Rating Models - 
Internal &  External 
(EDF Models) 
Financial Analysis and 
Rating methodology 
training 
 Reporting - Custom 
Reports 
5 Collect Data -  Loss 
and recovery,  
Collateral & 
guarantee  
 
Implement F-IRB 
Facility rating model 
 Train the trainers on 
new rating systems 
 
Basel II F-IRB 
Capital Calculations 
6  Validation 
Framework -  existing 
Borrower rating 
models 
User training on new 
rating systems 
Regulatory Reporting 
and disclosure - 
Custom Reports 
 
7 Ongoing data 
collection 
Roll-out F-IRB 
approach 
 
 
 
   
8   Estimate LGDs based 
on internal data & 
judgment 
    
8 (continued)   Model LGDs based 
on internal data 
  Review capital 
calculation measures 
under A-IRB 
8 (continued)  Validation of LGD 
processes 
   
 
Source: Moody’s KMV Credit Risk Specialist Group 
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6.11.1 Model for the prediction of LGD: LossCalc 
 
LossCalc is a multi-factor statistical model where the model variables determine the 
LGD. The determination of model and its variables follow the univariate and multi-
variate modeling steps on recoveries and the variables such as: 
 
1. Collateral  
2. Debt characteristics (Debt-Seniority type) 
3. Industry status 
4. Firm structure  
5. Macroeconomic conditions in country and jurisdiction 
6. Firm-specific (if available) or Industry/Country specific Distance-to-Default 
 
A bank can select 6 levels of collateral support, which are 1) Cash & Marketable 
Securities, 2) Pledge of All Assets, 3) Secured by Unknown, 4) Property, Plant 
&Equipment, 5) Subsidiary Support and 6) Unsecured.  
 
The sample data set used to develop the model covers the period 1981 – 2003 and 
captures over 3,000 LGD observations globally on public & private firms; rated & 
unrated debt; loans & bonds across 23 years.  Moody’s KMV performed out-of-sample 
testing to ensure the power of the model was unbiased. LossCalc significantly 
outperforms the traditional look-up tables, which are widely used by banks192. 
  
In addition, MKMV empirical research suggests that there is a relatively strong 
correlation between the default rates and recoveries. For example, during downturns 
when defaults are high, the recoveries tend to be lower on the transactions. To 
incorporate such credit cycle trend, Distance-to-Default (DD) was used as a factor into 
the LossCalc LGD model. For public firms, the Distance-to-Default measure available 
in the CreditEdge EDF databases is used and the levels are updated monthly. For 
private firms, an 'index' approach is in place. Given the industry and country that the 
firm belongs to, it factors in the peer group DDs in the LGD model for non quoted 
firms to reflect the point in the cycle. Consequently, LossCalc LGD measures tend to 
be predictive and forward looking across transactions and form an external benchmark 
model for downturn LGD estimations.  
6.12 Phase 9: Portfolio Analysis & Economic Capital Management 
 
6.12.1 Importance of Portfolio Management 
 
Credit portfolio management is at the forefront of financial institutions minds due to 
many influences in the market from regulators through Pillar 2 discussions, market 
participants through competition and senior management requiring information on 
portfolio level for their strategic decisions. For many international financial institutions, 
these changes have not impacted the way in which they do business as they have been 
leading this revolutionary change. For others in less developed markets, such as 
Turkey, this has been met with real challenges. Firms that are at the forefront of 
managing credit risk and achieving higher returns per amount of credit risk or economic 
 
192 Gupton and Stein, Moody’s KMV, “LossCalc V.2: Dynamic Prediction of LGD”,  January 2005. 
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capital, have a common high-level strategy:  they all manage their credit portfolios 
actively. Active credit portfolio management is a portfolio management strategy 
designed to: diversify the portfolio better, reduce portfolio volatility (unexpected loss), 
improve return/risk, use economic capital more efficiently, create capacity to do more 
business and increase shareholder value. The strategy involves holding credit only 
when the firm is being paid well for the marginal portfolio risk, reducing concentration, 
which is portfolio correlation caused by excessive investments in single names, 
countries and/or industries and deterioration in credit quality. The role of the active 
portfolio management for the loan product group has been discussed in Chapter 5, sub-
section 5.6.2 from an organizational perspective.  
 
Credit portfolio management is a broad scope that requires timely and accurate 
measurement of default probabilities, which the sources are to be found in the F-IRB 
and A-IRB phases of the implementation project. It also involves an understanding of 
the interactions of default risks; migration and correlations among assets in the 
portfolio because analysis results can vary greatly depending on risk parameterization 
and analytics used within correlation and credit migration framework. Finally, it 
ensures sophisticated methods are in place for measuring and improving portfolio 
performance, which can only be achieved by understanding the risk/return aspects of a 
portfolio. One needs a bottoms-up portfolio analytics that facilitate market based credit 
measures, accurate correlations measurement as well as granular and predictive 
migration probabilities stretching out to multi-periods, in contrast to the one step period 
analysis in the Basel II framework. For example, the analytics and framework in 
RiskFrontier (RF) are extensively used for multi-period analysis stretching from 0.25 
years (3 months) to 7 year time horizon, which means that any point in time between 
these boundaries can be entered as a future analysis horizon for portfolio value/loss 
distribution construction. The predictive and granularity of the credit migration 
framework ensures that the exposure and portfolio value take into account of credit 
quality changes in the future up till the maturity of the transactions.  
 
Economic Capital and Active Portfolio Management take the regulatory framework to a 
step further and hence requires a large amount of data for modeling purposes, which is 
indeed highly challenging. Some of these challenges have been met with the Basel II 
Pillar 1, which ensures internal rating, PD, LGD and EAD models are developed within 
each bank and processes are based on robust data infrastructure and system crucial to 
ensure the data and model are accessible and being used to its capacity.  However, 
correlation is a hard parameter to model that requires huge databases of data spanning 
across regions, industries and different sized firms for a long period of time.  Moody's 
KMV has researched and modeled (asset) correlation for over 15 years, and this 
experience and the datasets developed can be used in credit portfolio modeling.  
Financial institutions need to have the flexibility to compare and contrast different 
correlation models to each other to ensure they have a good understanding of the 
correlation risk of their portfolio.   The same stands for other portfolio credit risk 
drivers such as migration risk.  Financial institutions need ways to compare/contract 
and combine different views of migration risk in one platform to get a more thorough 
view of the underlying credit portfolio. The rapid development and sophistication of the 
structured credit markets has magnified these modeling challenges.  Many financial 
intuitions will be, or already are, involved in structured credit products, such as CDSs, 
CDOs, and ABSs.  Whether these products are used for regulatory capital relief, risk 
reduction strategies, or ways of bring new asset classes and exposures into the 
portfolios, very few have been able to model the true impact these products have on the 
portfolio. For example, many financial institutions are buying tranches of 
securitizations from other countries with the belief they are diversifying the overall 
portfolio.  These portfolios could, in fact, have many hidden concentrations given the 
collateral pool of the securitization may have the same name referenced, or in same 
country, or industry. Given all these changes in the market place, RiskFrontier provides 
access to the rich correlation and migration model that Moody’s KMV, but can 
compare and contract these models to bank’s own internal models (if any), or to other 
externally available models.  RiskFrontier also allows users to model the entire credit 
portfolio with specific models across a very large number of instrument classes. This 
capability becomes more important when considering the emphasis given in Pillar 2 for 
best practice, portfolio capture of concentration risks and stress-testing as mentioned in 
Chapter 3, sub-section 3.4.3.3. All types of instruments, including vanilla loans, loans 
with embedded options, bonds, revolving lines of credit with/without contingent usage 
schedules, CDS's (buying or selling), CDOs, retail products, basket default swaps, 
derivatives and equity are instruments RiskFrontier (RF) users can model. 
 
6.12.2 Data Infrastructure   
 
In general, basic instrument-level information, such as facility and counterparty details, 
origination and maturity dates, etc. are required as well as default probabilities, LGDs 
(which are estimated through Pillar 1) and counterparty information, such as industry, 
country, etc. The sources of LGD, PD, migration and correlation can be internally 
based models or Moody’s KMV based models, e.g. EDF measures, GCorr (Moody’s 
KMV’s Asset Correlation model), DD Dynamics (Moody’s KMV Empirical Credit 
Migration model). Please refer to the diagram below for an overview of data 
requirements.  
 
Figure 6.31: Credit Portfolio Data Integration  
MOODY’S KMV COMPANY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.1 30 August 2007COPYRIGHT ©
Data Integration 
Instrument
data
• Terms and conditions data (maturity, fees etc)
e.g. Loan, Bond, Derivative, Exposure Profile or 
Common Stock Data templates
Correlation Data
• Correlations provide by 
MKMV through GCorr™
• User - defined correlation 
factor data  can be included
Valuation Data
• LGD Schedule
• Yield Curve History
• Spread Curves, Spread 
Matrices, etc
• Exchange Rates
Rating Data
• Integration with MKMV EDFs
• CreditEdge™, Credit 
Monitor™, RiskCalc™
• User provided PD; Mapped to 
internal ratings
Migration Data
• Custom Migration Data
• Conditional DD Dynamics
• User-defined migration
• Migration matrices
• MKMV DD Dynamics
Counterparty Data
• Industry and Country Weights
• Counterparty Financials
• R-Squared needs to be entered, 
either through MKMV or user 
input
• Probability of Default (PD), either 
EDFs or user rating mapping
• CounterpartyIDs, subportfolio IDs
  
 
Source: Moody’s KMV  
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6.12.3 Model Framework 
 
RiskFrontier utilizes the Sharpe/Markowitz portfolio analysis framework to optimize 
the risk/return trade-off. Portfolio risk, broadly defined, is the risk in changes of the 
market value of the portfolio. The approach uses value-at-risk (VAR) measurements 
and is fully consistent with methods employed to measure ‘market’ risks such as 
currency and interest-rate risks.  With a VAR model, the quantity of required capital is 
the quantity of risk in the portfolio.The key determinants of Portfolio Risk and Return 
in this framework are: 
 
1. PD (at F-IRB or A-IRB phase) 
2. LGD (at F-IRB or A-IRB phase) 
3. Credit Migration 
4. Valuation 
5. Correlation 
 
The PD and LGD selection is already discussed in the earlier phases of the 
implementation project; therefore, correlation and migration approaches will be 
explained in this sub-section when portfolio analytics is concerned. Using Monte Carlo 
simulation, the system calculates the distribution of portfolio values at the chosen 
horizon.  
 
Figure 6.32: Credit Portfolio Value Distribution 
 
Source: Moody’s KMV 
 
Each value on the portfolio value distribution can also be associated with a portfolio 
loss. Thus, RF can associate a probability with each possible portfolio loss (or value at 
risk). VAR is calculated through simulation.  For each trial, RF calculates the value of 
the portfolio by aggregating the simulated instrument values.  This includes the 
recovery value for defaulted instruments and the value of the non-defaulted instruments 
which is determined by the realized credit state of the underlying obligor.  
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As a result of the Monte Carlo simulation, the portfolio value/loss distribution at 
horizon can be constructed. In essence, the Economic Capital can be computed as the 
present value of portfolio losses at the “as-of” or current date of analysis, given a target 
probability (bank’s desired level of safely or capital exhaustion) on the loss distribution 
that the losses exceed Economic Capital as illustrated below. 
Figure 6.33: Credit Portfolio Economic Capital 
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RF constructs value/loss distribution for each exposure, which is the losses that result 
from changes in the exposure value, taking the valuation of an exposure caused by 
changes in the credit quality of the obligor over a measured time horizon.  For 
exposures that mature after the horizon, credit migration is taken into consideration.  
 
The biggest challenge in credit portfolio modeling is the parameterization of various 
credit portfolio drivers, such as correlation, migration and valuation.  RF not only 
includes the robust and advanced technology from the Moody’s KMV research team in 
these critical areas but does so using a uniquely powerful database of default history, 
asset value measurements and market prices. Moreover the model is transparent which 
enables all users to compare and contrast their own views of these parameters with 
those of the model.  Each of these three critical areas merits further information.  
 
6.12.4 Credit Migration 
 
RF simulates instrument value realizations at each credit state of the world. The change 
in the value of the exposure at future time horizon, if not in default, can be determined 
by either the user-specified rating transition probability matrices or MKMV Empirical 
Credit Migration model (Distance-to-Default(DD) Dynamics). In contrast, some 
models in the market, CreditRisk+ focus only on the default probability at one future 
time horizon, thus ignoring maturity as a risk factor, in the construction and analysis of 
the credit portfolios. This form of modeling essentially (often referred to as Default/No 
Default) assumes that there are only two states that a loan can be in: normal or in 
default. The probability of increases in risk that may lead to default is not calculated.   
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This drawback becomes most important in the context of higher risk and longer-dated 
instruments. In the new Basel framework, maturity is defined as a ‘risk factor’ side by 
side with the default probabilities, exposure at default and recovery rates. DD 
Dynamics focus on both default probability and credit migration at horizon, and treats 
maturity as a risk factor as intended in Basel II framework. Ignoring maturity as risk 
factor is a huge underestimation of the risk associated with instruments that are held in 
the portfolio till maturity date as it will not pick up on any value changes at the horizon 
that may lead to large losses in the future.  
 
Other models such as Credit Metrics also provide a migration matrix however these 
matrices have the drawback that they are not based on market measured data but rather 
on the tables produced annually by the rating agencies.  These tables have three 
significant drawbacks: they are based on a much smaller sample of firms, the sample is 
very biased towards the very largest firms in the largest economies and third they lack 
the dynamism of the marketplace as agency ratings are notoriously slow to react to 
changes in credit conditions. Moreover estimations using historical data are backward 
looking in nature. DD Dynamics uses the forward looking EDF values when assigning 
the forward survival probabilities and transition matrices are based extensive empirical 
work of 33 years of default data globally.  
 
Another substantial disadvantage to the use of ratings-based migration estimates is that 
they are formed as an aggregate probability given a rating category, and may mask 
information that is counterparty-specific. It follows the assumption that all obligors in 
the same rating category trends the same in terms of credit quality deterioration or 
improvement. The granularity is limited to differentiate among credits and the obligor-
specific term structures are ignored. The reality is that not all BBB-rated firms have the 
same credit quality or future prospects and EDF measures solve this issue by forming 
the basis of its analysis on firm-specific data to reflect on individual counterparty risk, 
i.e. firm’s market data and capital structure. The range of EDF values are from 1bps to 
33%, which compared to the ratings is highly granular. It is an absolute measure of risk 
as opposed to relative measure such as the ratings.  
  
6.12.5 Valuation 
 
As RF takes into account not only default events, but also migration, the model can 
extend its framework to a valuation of the credit asset at maturity with migration taken 
into account. Understanding the possible changes in value of an asset and a portfolio 
are an increasingly crucial aspect of portfolio credit risk modeling.  In this regard RF 
has introduced a new and powerful lattice valuation method193 that assesses the 
optionality that is generally embedded in credit instruments.  By assessing the credit 
migration of an instrument at several points in time before the horizon the lattice 
valuation model can evaluate the probability of different actions the borrower might 
make.  These options/actions include prepayment, change in usage, default, call and put 
options.  This valuation model is unique in the marketplace and assigns an exposure’s 
return versus its risk considering all aspects of the transaction from embedded options, 
migration, etc. 
    
 
193 Moody’s KMV ‘Lattice Valuation Model’ whitepaper, Yashan Wang and Bin Zeng, September 2006 
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6.12.6 Correlation 
 
Defaults can arise among a series of connected risks.  It is this combination of defaults 
that can be the most dangerous threat to a bank and so a great deal of thought and 
research has been put into the measurement of risk correlation. Unfortunately, default 
correlations are not empirically observable. Volvo and its suppliers have not defaulted 
together to date.  Does that mean the correlation is zero, if Volvo is placed in default 
will its suppliers be unaffected? The answer is certainly no and banks cannot ignore 
these risks simply because they are so hard to measure.  
 
In order to measure correlations, RF’s Global Asset Correlation Model (GCorr)194 was 
designed that could operate at the borrower level.  In other words it is not only capable 
of specifying correlations between default events, but also migration events for 
individual exposures. Top down approaches, such as CreditRisk+ fails to capture 
correlations individually since there is no focus at instrument/counterparty level. 
Rather, top down models try to approximate using historical credit losses on 
comparable portfolios, e.g. sector analysis. This approach may be appropriate for 
homogeneous portfolios, such as a bulk of credit card portfolios, but for large 
corporate, commercial and SME portfolios, it will be highly inappropriate as it will 
underestimate the risks associated at the tail of the loss distribution where extreme 
losses are mostly incurred and eat up shareholder capital. 
 
In an attempt to provide some insights into other correlation models and their 
drawbacks, the thesis will start by looking at Equity Correlation models195, such as 
CreditMetrics.  Essentially, equity correlation models aim to measure how much two 
firm’s market equity caps vary together. This is a poor proxy for capturing the co-
movements in the underlying asset (business) value of the obligors because changes in 
leverage can obscure the asset correlation. Despite the fact that equity correlations are 
easily observable from a rich data set, they largely understate risk by ignoring debt 
structures of the obligors. In addition, by ignoring the leverage of the firms, equity 
correlation models often specify negative correlations which are very unlikely to exist. 
  
Alternatively, one may choose to observe “raw” asset value correlation, i.e. the 
movement in a typical firm’s asset value with another and these are mostly driven by 
factors idiosyncratic to those firms. Hence, observed “raw” correlations are prone to 
“noise”, which may randomly under or overstate actual correlation. It is also true to 
state that sample models (e.g. sectoral analysis like CreditRisk+) will only reflect co-
movement that is unique to that sample period and will not be very useful for predicting 
ex ante correlation over a subsequent time horizon. 
 
Another approach which is adopted by model suppliers that do not have access to 
extensive market data is to use an estimate of “average” correlations196.  These models 
are generally the ones that are used by consultants. This approach is fraught with 
danger as it tends to encourage portfolio managers to increase exposures to the largest 
clients as such additions to concentration risk will not be identified as such by the 
 
194 Moody’s KMV ‘Global Correlation Factor structure’ whitepaper, Peter Crosbie, January 2005 
195 Zhang and Zeng, Moody’s KMV ‘Measuring Credit Correlations: Equity Correlations are not enough!”, January 2002. 
196 Zhang and Zeng, Moody’s KMV, ‘Empirical Assessment of Correlation Models’, , November 2001. 
operation of the model.  There is no empiric migration (often the agency tables are 
used) and granularity is missing in the assumptions underlying the average correlation 
estimates. The RF’s Global Asset Correlation model has become the most widely used 
correlation measurement tool in the world because it overcomes the disadvantages of 
the alternative methods.  It is fairly stable since it is a factor-based approach, reflecting 
global economic, regional/country and sector factors. Factor modeling is best suited to 
capture systemic co-movements which are the most important predictors of future 
correlation between asset values; the very thing that a portfolio manager needs to 
estimate as well as possible.  
 
Factor model technology, pioneered in the 1970’s for equity portfolios and now in 
common use for those portfolios,  aims to determine underlying factors which cause 
two firms’ asset values to rise and fall together, instead of observing raw pair wise asset 
value correlations among firms.  This approach separates signal from noise/sampling 
error and allows for intuitive understanding of sources of correlation and for application 
to non-listed firms.  
 
GCorr finds a systemic factor that captures what is common between firms as well as 
capture the sensitivity of each firm to this common systemic factor. In essence, 
knowing how the common systemic factor moves each firm will explain how firms 
move together. Consequently, correlation between each firm and the common factor 
determines the correlation between each pair of firms, thus eliminating the need to 
directly estimate the correlation of every pair, a huge computational task. GCorr uses 
120 factors based on the global economy, region, sector, industry, and country, 
providing high resolution on sources of correlation. Please refer to the diagram below:  
 
Figure 6.34: Global Asset Correlation Factor Structure 
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The extent and granularity of the factors allow for intuitive understanding of common 
economic factors leading to correlation. It starts by computing a series of weekly asset 
returns (changes in asset value) for all 39,000 firms using observations from January 
1990 till December 2006 for the 2006 correlation model.  The correlation factors are 
updated annually adding new weekly asset returns observations each year. Using this 
individual firm data within countries and industries, it determines country and industry 
indices and continues by regressions on these country and industry indices on 
orthogonal macro factors constructed from asset returns. Following this process, it 
builds, for each firm, a “composite factor” based on country and industry composition 
 
It then performs a second regression on the obligor asset return to compute R-squared, 
which is the portion of asset variance explained by the composite factor. In this second 
regression, it uses the latest 3-year weekly asset returns observations. Using these 
results relating to the systemic component of the asset return (R-Squared), GCorr 
determines the asset correlation among firms. Asset correlations combined with 
obligor’s default probabilities will determine the Default Correlation, which is used if 
the default event occurs during simulation. If no-default, with correlated migration 
(correlation and survival probabilities at horizon), the value distribution of each facility 
is simulated, which on aggregate level determines the portfolio value distribution.  
 
A common misunderstanding of the GCorr argues that if there is not sufficient number 
of Turkish firm asset return to build the correlation model then it will not applicable to 
use by Turkish banking portfolios. This is clearly an incorrect reflection on the model 
because the model tries to identify how the common systemic effects from global, 
regional, sectoral as well as industry- and country-specific factors and the residual left 
from these common effects become the firm-specific, which is diversifiable. By 
incorporating the most forward looking and predictive asset return data from the public 
EDF model, it brings valuable information on the credit cycle turns and changing 
liquidity conditions.  It will be unjustified to argue that Turkey can be isolated from 
these common systemic effects as many of the credit crisis have shown in the past and 
continues to show that the impact of world economy as well as other cause significant 
variations on the Turkish economy, its market participants and ultimately their portfolio 
capital allocations. Considering the relatively large foreign debt in Turkey, it is very 
difficult to say that any liquidity conditions in the global markets will not turn into local 
credit events and incur large losses as correlated defaults grow.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. 13 Overall Credit Risk Management Work Plan & Schedule 
 
Once again using the same structure, the following table provides an indicative 
roadmap for developing effective credit risk management in its broadest sense, i.e. 
including a portfolio based approach to credit risk management and economic capital.  
 
Table 6.5: Credit Portfolio Risk Management Implementation Road Map 
Source: Moody’s KMV Credit Risk Specialist Group 
Overall Credit Risk Management Road Map – Activities  
          
Milestones Data  Process People Systems 
1 Gap analysis 
 
 
2 Design the data 
structure 
(including loss & 
recovery data) 
Design a CRM 
solution 
Training Plan Specification for an IT 
system framework – 
RiskAnalyst 
 
3 Implement the data 
infrastructure 
 
Training - 
Fundamentals of credit 
Implement Borrower 
and Facility Rating 
System –RiskAnalyst 
 
4 Collect Data -  
Borrower and Facility 
data 
Build Borrower 
Rating Models - 
Internal &  External 
(EDF Models) 
Financial Analysis and 
Rating methodology 
training 
 Reporting - Custom 
Reports 
5 Collect Data -  Loss 
and recovery,  
Collateral & 
guarantee  
 
Implement F-IRB 
Facility rating model 
 Train the trainers on 
new rating systems 
 
Basel II F-IRB 
Capital Calculations 
6  Validation 
Framework -  existing 
Borrower rating 
models 
User training on new 
rating systems 
Regulatory Reporting 
and disclosure - 
Custom Reports 
 
7 Ongoing data 
collection 
Roll-out F-IRB 
approach 
 
 
 
   
8   Estimate LGDs based 
on internal data & 
judgment 
    
8  Collect Data -  
Returns & Costs 
 
Model LGDs based 
on internal data 
  Review capital 
calculation measures 
under A-IRB 
8 - 9 Obtain Data - 
Correlations 
 
Validation of LGD 
processes 
   I 
9   Risk based pricing User training on 
portfolio management 
system 
 Implementing 
Portfolio Management 
tools - Risk Frontier 
Portfolio Manager 
Annual validation of the risk rating models 
Data Warehouse 
Governance and Oversight 
 
Note: In order to highlight the incremental nature from the F-IRB and A-IRB processes, the associated 
activities are retained (shaded). 
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6.14 Closing Remarks to the Implementation of IRB with Moody’s KMV 
 
While no single financial institution is typical, the thesis has identified the key phases 
that financial institutions typically experience on their way to advanced credit risk 
management. The Turkish banking system is rapidly growing, and has evolving 
economic structures that are quite different from the majority of the banking systems, to 
which the BIS frameworks are being applied. Without this understanding, offering the 
standard “here are the tools/skills the leading banks have but good luck” type analysis 
would simply create misleading, and ultimately unrealistic objectives for the banks, as 
the standard analysis do not necessarily focus on the economic reality surrounding 
them. On the other hand, Basel II IRB solution needs to have the ability to bring 
acknowledged industry best practice to the assessment of all industry segments, 
irrespective of their location.  
 
To develop an appropriate solution for the Turkish banks, this chapter focused on three 
core dimensions; 1) Data, 2) Systems / Processes and 3) Methodologies. These 3 
dimensions prove extremely powerful in providing the structure for banks’ Gap 
Analysis of F-IRB or A-IRB road map described in Phase 1 and will be pivotal to the 
phasing of the solution sought in this thesis. 
The importance of the appropriateness of the data available was stressed for the long 
term effectiveness of all risk management processes in Phase 2. This is particularly true 
of data on default events and recovery which are difficult to collect retrospectively in 
Turkey and elsewhere. Good data infrastructure should encompass data relevant to the 
assessment of single obligor risk, including an appropriate level of financial statement 
data and defaults, facility risk, based on an appropriate level of facility and collateral 
data, LGD & EAD, based on loan loss and recovery experience and historical rating 
performance. Consequently, the formation of a Data Consortium is suggested as the 
starting point of a successful Basel II IRB implementation project for the Turkish 
banking industry. The Data Consortium not only serves to the Phases 1-6 for F-IRB, 
but should also aim to serve banks in achieving A-IRB status outlined in Phase 8 for the 
development of internal LGD and EAD models.  
 
In Phase 3, an effective internal rating system should facilitate the development of 
credit strategy, planning and reporting framework. Identifying the most risky 
borrowers, pricing for risk, and measuring regulatory and economic capital cannot be 
achieved without an accurate internal rating system. Without it, it is also very difficult 
to really take advantages of active portfolio management that entails buying and selling 
of portfolio of assets. There may be many purposes of an internal model ranging from 
credit approval/renewal, loan structuring, credit monitoring on borrower and portfolio 
level, limit system, economic and regulatory capital, loss calculation to pricing. The 
appropriate approach can differ from portfolio to portfolio and the asset type as well as 
the objectives of the organization.  
 
In Phase 4, some aspects Turkish banks need to take into consideration in building their 
PD models were explored. Depending on the asset type, the internal models may 
incorporate more than one model, with hybrid approaches between PIT and TTC. The 
thesis aimed to analyze options varying from internal PD models to external PD 
models, such as the EDF models and to external rating scorecards. Of key importance 
to understand is that there is very little degree of isolation to global credit market 
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turmoil and that credit cycle is a reality for Turkish financial institutions and large 
corporations. Banks in most economies including in Turkey respond to cyclical changes 
and tend to tighten their lending policy, during recessions like in late 1980s and early 
1990s and more recently in 2000-2002 and second half of 2007. This results in liquidity 
shortage and reduced bank funding leads to additional defaults of companies which are 
highly dependent on additional liquidity. Hence, the use of internal PD models that 
incorporate market information will be a step forward to handle credit cycle changes. 
CreditEdge and RiskCalc solutions of Moody’s KMV have been explored in this 
context either as a primary model or benchmark as suggested in Phase 7. It is very 
common to have more than one solution in place and Phase 5 stresses the importance of 
integrating all solutions into the overall assessment and decision processes. The days of 
having a rating just for the sake of saying you have a rating are over, the "use test" is a 
key criteria for compliance under Basel II.To assist the banks to administer an ongoing 
validation process, the validation approaches have been explored in Phase 6. One 
benefit of the establishment of such a framework is that it will enable the banks to 
maximize the amount of future validation work able to be undertaken in-house. Further, 
to the extent that some involvement of external validation experts is still required, the 
existence of a well applied validation framework will minimize the time required for 
them to complete their tasks.  
 
Credit portfolio management is at the forefront of financial institutions minds due to 
many influences in the market from regulators through Pillar 2 discussions, market 
participants through competition and senior management requiring information on 
portfolio level for their strategic decisions. For developing markets, such as Turkey, 
this has been with real challenges. Phase 9 aims to provide key guidelines in this field 
and shares the most successful and widely used credit portfolio management solution 
(Moody’s KMV RiskFrontier – its predecessor, Portfolio Manager) across financial 
institutions globally.  These financial institutions that are at the forefront of managing 
credit risk and achieving higher returns per amount of credit risk or economic capital, 
have a common high-level strategy:  they all manage their credit portfolios actively.  
 
Active credit portfolio management is a portfolio management strategy designed to: 
diversify the portfolio better, reduce portfolio volatility (unexpected loss), improve 
return/risk, use economic capital more efficiently, create capacity to do more business 
and increase shareholder value. This does not only require timely and accurate 
measurement of default probabilities, which the sources are to be found in the F-IRB 
and A-IRB phases of the implementation project, but it also involves an understanding 
of the interactions of default risks; migration & correlations among assets in the 
portfolio. Finally, it ensures sophisticated methods are in place for measuring and 
improving portfolio performance, which can only be achieved by understanding the 
risk/return aspects of a portfolio. Consequently, Pillar 1 can be interpreted as a good 
starting point for Turkish banks, but a further stretch needs to be pursued by the 
industry for Pillar 2 considerations as well as active portfolio management in the next 
years to come and banks need to be well prepared in advance.   
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SECTION IV:  Synthesis and Conclusions 
 
Chapter 7: The Synthesis of the Chapters and Conclusions drawn 
from the Thesis 
7.1 Emergence and Importance of Prudential Supervision and Financial 
Stability 
 
Since the implementation of the first Basel accord in 1988, banking business has seen 
the introduction of new risk management practices under many different supervisory 
approaches ranging considerably across the world. In parallel, financial markets have 
undergone significant transformations and become more global. These transformations 
in the financial industry exposed weaknesses in the first accord and this research 
concluded that the first accord is not only time-inadequate, but also system-inadequate, 
when Turkey’s capital adequacy ratios under Basel I regime were observed against the 
aggregated R-Squared (portion of risk that is systemic based on market asset return 
observations) by Moody’s KMV. The Moody’s R-squared data flashed alarming signals 
about the increasing systemic risks in Turkey since the twin crises of 2000 and 2001. 
The Basel I based capital adequacy ratios proved an ineffective benchmark for a sound 
and safe financial system in Turkey. The reason was that in many countries, those 
transformations can be closely linked to increasing systemic risks, which challenge the 
very existence of the financial stability and cannot be captured by ratio-based capital 
metrics. Hence, Basel II will be tested on the level of building sound financial systems 
globally through more risk-sensitive measures, enhanced governance and increased role 
of supervision and market discipline.  
 
Today, the threat to the financial stability is presented by contagious effects stemming 
from the hemispherical nature of doing business. As a result, the need for integrated, 
global regulatory solutions across financial systems has become much more immediate 
and a clear necessity. In this regard, financial stability concerns can be considered the 
main impetus behind the developments of comprehensive banking supervision in many 
countries. Not surprisingly, the new EU directive and Basel II objectives are in full 
harmony with Turkey’s EU accession program as well as with the Turkish banking 
reforms introduced by the supranational anchors as discussed in Chapter 2. In view of 
that, BIS ascertains the importance of this issue with the statement as follows:  
 
“Safety and soundness in today’s dynamic and complex financial system can be 
attained only by the combination of effective bank-level management, market 
discipline, and supervision...The Committee believes the benefits of a regime in which 
capital is aligned more closely to risk significantly exceed the costs, with the result that 
the banking system should be safer, sounder, and more efficient”197. 
 
Respectively, the Basel II implementation process requires close cooperation with the 
regulators. Rather than following the “wait-and-see” type of approach, Turkey being on 
the forefront of European accession, Turkish banks and regulatory bodies need to 
 
197 Secretariat of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: The New Basel Accord – An Explanatory Note. Basel: BIS, 2001, 
p. 1-3. 
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review the implementation of Basel II with a number of initial “consultation papers”, 
commensurate with the former experiences of other leading regulators. Before enacting 
the new Basel framework into its domestic banking system via the imposition of “over 
the night” issued directives, the regulators in Turkey should start setting up the 
“principles of implementation” in cooperation with a workgroup from the banking 
industry rather than postponing the IRB to future dates. Likewise, the senior 
management of the banks should bear the prime responsibility of proper 
implementation. The thesis argued in Section II that the trade-off between choosing the 
standardized and IRB methods is much too large to ignore, as using standardized 
methods results in extra capital erosions under the new pillar system in the Turkish 
banking sector. Hence, decisive and corrective actions on the parts of supervisors and 
banks in Turkey are immediately required on the path to Basel II IRB implementation.   
 
In Turkey, there is still room for the exercise of socially suboptimal policies only 
because of accident and ignorance on both banks’ and regulator’s part. Equally, banks 
also have to be cautious for the imposition of “best practices” from the rest of the world 
as it may not mean “best practice” in Turkey and for the national regulatory bodies. For 
that matter, the thesis reviewed the requirements by Basel II and their impact globally, 
nationally and at individual bank-level in Section II and proposed guidelines in Section 
III in relation to the adoption of better policies, systems and methods under the new 
accord, which are hoped to lead towards more systemic stability and welfare. 
Unfortunately, many political factors play a huge role in shaping banking sector 
policies. According to Barth, “uncompetitive political systems that limit democratic 
input and grant extensive discretion to the chief executive will not tend to adapt bank 
supervisory and regulatory policies that promote private sector monitoring through 
information disclosure rules because transparency empowers the market in general, not 
only those in political control”. To put it uncompromisingly, socially efficient 
regulatory changes may disturb the powerful segments of the politico-economical elite 
in the country and they may not prefer to choose to implement the “best practice” 
methods198. Therefore, the Basel II implementation process demands open, 
competitive, democratic and effective political systems to start with. Thus, successful 
implementation of banking sector reforms requires country-level customizations and in 
the case of Turkey, the driver for the customizations is the EU as the main political 
anchor, flanked with the supportive programmes of IMF and the World Bank as the 
supranational anchors. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Basel II implementation may not be under the sole 
domain of the national supervisor. In past and present, such long term implementation 
was/is encouraged and sometimes enforced by the “Supranational Anchors: the IMF 
and the World Bank” in Turkey with the argument of sustaining systemic stability 
under Article IV covenants199. In contrary to the mis-beliefs of market participants and 
regulatory bodies in Turkey, the international community can exert real pressure for 
reforms. For these organizations, the primary goals are to: 
 
 
 
198 Barth, J.R. (et all.): Rethinking Bank Regulation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 2006, pp. 259-306. 
199According to Eichenberger (2004, p. 304), the whole logic behind the current push for codes of conduct and international 
standards lies in the initiatives and efforts to standardize the financial and regulatory practices for all countries which seek to be 
active on international financial markets. 
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(1) Collect information, 
 
(2) Identify, what works best in different countries and conditions in terms of banking 
and regulatory policies 
 
(3) Disseminate this information to policy makers around the world200. 
 
Supranational anchors may even go a step further and establish a regulatory and 
supervisory agency from scratch as they did by the end of 2000 in Turkey, given the 
dire conditions, when the economic and political system deliberately chose and 
maintained inefficient supervisory and regulatory policies that were in contrast to the 
public interests. Accordingly, the compliance with Meta level standards, such as Basel 
II, should be a prerequisite for qualifying in the possible contingent credit lines funded 
from the supranationals and other global players, in particular in Europe. Indeed, this 
suggests the need for developing countries to fulfill regulatory duties continuously with 
internationally accepted norms, such as Basel II. Consequently, the importance and 
efficacy of Basel II’s tripartite pillar system and its reforms should be viewed by 
political leaders and the Turkish financial institutions as being in their own interests as 
long as the credit lines are funded by these external institutions and EU accession 
continues. The bottom-line expectation of EU on prudential regulation is that Basel II 
nurtures the development of risk culture where the supervisory role transitions from 
simple “ratio watching” to “a risk-based process”.  Although a “Basel II road map” has 
been devised by the BRSA and the Turkish Bankers Association, there still remains to 
be an ownership issue. While subjects like effective risk management, enhanced 
corporate governance and prudential banking supervision, which are the key objectives 
of Basel II, can strengthen the financial system, macro-economic volatility should be 
stabilized or reduced in Turkey through monetary policies and structural changes 
mandated by the supranational anchors. Certainly, it is also true that macro-economic 
stability cannot exist without a safe and sound financial system. Typically, it is a 
“chicken and egg” situation and lasting results can only be achieved in the Basel II 
implementation if and only if all parties that make up the environmental system are 
fully taken into account of in the implementation process.    
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Basel II accord contemplates giving banks a choice in 
capital determination: the Standardized approach or one based on a bank’s own internal 
ratings, namely the Internal Rating Based Approach. “The concept is sound with one 
exception. Each nation’s regulators may stimulate the usage of one method for each 
other. The problem with this approach is there is no single standard for the design and 
operation of a model based internal rating system”201. If more complex IRB 
approaches are to be used, the range of methods and models, including diverse range of 
risk weights, will be far more extensive than in the Standardized approach. This is in 
the intention of capturing greater risk sensitive measures and systems in place at banks, 
but it also adds further complexity. During an analysis of successful implementation of 
Basel II inside the Asia-Pacific region, Jovic (2005) concluded that the most important 
goal is not to look for the quickest possible way to reach an internationally comparable 
Basel II level. Rather, achieving a continuum of different status, described as: 
 
 
200 Barth, J.R. (2006, p. 272). 
201 Chorofas, D. N.: Managing Risk in the New Economy. New York: NYIF, 2001, p. 224. 
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“Every institution that has to comply with the accord must allow enough time and effort 
for each critical component – people, expertise, processes, organization, methods, IT 
systems, data – to be soundly built, improved, deployed, validated and supported on a 
continuing basis. In this sense, it is crucial to remember that Basel II compliance is not 
just a project but the first step in a continuing process”202. 
 
At the outset, Basel II is a more conceptual framework than its predecessor, Basel I. 
Contrary to Basel I, the new accord is not a simple sole prescription for capital 
requirements. The smooth implementation requires extensive investment in new 
systems, data, models and technical know-how combined with continuous training and 
education in multi dimensional disciplines. Although most leading institutions may not 
always have the best Pillar 1 models, but they tend to have risk management staff that 
are experts in actuarial management, knowledgeable about the industry and the latest 
risk management technology, and highly analytical. They manage credit risk models in 
accordance with the goals and objectives of the organization, and constantly challenge 
the models by aggressively testing new value enhancing strategies203. Therefore, data 
retention and the sophisticated usage of the credit risk management systems for 
decision making and reporting under Pillar 2 and 3 are the lifeblood of today’s most 
successful banking institutions. The foundations of data, models, validation and 
portfolio management are to be laid in concert with the goals and management 
philosophy at the hands of experienced and managerial resources of a bank. In the case 
of missing skills or know-how, solutions from vendors are to be sought. As the 
competitive pressures grow with the EU accession as well as increasing participation by 
global banks in Turkey, Turkish banks will be more inclined to meet international best 
practice in terms of their data, systems and models, but more importantly the design of 
the new risk management organization and the training of bank’s internal staff in midst 
of change. In fact, whether banks go for the SA or IRB under Pillar 1, the new design 
should go beyond the minimum regulatory compliance and opt for market best practice 
as stressed in Pillar 2 with its supervisory review process and in Pillar 3 with its market 
disclosures that allow for market participants to identify poorly- versus well-managed 
banks. The role of supervision is clearly not only about determining which banks will 
comply with SA or IRB, but much more. This is indeed confirmed by the empirical 
research done by Barth, Levine, and Caprio, as discussed in Chapter 3.3. Accordingly, 
there is weak evidence between more stringent capital requirements under Pillar 1 
considerations and the systemic banking crisis. Rather, the research found that stronger 
banking supervision and market discipline will overcome the banking failures as 
intended with Pillar 2 and 3. As a result, this thesis concluded that prudent supervision 
will be pivotal in communicating to the market the right differentiation among banks 
regarding their risk management practices, culture and profile and in sustaining the 
overall financial stability through the elimination of banking mavericks as a result of 
effective market discipline. It is important to note that despite the increasing systemic 
risks in Turkey signaled by the R-Squared, the result was not another crisis in Turkey 
due to stronger supervision led by the authorities.   
 
202 Jovic, D.: Basel II Deployments in Asia-Pacific: Who’s Ahead? In: Global Association of Risk Professionals, Issue 24, May / 
June 2005, p. 33. 
203 Mc Cahill, L.: Organizational Issues in Building and Maintaining Credit Risk Models. In: Mays, E. (ed.): Credit Risk Modeling 
– Design and Application. Chicago: Amacom, 1998, p.13. 
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7.2 Call for More Risk-sensitive Capital Measurement: Pillar 1 
 
Keeping pace with financial innovation and developments, Basel II introduced much 
more risk-sensitive measures in capturing credit quality and credit risk mitigation 
techniques in its Standardized approach and more so in the IRB approaches. The 
quantitative impact studies conducted by Basel committee as well as the Turkish 
national supervisor suggested, in Chapter 4, that the Standardized approach would lead 
to an increase of 8% in credit risk-based capital requirements and the decrease of 
capital adequacy ratio from 28.84% to 17.33%. A more recent study done in 2007 also 
depicted that the capital adequacy ratio would fall down to 13.68% at Turkish banks 
with the adoption of Basel II SA. The reasons are mostly due to the impact of the new 
risk-weighting regime under SA on loans that do not have external ratings as well as on 
specific portfolios and the lack of data on credit risk mitigation. On the latter, the 
expectation is that data will become available to see the savings realized by risk 
mitigation in the pricing of loans. However, there still remains the issue of capital 
erosion in the Turkish banking system by a factor of 30% with the implementation of 
SA. Hence, most large private banks stated that they would lean towards the 
implementation of IRB approaches by the end of 2009. With the adoption of IRB, 
however, supervisors need to sign off on the bank’s internal rating design, validation of 
its internal rating and stress-testing systems. In Chapter 2, the thesis outlined challenges 
of IRB implementation, in relation to measurement uncertainties, data limitations due to 
either lack or inconsistency of data. Equally important is the lack of a single benchmark 
or supervisory guidelines in Turkey in the assessment IRB methodologies, systems and 
data foundation. In light of Basel II minimum requirements and sound practice 
guidelines as well as international best practices, the thesis proposed a roadmap of 
internal rating systems, models and data for an IRB implementation in Chapter 6.        
 
In this roadmap, a good rating system should be designed for neither relationship 
management nor accounting purposes. Rather, the thesis advocated that the internal 
rating system of a bank should be developed to support credit risk management 
functions. In turn, a good rating system should be powerful in its rank ordering among 
bank’s customers and calibrated such that it provides the accurate levels of default 
probability, which prevents over or under estimation of the expected losses and hence 
over or under pricing due to systemic clustering of more negative or positive ratings, 
respectively.  
 
In addition, a good rating system should be granular such that there is sufficient range 
of default probabilities among borrower grades and loss probabilities among facility 
grades. The dual-rating framework guided by the Basel II accord supports the 
negotiations on the structure of the transactions and collateralization while the borrower 
grades remain in their nature less negotiable. Behind good risk management lies good 
measurement of material risks, therefore lack of granularity in rating systems will 
defeat bank’s purpose of better monitoring, earlier intervention and fewer losses.              
 
Agency ratings and other through the cycle measures are not generally designed to 
indicate or predict levels of default risks or credit pricing. Plus, they use accounting 
ratios that are typically backward looking. Empirical evidence reveals that “through the 
cycle metrics” perform generally good risk differentiation on industry-level among 
credits in the same grade, however, this relative differentiation is not sufficient for best 
practice risk management by any means. The objective of a good rating system is to 
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achieve accuracy in predicting levels of increasing risks as early as possible. Clearly, 
depending solely on accounting-based figures and ration for the credit risk prediction 
will not achieve this objective solely and effectively. While most banks develop models 
that use fundamental analysis, the thesis presented the use of EDF models to bring in 
the market-based information into an internal rating system, which are widely 
considered as best practice across the global banking industry. Empirical evidence 
confirms that EDF models help in more accurate prediction of defaults when conditions 
of borrower, economy or industry change as they do not mute the signals from the 
market. It also confirms that EDF models appropriately identify non-defaulters as they 
are based on extensive default data. 
 
As a consequence, the thesis proposed the use of fundamental analysis in conjunction 
with market-based measures, in the spirit of gaining more market insight and earlier 
mitigation of risks when credit cycle, borrower-level and industry-related risks change 
before they are reported in the financial statements. Basel II also stresses the 
importance of using all data available to form the rating, thus a “balanced” view of the 
borrower and facility based on fundamental analysis, expert judgment and market-
based metrics that prevent over optimism or conservatism. Quantitative models such as 
the EDF measures are based on extensive default data and deploy state-of-the-art credit 
risk modeling, and hence they can be used either as benchmark or direct input to a 
bank’s internal rating system.   
 
As much as a good rating system needs to pick up on credit deterioration on time, it 
also needs to be easily applicable and its drivers are understood across the bank. While 
retaining its objectivity, it should serve as a source of intuition and insight across the 
organization. For that matter, data archiving of inputs and outputs of a rating system is 
as important as the process of rating assignment. The reporting and aggregation of risks 
on a portfolio basis will be pivotal in the validation and calibration needed to maintain 
accuracy and effectiveness of internal rating system as Basel II guidelines noted.  
 
Conclusively, a best practice risk management will empower consistent decision-
making process across the organization from analysts, lenders to senior management; 
enable an efficient rating process and better understanding of risks by borrowers across 
portfolios. It should promote trend assessments, peer analysis, benchmarking and 
stress-testing within its system design and data capture. These should facilitate and link 
with the development of bank’s overall credit strategy, planning and the determination 
of risk profile by the senior management.  
 
Finally, the long-term effectiveness of an internal rating system and methodologies can 
only be assured with the extent and appropriateness of data available. In that regard, the 
thesis proposed the formation of Data Consortium in Turkey that serves to the 
development of Pillar 1 type of risk models and rating systems continuously and 
consistently. Without the data, it is very difficult to validate the robustness and 
effectiveness of any internal rating and stress-testing systems.  
7.3 Emergence and the Importance of the Link to Loss Given Default  
 
To appreciate the depth of the risk mitigation standards of Basel II, one has not to go 
far. Recent financial turmoil teaches a lesson. Paraphrased in the word of Soros, “The 
periodic crises were part of a larger boom-bust process. The current crisis is the 
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culmination of a super-boom that has lasted for more than 60 years. “Boom-bust 
processes usually revolve around credit and always involve a bias or misconception. 
This is usually a failure to recognize a reflexive, circular connection between the 
willingness to lend and the value of the collateral”204. 
 
One of the biggest contributions of Basel II is the “invention of LGD” and the increased 
attention given to the LGD analysis, not only from the regulatory, but also from an 
effective risk management perspective on the level of ex-ante facility and ex-post work-
out processes. The measurement of LGD and hence the Recovery Rates take into 
consideration all efforts associated with real costs and gains on the recollection of 
doubtful loans, which mean that any improvement in the recovery procedures will be 
leading to a reduction in empirical LGDs and lower capital requirements for the 
following years. As a matter of fact in Turkey, the total value of assets, waiting for the 
recovery at the hands of the savings and deposit insurance institution is over USD 60 
billion, which indicated the severity and the importance of possible LGD-related issues. 
However, further refinements and alternative methodologies can be added to the 
existing regulatory framework in Turkey, in order to gain a full insight of recovery risk, 
in which case Basel II will significantly contribute to. 
7.4 Emergence and the Importance of Validation and Calibration 
 
In Chapter 6, the thesis discussed the development of different PD and LGD models 
from the perspective of Pillar 1. The value of any models will rely heavily on its 
accuracy and effectiveness in predicting defaults and recoveries and in rank-ordering 
among different types of credits and the underlying securitization structures. 
Respectively, models that are effectively validated will add transparency and statistical 
rigor to the bank’s lending process as proposed in Chapter 5 and better risk 
management will lead to lower costs and capital requirements as guided by the Basel II 
principles. A well understood and robust rating model that correctly measures risk 
provides a solid foundation for risk-based pricing and calculating economic and 
regulatory capital. More powerful models also save banks money and improve 
profitability205.  
  
Models typically are developed in conjunction with fundamental analysis, expert 
judgment and market-based metrics and the essence of such models should be to 
provide the lenders with actionable insight in their lending process. Hence, the 
economic value driven from the models can be validated on the basis of their 
practicality, precision and robustness over range of conditions and circumstances. In 
line with the business value of the validation process, regulators, driven by Basel II 
guidelines, often require validation as part of maintaining a sound risk management 
framework. Regulatory considerations aside, the thesis argued that proper validation 
creates real economic value as a robust, precise and transparent model will streamline 
the approval process and lead to lower transaction costs and efficiency gains.   
 
Generally, models are developed using data that reflects the lending experience of the 
individual bank. If the bank experienced low defaults, for example, in the past, it may 
feel that the validation is a low priority task. However, it is of key importance to see 
 
204 By George Soros Published: January 22 2008, at www.ft.com/cms/s/0/24f73610-c91e-11dc-9807-000077b07658.html. 
205 “What is a powerful model worth?” Roger M. Stein and Felipe Jordao, November 13, 2003  
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how the models perform in the future at different points in the credit cycle. Considering 
that most of the Turkish banks are developing models using data only stretching back to 
3-4 years (under relatively good lending conditions after the twin crisis), the robustness 
and accuracy of the existing internal models are largely in question under severe 
lending conditions when the credit cycle turns. Additionally, since the twin crisis, most 
banks in Turkey are expanding their businesses to new types of customers and asset 
classes, e.g. mortgages and SME lending businesses. The models, on the other hand, are 
largely developed on different portfolio compositions from the past compared to 
today’s business. Only for that matter, validation is a vital task for Turkish banks as it 
should test the portfolio and the model performance against external data and new 
business conditions.   
 
There is also a final challenge presented with the qualitative factors that go into most of 
the models. In Chapter 6, the thesis mainly focused on the validation process of the 
quantitative factors of a model. The reason is that the information on qualitative factors 
is not compiled over time under generally accepted principles in the Turkish banking 
sector that makes the task of validation even more difficult. Nevertheless, power curves 
should be constructed on the impact adding qualitative factors to the quantitative 
structure as suggested in Chapter 6.  
 
The repeating theme in this thesis has been that lending conditions and portfolio 
compositions at banks change over time and hence Turkish banks should not see the 
Basel II guidelines and requirements on validation and calibration as one-off exercise. 
As circumstances and conditions change, banks should devise a robust framework to re-
validate and re-calibrate their internal models as well as the effectiveness of their risk 
management decision processes as stressed numerous times in the relevant chapters of 
this thesis. In fact, as part of ICAAP, it is crucial to have an independent view either by 
internal audit or external consultants. For a successful Basel II strategy, a robust, 
transparent and independent assessment of model performance is a prerequisite. An 
ongoing validation process will enable the banks to seek and unlock value hidden in 
their banking systems by including new data available and improving model 
performance continuously.  
 
While the decision of appropriate validation framework lies with the national 
regulators,   the thesis suggested that by using the best practice methods (in Chapter 6), 
producing good documentation and enabling a robust process (in Chapter 5), Turkish 
banks will be able to prove to the regulators that an effective validation framework has 
been adopted.     
 
For the non-Pillar 1 types of risks, which may be difficult to quantify, reputation, 
liquidity or strategic risk, bank should ensure that there is sufficient management 
oversight, contingency planning and stress-testing for the management and prevention 
of such risks.  
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7.5 Call for Better Supervisory Review Process and Additional Portfolio 
Considerations: Pillar 2 
 
As banks approach the milestone of end-2009, a date the Turkish supervisory and 
regulatory bodies have set for the implementation of Basel II accord, the most of the 
focus has been applied to the Pillar 1 aspects of the accord. While the banks have made 
and are making considerable financial and resource investments in data capture systems 
and internal rating tools, supervisory and regulatory bodies have been somewhat 
prescriptive in providing guidelines in achieving an acceptable regulatory standard in 
Turkey. In addition, Pillar 2, which is a source of competitive advantage for banks with 
its SREP and ICAAP, are mostly overlooked by Turkish banks. The thesis argued that 
it is likely for the banks’ investment towards Pillar 2 to be minimal due to the lack of 
clear direction by the regulatory bodies in Turkey. Motivated by this, the thesis aimed 
to be a roadmap in Chapters 5 and 6 for acceptable standards, not only at Pillar 1 level, 
but also Pillar 2 and finally Pillar 3. 
 
Regarding Pillar 2, many regulators in the world have issued ICAAP, most notably the 
UK FSA; the thesis included their views on the effective approaches during the 
implementation of the Pillar 2 in Chapter 3 and argued that Pillar 2 is not about 
compliance, but it is about embedding a risk awareness culture and organization at 
banks in Chapters 5 and 6. In turn, the regulators have the discretion to reward banks 
that have the risk management at the forefront of their organizations and embrace the 
new risk culture mandated by the Basel II accord. In contrast, Pillar 2 can also work 
against the banks as capital requirements can increase at the regulatory discretion and 
becomes Pillar 1 capital plus additional Pillar 2. The extent of add-on capital which 
Pillar 2 aspects of the accord have the ability, will determine the competitive advantage 
among banks when sourcing customers and risk assets.  
 
Remarkably, there was not any regard taken of aggregate portfolio in the Pillar 1 of the 
accord, only a risk weighted capital applied to the risk assets without any consideration 
to portfolio concentration, correlation and migration risks. In essence, each portfolio 
has its idiosyncrasies that need to be dealt with as acknowledged by the Pillar 2 and 
bear further capital consequences at the bank. In Chapter 6, the thesis proposed the 
implementation of an internal capital model (mostly referred to as economic capital 
model) that can explicitly account for the portfolio risks, such as the correlation and 
concentration risks. In that respect, there are a number of commercially available 
solutions with a variety of approaches, but the key competence lies in the depth and 
diversity of data foundation in economic capital models. The thesis assessed the use of 
Moody’s KMV Economic Capital model in Chapter 6 on the basis of both extensive 
data foundation and robust modeling capabilities, particularly in the area of correlation 
multi-factor analysis and systemic risk capture.  
 
Through Basel II Pillar 2, regulators are increasingly encouraging the use of Economic 
Capital modeling and reporting worldwide. The second pillar mandates the banks to 
calculate capital for risks that are not covered by Pillar 1, in particular addressing the 
risk concentrations in a portfolio, understanding the risk profile and portfolio loss 
distribution, stress-testing under different conditions. Economic Capital is a catch-all 
metric that can be used for these purposes. This trend has not been only encouraged by 
the regulators, but has been part of international best practice as Economic Capital has 
been used at banks in the strategic portfolio planning, risk-based pricing and 
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performance tracking for some years. Moreover, Economic Capital stretches Basel II-
type risk profile by including other risks, such as migration and correlation risk, in 
addition to the default and concentration risk. The thesis analyzed all these risks in the 
Chapter 6 adopting a bottom-up approach, which requires the input of transaction terms 
and conditions as well as counterparty’s PD, industry and country breakdown and 
transaction LGD. As a result, the Economic Capital model presented in Chapter 6 takes 
into account the economic realities of a bank’s credit portfolio and adds layers such as 
inherent migration and correlation structures that may arise in the future time horizon. 
On the other hand, the thesis argued the shortcomings of alternate models of economic 
capital, including the top-down approaches that are easier to implement as they only 
require mean default rates and some macro-economic parameters, but they are unable to 
make specific analyses on individual exposures in the portfolio and lack considerably a 
robust correlation and migration framework due to data and model limitations. In fact, 
the model parameterization is the most difficult aspect of portfolio credit risk modeling, 
which is why many institutions worldwide decided to use Moody’s KMV-developed 
models as they are based on extensive datasets and robust financial modeling. As a 
result, the thesis proposed the use of international best practice, the RiskFrontier, in the 
measurement of economic capital and portfolio credit risk.   
 
Additionally, in Pillar 2, it is the banks’ implementation and understanding of the 
models it uses that will determine the competitive advantage as well as capital 
requirements by the regulators. In that regard, banks should have a process to assess 
capital adequacy in relation to their risk profiles through board and senior management 
oversight, monitoring and reporting, which are all parts of a risk aware culture 
discussed in Chapter 5. A bank’s senior management is responsible to understand the 
nature and level of risk and relate them to the overall capital requirements, which in 
consequence determine the bank’s strategic business plan and risk appetite and identify 
the capital needs and sources of required capital. Economic capital is neither book nor 
market measure, thus further education, communication and effort of the board, senior 
management as well as individual business units are required for a Pillar 2 perspective 
of the new accord, in contrast to Basel I. Consequently, regulators want clear policies 
and procedures that identify measure and report the material risks inherent at the bank 
(including portfolio risks and other risks that are immeasurable, but manageable, e.g. 
strategic risks) and in line with the strategic and business objectives of the bank. This 
implies risk planning in conjunction with overall business planning.  
         
Pillar 2 sits at the heart of regulators, key aims of financial stability and security 
through supervision. By differentiating between well risk-managed banks and others 
thorough capital relief or add-on capital, the message from the regulator will be clear to 
the market place and further disclosed to the market participants and external agencies 
through Pillar 3 reporting. The tasks for the banks will be to ensure that the new risk 
culture is reflected in the organization structures, bonus schemes, remuneration, 
budgeting and planning as well as educational initiatives in “the way we do business at 
the bank”. It is apparent that Turkish financial institutions have disappointed their 
investors in the past, such as the 2000 and 2001 twin crisis due to the volatility of their 
earnings and the resulting losses, with respect to mainly credit related losses. By 
investment in risk management, a priceless opportunity is presented through Pillar 2 to 
the proactively risk-managed banks, if the regulators can link the lower capital 
requirements when banks can show that the risks are measured, managed and mitigated 
on a portfolio level with precise account of risk/return payouts. In this way, the market 
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participants are also given the opportunity to continually discount the poorly versus 
reward the well managed organizations where the overall financial stability can be 
restored through effective differentiation. 
 
Basel I accord’s limitation was that it took a “one-size-fits-all” type of approach to 
banking regulation such that capital requirements were overly high for risk-averse 
banks and dangerously low for banks with adventurous outlook, like many in Turkey 
before the twin crisis. The motivation with Basel II was to ensure that best practice risk 
management processes are in place that bank failures are left behind in the past as 
financial markets become more sound and safe. Stress-testing requirement under Pillar 
2 sits at the heart of these discussions that it serves as a precautionary technique to 
counteract the credit cycle fluctuations and overall macro-economic fluctuations, which 
are considered as second order effects when developing models under Pillar 1 
considerations. While the inclusion of macro-factors in PD and LGD estimates will be 
the wrong modeling approach206, Pillar 2 stresses, nevertheless, that these second order 
effects should be accounted for in the risk management processes. Thus, banks need to 
adopt a stress-testing framework to bring these effects into the impact analysis when 
downturn occurs in a given asset class, industry, region and so on.  
 
The impact of macro-economic shifts on the aggregated portfolio is much more 
tractable rather than trying to determine the impact on individual credit. In the systemic 
risk discussions in relevant chapters, the thesis argued that it is much more feasible to 
quantify the aggregated impact in a portfolio given a downturn condition, and then 
reflect on how individual credits relate to the collective. In fact, the R-squared measure 
in the Moody’s KMV Global Asset Correlation model aims to quantify the systemic 
risks in the portfolio under 120 factors, then find out how individual transactions relate 
to a given system of common factors. Scenarios on correlation factors and correlated 
credit migrations under different market conditions will be the primal focus for the 
practitioner under Pillar 2 stress-testing regime.  
7.6 Call for Market Discipline and Transparency: Pillar 3 
 
Basel II is motivated to cover both sides of the coin, in terms of sustaining the safety 
and soundness of a financial system and the realization of the level playing field for the 
major players around the world. In particular, the objective of soundness of the 
financial system gained more importance since the summer 2007 in the financial 
markets worldwide. The latest credit crunch continues to suggest that in the new 
financial era, the emphasis will be extremely on successful implementation of Basel II. 
On the other hand, with much national discretions, a common level playing field still 
appears to be a difficult goal to achieve. Under so many “national discretions”, Basel II 
seems incapable of providing an incentive on establishing a common ground for all 
players in the different parts of the world. In this respect, Pillar 3 disclosure 
requirements may help to establish the common ground as long as disclosures are 
relevant to the audience (equity and debt investors, external rating agencies, etc) and 
the audience, in turn, has the knowledge and background to make educated 
assessments.  
 
 
206 Tony Hughes, “Portfolio Stress-testing”, Moody’s Economy.com, Regional Financial review, September 2007 
 193
                                                
Furthermore, as indicated in Chapter 3.4.4, “Fraudulent Banking Structures: Threats to 
the Financial Stability” and according to Frenkel (1999, p. 66), many of the problems 
stem from moral hazard207. Without any exception, the credit dynamics are the same 
everywhere. Since 2003 in Turkey, as markets were pumped with liquidity, financial 
intermediaries extended loans that were very risky. In many of the cases, the loans can 
be considered sub prime, for the purchasing of assets, such as real estate. The growing 
demand for such “assets” financed by the readily available credit lines, which are then 
refinanced by syndicated loans and securitized facilities, gave rise to the 
disproportionate increase of real estate prices. The existing “Zeit Geist” made both 
customers and lenders happy while real estate developers rushed into Turkey from the 
Gulf States and Europe hand-in-hand with investment bankers ready to “close deals”. 
The shareholders of the banks, as a result, enjoyed the large asset value growth, which 
is just another bubble. Financial intermediaries, at the same time, experienced the 
collateral on the books go up in price until the first burst in the bubble took place.   
 
As depicted in Figure 3.3, “Systemic Risk estimates in Turkey 1992-2006”, the 
doubling of the R-squared in 2003 flashed the first signals of the turn-of-the-tide in 
Turkey. During this time, financial statements and asset values of the banking system 
were distorted, making it difficult to determine the “true and transparent” financial 
positions of the banks208. The collateral on the books of the financial institutions were 
also diminished. From the perspective of Basel II, an important issue arises such that 
under those circumstances, how one can determine the true “viability” of a bank, when 
figures are distorted during a crisis.  
 
The determination of the viability is a critical aspect of Pillar 3. Under such 
circumstances, viability may be determined by examining two factors. First, the bank 
must develop a short to medium term plan that shows the capital adequacy and 
profitability situation of the bank under realistic macroeconomic assumptions.  
 
Secondly, the position of the shareholders if and when the “business plans” do not 
succeed. In addition, the regulatory authorities must develop a view as to the future 
volume of banking activity that an economy under stressed conditions may absorb and 
signal certain criteria for sound banks for the evaluation by the market participants209. 
In this case, the role of the existence of supervisory data is important. The supervisory 
data may be outdated, so a process for collecting data based on uniform valuation 
criteria should be initiated. This is exactly the area where LGD assessment articles play 
a very big role of Basel II. In this sense, the supervisors should adapt uniform and 
transparent rules for keeping a strong market discipline that apply to all banks. Tasks at 
this stage include reinforcing the prudent and regulatory oversight and strengthening 
the transparency. In principle, market forces strengthened by the market disciplinary 
tools should determine the winners and losers among financial institutions. 
 
207 Frenkel.  J.: Remarks to Financial Crisis: What Have We Learned From Theory and Experience? 1999, pp. 66-67. 
208 The Financial Stability Report of Central Bank of Turkey 2005 indicates a high level of provisions for that period. 
209 IMF: Managing Systemic Banking Crisis, Occasional Paper 224, 2003,  
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7.7 The New Risk Management Organization: A Source of Competitive 
Advantage  
 
With the Basel II accord, the risk management organization is expected to be a 
contributor of value, as opposed to its “policeman” role traditionally. The change 
requires considerably large investment in the design of the new organization, in 
particular in systems, data and models as well as in the systemization and centralization 
of the credit approval processes while keeping a de-centralized monitoring and control. 
Typically, Turkish banks recognize the need for the transition to the new risk 
management organization; however, the main inhibitor to this change has been the lack 
of transparency regarding the benefits from such change. As discussed in Chapter 5, 
this is an opportunity for Turkish banks to invest in changing risk management to 
improve the financial performance, without compromising prudence and regulation.  
 
The main prerequisites for the successful implementation of the new organization 
structure are the good data, systems and models, of which the thesis proposed solutions 
in these domains in Chapter 6. Assuming that these are all in place at Turkish banks, 
the next step for banks is to make better use of information to improve efficiency and 
cut costs. Systemization as proposed in Chapter 5 lies at the heart of minimizing human 
intervention through maximizing the use of tools, which in turn reduce costs, improve 
efficiency through reduced reporting and credit approval layers and increase customer 
satisfaction at origination. The automation of a range of support processes, such as the 
data management, monitoring and control allows for the de-centralized processes at 
business unit level. With greater central control of improved data and systemization, the 
need for management by “credit committee” is reduced. Rather, they are distributed to 
the risk management industry desks. In turn, the performance tracking, planning and 
training can become more efficient as data and systems are centralized through 
reporting to the group risk functions, which are primarily geared towards setting risk 
strategy and managing the value added or destruction at bank’s portfolio.     
 
Evidence shows that the payback on the investment in the new risk organization can be 
many times the cost of the investment as experienced in many global banks. This is a 
great opportunity for Turkish Banks, but the challenge still lies in the data collection,  
changes in systems and processes, and the implementation of appropriate models, 
which may take years to build and create for a successful transition to the new 
organizational design of risk management. In any case, Turkish banks should start now 
to consider the implications of risk management organization design if they are aiming 
for the end-2009 Basel II deadline.         
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I. Work Experience 
 
1. Kiler Holding – CFO of the Group  June 2008 -  still working
   
 
My responsibility ranges from project finance facilities down to the arrangement of 
syndicated construction finance facilities for Sapphire, which is second tallest building 
in Europe. The range of finance also includes the IPO of the Group’s Reit and the 
financing including modelling of the existing energy projects in the name of Kiler 
Group. Group’s retail activities are also financed by the Holding company. 
 
 
2. TOKI – The Governmental Agency of Housing Jan 2007 – still working 
 
Chief Financial & Risk Advisor to the Board of Directors 
 
Toki is the chief residential housing agency of the Government of Turkey. Being the 
largest player in the mortgage market, is also playing a huge role in financing the real 
estate development and construction market. My duty consists of analysing and 
managing the project and portfolio risks of the real estate development projects of 
TOKI. 
 
3. Halic Leasing – A subsidiary of ILIC Kuveyt      April 2006- Jan 2007 
 
Acting General Manager – Member of the Credit Commitee, being responsible for: 
 
- The Representation of the Company in Turkey 
- Responsibility for Origination and Structuring Asset based Leasing and Private 
Equity transactions 
- Syndication of the originated leasing facilities 
 
Achievements:   
 
Two Private Equity transactions combined with structuered leasing facilities concluded 
in the area of Logistics and Olive Oil Production. Existing bad debts worth USD 10 
mln are restuctured under bankruptcy protection rules of Turkey. Arrangement of the 
financing of a green field cement factory project in Syria in favor of Güriş 
Construction. 
 
4. Halkbank – Turkey      Dec 2003 – April 2006 
    
Executive Vice President for Financial Institutions   
Member of the Executive Commitee of the Bank 
 
Responsibility: 
 
Responsible for the Origination of Syndicated Lending Facilities and the management 
of syndication related risks arising from Structured Finance, Project Finance and Trade 
Finance transactions. The duty included the management of foreign and domestic bank 
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relations, covering the analysis and defining bank risks as well. The range of risk 
responsibility was further extended up to affiliated and subsidiary companies of 
Halkbank consisting of 34 companies from different industries, 3 banks abroad and the 
financial services companies in Germany and Bahrain as well. The position included 
the Management of Key Bank Account Relationships domestically and internationally 
within Global Banking Operations.  
 
Achievements:  
 
Arrangement of Loan Syndications with Global Banks like Abn Amro, Deutsche 
Bank, Bayerische Hypo-Vereinsbank and Citibank as well. Several of the deals 
include the following transactions: 
 
o Arrangement of USD 1.8 billion worth of Tüpraş Deal as Mandated 
Arranger besides Standard Bank London and other syndicate banks in 
Turkey. The Deal was chosen as the best acquisition finance deal by 
the year 2006. 
o Arrangement of EUR 178 mln TAV Ankara Esenboga Airport 
Finance Project with Bayerische Hypo Vereins Bank. The Deal was 
elected as the best project finance deal in 2005 by IFR. 
o Volkswagen-Dogus Syndication – EUR 140 mln Stand-By LG Facility 
with ABN Amro Bank, Deutsche, HSBC, ING Bank 
o Doğuş Otomotiv Syndication – EUR 50 mln, Syndicated Term Facility 
with Abn Amro, Societe Generale, Koc Bank N.V. 
o TAV International Cairo Airport Project – USD 35 mln Stand-By 
LG Facility, Mandated Lead Arranger, Arranged with Garanti Bank, C-
Bank, Family Finance House and Egypt/Romanian Bank 
o Arrangement of USD 350 mln, 8 years  Real Estate Project Finance for 
Turkish Housing Agency (TOKI), syndicated with Deutsche Bank, 
Standard Bank London and Halkbank 
o THY Syndicated Loan Facility of USD 270 mln, Co-Arranger with USD 
50 mln 
o Demir-Halk Bank Syndication of USD 100 mln, Mandated Lead 
Manager with USD 7.5 mln 
o Oil Trade Finance Facility of USD 125 mln, transacted on the behalf of 
Tüpraş Oil Refinery   
o Ararngement of Structured Term Repo Facility for 15 years arranged 
with Deutsche Bank to solve the long term liquidity problem of 
Halkbank. 
o Demir Halk Bank N.V. syndication of USD 100 mln, Lead Mandated 
Arranger with USD 7.5mln, one year pre-export finance facility. 
o Financial advisor to the USD 6.5 billion worth of Turk Telekom 
privatisation deal of Saudi Oger / Eksim Dış Ticaret Group. 
o Lead Arranger to the TUV Turk-Doğuş- Akfen vehicle inspection 
project worth of USD 850 mln (deal suspended). 
o Arrangement of several energy related syndicated deals  
  
• Restructuring Halkbank with IMF and the World Bank under Article IV 
programs. 
• Management  and control of bank risks at the domestic and international level. 
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• Management and restructuring of  Financial Services Companies of Halkbank in 
seven different branches in Germany. 
• Management of Subsidiary Companies of Halkbank including Financial and 
Non Financial Companies in Germany, Holland (DHB Bank), Hungry 
(Hungarian Volksbank), Turkmenistan (UGOB), Iran (rep office), Bahrain 
(Offshore Branch). 
• Managing the merger with Pamukbank at FI level. 
• Acquisiton of Insurance Companies (Birlik Sigorta &Birlik Hayat) and an 
Investment Company (Halk Yatırım) for Halkbank. Board Membership at the 
Bank’s Insurance Company, Birlik Sigorta 
 
5. Banking Regulatory and Supervisiory Agency (BDDK)  
 
Credit Risk Management Advisor     June 2002 – Dec 2003 
 
Responsibility: 
 
Development of a new Credit Risk Management and Supervision Concepts for the 
Turkish Regulatory Body BDDK after the financial crisis in Turkey.  
 
Achievements: 
 Supervisory concept development for Credit Risk Management standards based on 
the forthcoming Basel II new regulatory regime. Analysis of the German Bafın’s 
credit risk management regime (Mindestanforderungen an das Kreditwesen – MAK) 
and the Swiss regulatory and supervisory standards (EBK-Schwerpunktprüfung 
Kreditrisikomanagement) and their application to Turkish standards. 
• Synthesis for the Enron’s collapse and its consequences for the Banking 
System. Analysis of the Enron’s business, financial and contingent risks based 
on the real credit proposals arranged by ABN AMRO Bank and the simulation 
of loan facility decision making to increase the credit risk analysis skills of the 
regulators. 
• Asset Securitization Structures and Mechanics. Application of asset 
securitization to resolving of Non Performing Loan problems in Turkey. 
• Rating and Regulatory Standard. How to approve the IRB Approach in Turkey. 
 
6. Günay Construction Lmt. (Nato Constructor)  
Project Finance Director        Dec. 2001 – June 2002 
 
Responsibility: 
 
Establishment of Project Finance Department. Structuring project- and working capital 
facilities for the domestic and international construction projects. Arrangement of Bid- 
and Performance Bonds for the tenders. Developing project financing & cash flow 
models for the financial feasibilities of the projects and analysing the performance 
criterias (IRR) of the projects. 
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Management of the Project Finance Department, Arrangement of LGs and construction 
financing facilities for: 
• ISKI (Municipality of Istanbul Water Administration) new pipeline projects 
(Arrangement of 5 year leasing facility for the water pipelines) 
• IGDAS (Municipality of Istanbul Natural Gas Administration) new gas pipeline 
projects financing and leasing facilities 
• Conakry New Guniea Higway Construction International Tender Bid Bonds 
• Jordan -  Renewal of  Bus Station Terminals International Tender Bid Bonds 
• Sudan Khartoum Ring Road Project – Bid & Performance Bonds 
• Financial Feasibility Analysis of Brasov Airport Project 
7. ABN AMRO BANK Leasing - Istanbul    
Assistant Vice President      June 1999 – Dec 2001 
 
Achievements: 
 
- Establishment of the Leasing strategy in line with the ABN AMRO Bank Head 
Quarter’s business and country business plans. This included the ABN AMRO Bank’s 
client portfolio needs as well as the origination of deal at the second-tier portfolio level 
- Development of the Business from scratch up to a USD 40 million business portfolio.  
- Managing Corporate Accounts 
- Structuring financial & operational Leasing proposals in terms of risk and return, 
writing up credit proposals when needed.  
 
8. WestLB - Istanbul      
Manager Corporate Banking    June 1998 – June 1999 
 
Achievements:  
 
Arrangement of Trade Finance and Forfaiting facilities for Turkish Banks.Arrangement 
and of Bank and Vakıf Bank Syndications, including the Raks Asset Securitisation. 
Arrangement of Bank money market and trade finance lines for domestic turkish banks.  
 
9. ABN AMRO BANK - Istanbul     
Account Manager at Corporate Banking Department  June 1996– June 1998 
 
Achievements:  
 
- USD 20 mln, 5 years term Syndicated Acquisition Finance of UNO Bread 
Factory  for Dogus Holding 
- Arrangement of Dogus Holding Genoto DEM 10 mln L/G and ECA facilities. 
- Structuring several working capital finance and export loan facilities for 
Corporates and Multinational Companies.  
- Arrangement of credit facilities trough using credit risk default swaps in Russia 
in favor of Daimler-Crysler in Turkey.  
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- Arrangement of Berdan Tekstil IPO with capital markets group. 
10. INTERBANK-Istanbul     
Strategic- and Financial Planning Officer          January 1995-March 1996 
 
Achievements: Monitoring and measurement of Treasury Transactions and 
Performance incl. Forwards/Swaps/FX. Development of systems for better 
Financial Reporting and Planning system of the Bank. 
11. KOCBANK-Istanbul             
EDP Systems Business Analyst and Developer   June 1994 – January 1995 
 
Achievements: Development of Treasury Risk Management Systems & Transfer 
Systems Electronic Funds Transfer Systems (EFT). The EFT project was awarded as 
the best project solution. 
 
II. Work Experience in Switzerland 
 
1. Organisation: Fachschule für Bankwirtschaft Zürich/Switzerland 
Responsibility: Swiss Money and Capital Markets Instructor 
Dates: January 1992– April 94 
Achievements: Money Markets Instruments course development for Reuters 
Zürich, which saved the company from a bankruptcy. 
2. Organisation: University Of Zürich – Handelswissenschaftliches Seminar 
Responsibility: Teaching Assistant for Management Accounting, Banking and 
Finance at the University of Zürich Switzerland 
Dates: January 1989– June 1990.  
 
3. Organisation: Management Development at the University of Zürich 
Responsibility: Project Assistant for Management Development 
Dates:   13/8/1990 - 27/10/1990  
 
III. Consulting Activities Organised  
 
1. First Risk Management Convention in Turkey arranged with Almafinjaeger 
(Switzerland) and the University of Commerce – February 2002 (Istanbul) 
 
2. Workshops for several banks (TEB, Tekfenbank, Garantibank) regarding Credit 
Risk Management (February 2002 Istanbul) 
 
3. Seminar for BDDK about Asset Securitisation (February 2002 – Ankara) 
 
4. Financial Consultancy for Ege Group in Ankara (March 2003). Preparation of a 
cash flow model for implant production project worth USD 6.1 million 
 
5. Presentation for Swiss Regulatory Body in Bern Switzerland (May 2003) 
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6. Presentation at World Bank Conference about Pricing of Non Performing Loans 
(April 2004) 
 
7. Presentation of Real Estate Finance for Caisse D’Epargne in Istanbul (April 
2005) 
 
8. Participation and Delegation of Halkbank at IMF, World Bank and IIF Meetings 
in Washington D.C. and in Ankara during the country oversight meetings. 
 
I.  IV. Teaching Activity 
 
1. Lecturer at the University of Commerce Istanbul. Main teaching areas involve 
Corporate Banking, Marketing Financial Services and Credit Risk Management 
 
2. Phd Program at the University of Zürich, Implementing Basel II at Public Banks 
in Turkey 
 
3. Lecturer at the University of Kadir Has in Istanbul since February 2005. (Basel 
II and the Credit Risk Management) 
 
4. Lecturer at the University of Marmara for the Summer Term 2004. 
(International Banking and Structured Products) 
 
5. Lecturer at the University of Has in Istanbul  
(credit risk management and Basel II). 
 
V. Special Skills 
 
1. User of Moodys KMV Risk Analyst, KMV Portfolio Manager  and Credit 
Rating and Analysis Tools. 
 
2. User of Moodys KMV Portfolio Manager and Deal Analyser. 
 
3. Basel II and CAD III related regulatory information. 
 
4. Turkish Banking Law and related regulations with respect to debt and 
bankruptcy protection rules. 
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Appendix V: CRD/Basel II Project Road Map Turkey 
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banks    related to credit risk Management 
 
                                             
1.1.1.2 Disclosure of adjustments related to credit risk 
management for external opinions 
                                             
 
 
1.1.1Credit 
  Risk  
 Management         
1.1.1.3 Publishing adjustments related to credit risk 
management 
                                             
1.1.2.1 Disclosure of adjustments related to evaluation 
of market risk models for opinions 
 
                                             
1.1.2.2 Publishing adjustments related to evaluation of 
market risk models 
 
                                             
1.1.2.3 Disclosure of adjustments related to market risk 
management for external opinions 
 
                                             
 
 
 
 
 
1.1.2 Market  
Risk 
Management  
1.1.2.4 Publishing adjustments related to market risk 
management 
 
                                             
1.1.3.1 Designation of data sharing elements between 
banks related to operational risk management  
 
                                             
1.1.3.2 Disclosure of adjustments related to operational 
risk management for external opinions  
 
                                             
 
 
 
 
 
1.1.3Operational 
Risk 
Management 1.1.3.3 Publishing adjustments related to operational 
risk management  
 
                                             
1.1.4.1 Disclosure of adjustments related to interest rate 
risk management for external opinions  
 
                                              
1.1.4 Interest 
Rate Risk 
Management 
1.1.4.2 Publishing adjustments related to interest rate 
risk management 
 
                                             
1.1.5.1 Disclosure of adjustments related to liquidity 
risk management for external opinions  
 
                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Risk 
Management 
Formulation 
 
 
1.1.5 Liquidity   
Risk 
Management 
1.1.5.2 Publishing adjustments related to Liquidity Risk 
Management 
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related to rating organizations that will be considered 
within the context of Basel-II. 
                                             
1.2.2 Publishing adjustments related to rating 
organizations that will be considered within the context 
of Basel-II.  
 
                                             
 
 
 
 
1.2 Rating 
Organizations  
1.2.3 Starting process for granting permission to rating 
organizations that will be considered within the context 
of Basel-II.  
 
                                             
 
1.3 Internal 
Auditing 
 
1.3.1 Publishing adjustments related to Internal Auditing 
                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.Infrastructure 
Formulation 
 
1.4 Corporate 
Governance 
 
1.4.1 Publishing adjustments related to corporate 
governance   
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 2.1.3 Starting CRD/Basel –II Calculations beside Basel –II
(parallel practice) 
                                             
 
 
 
2.1. Standard 
  Approaches 
 
 
 
2.1.4 CRD/Basel-II rules to come into force                                              
 2.2.1 Designation of criterions related to the banks that 
will use IRB approach 
                                             
 2.2.2 Disclosure of adjustments related to IRB 
approaches to external opinions 
                                             
 2.2.3 Publishing adjustments related to IRM approaches                                              
2.2.4 Disclosure of evaluation and approving internal 
rating systems process guide to public opinion. 
                                             
 2.2.5 Starting parallel practice in the banks that will use 
IRB approaches 
                                             
 2.2.6 Starting the process of permitting for IRB 
approaches. 
                                             
 2.2.7 Designation of criterions related to the banks that 
will use VAR model 
                                             
 2.2.8 Disclosure of evaluation and approving VAR 
models process guide to public opinion. 
                                             
 2.2.9 Starting parallel practice in the banks that will use 
market risk model in calculations of Legal Capital 
Obligation as mandatory. 
                                             
 2.2.10 Use of market risk model in calculations of legal 
capital obligations will be made compulsory for the 
banks within determined criterions. 
                                             
 
 
2.2.11 Designation of criterions related to the banks 
which will use AMA approach. 
                                             
2.2.12 Disclosure of adjustments related to AMA 
approaches to external opinions 
                                             
2.2.13. Publishing adjustments related to AMA 
approaches. 
                                             
2.2.14 Disclosure of evaluation and approving AMA 
approaches process guide to public opinion 
                                             
2.2.15 Starting parallel practice in the banks that will 
use AMA approaches 
                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Advanced 
Approaches 
 
 
 
2.2.16 Starting the process of permitting for the use of 
AMA approaches. 
                                             
2.3.1. Disclosure of sub- adjustments draft associated to 
relations between other country supervision authorities 
within the context of CRD\ Basel II  
                                             
2.3.2 Publishing sub adjustments associated to relations 
between other country supervision authorities within the 
context of CRD\ Basel II 
                                             
 
2.3 Second 
structural 
Block 
2.3.3 Projection and due diligence process for evaluation 
system of banks internal equity  
                                             
 2.4 Calibration  
 
2.4.1 Starting calibrations studies for LGD and EAD 
rates for our country 
                                             
2.5.1 Disclosure of Provision Legislation changes to 
external opinions 
                                              2.5 Risk Based  
Provision Practice  
 2.5.2 Publishing Provision legislation changes                                              
2.6.1 Disclosure of relevant chapters of Accounting 
Practices Regulations to external opinions. 
                                             2.6 Financial 
Reporting 
 2.6.2 Publishing revised relevant chapters of Accounting 
Practices Regulations within the context of Basel II. 
                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Adaptation 
to EU Capital 
Requirements 
Directive 
(CRD) 
 
2.7.Supervision 
Reporting                
2.7.1 Announcement of revised reports                                               
 
 
  DATES SPECIFIED ON THE ROAD MAP 
 WORKS COMPLETED ON THE DATE SPECIFIED ON THE ROAD MAP 
 COMPLETION DATES OF DELAYED WORKS 
 COMPLETION DATES OF WORKS PLANNED TO FINISH IN THE FUTURE  
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Subject 
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Sub-Topic 
 
Related Activity 
 
2005 
 
2006 
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  10
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1 
 3.1.1 Disclosure of Road Map to public opinion.                                               
 
3.1 Road 
Maps 
 3.1.2Request for Banks´  internal Road Maps regarding 
Basel II  
 
                                             
 3.2.1 Basel II Project Committee Meeting                                              
 
 
3.2.2 Basel II Orientation Committee Meeting                                              
 3.2.3 Basel II Coordination Committee Meeting 
 
                                             
 3.2.4 Establishment of sub working groups in B2YK 
structure 
 
                                             
 
 
 
 
3.2 Basel II 
Committees 
 
 3.2.5 Establishment of sub working groups in BDDK 
(Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency) structure 
                                             
3.3.Quantitative 
Impact Studies       
3.3.1 Starting Second Local Quantitative Impact Studies 
(QIS-TR2) (including VAR, IRB and AMA) 
                                             
 
3.4 Publications 
 
 3.4.1 Publishing Turkish translation of Basel – II 
(including November 2005 changes) 
                                             
 3.5.1 Informing progress reports contents that will be 
requested from banks every six months 
 
                                             
 3.5.2 Sending progress reports that will be requested 
from banks every six months 
 
                                             
 
 
3.5 Progress 
Reports 
 
 3.5.3 Publishing evaluation report regarding progress 
reports that are requested from banks every six months 
 
                                             
 3.6.1 Starting instructive activities for non-financial 
sector about possible Basel-II impacts 
 
                                             
 3.6.2 Discussing other public bodies and Basel-II 
strategies 
 
                                             
 
 
 
3.6.3 Starting preparations for symposium with 
extended participants 
                                             
 
 
3.6 
Communicating 
with other 
Departments 
3.6.4 Organizing a symposium with extended 
participants regarding Basel-II 
 
                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Adaptation 
Process 
 
 
3.7 Training 
 
3.7.1 Planning BDDK (Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency) training program 
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 WORKS COMPLETED ON THE DATE SPECIFIED ON THE ROAD MAP 
 COMPLETION DATES OF DELAYED WORKS 
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Appendix VI: Global Asset Correlation Factors 
 
  
 
FACTOR CLASSIFICATIONS IN GLOBAL ASSET 
CORRELATION MODEL 
  
 GLOBAL EFFECT 
1 Macro 
2 Small Firm 
  
 REGIONAL EFFECT 
1 Europe 
2 North America 
3 Japan 
4 South East Asia 
5 Australia/NZ 
  
 SECTOR EFFECT 
1 Interest Sensitivity 
2 Extraction 
3 Non-Durables 
4 Durables 
5 Materials 
6 High Technology 
7 Medical 
  
 COUNTRY EFFECT 
1 USA/CARIBBEAN 
2 CANADA 
3 DENMARK 
4 GREECE/SOUTHEAST EUROPE 
5 JAPAN 
6 AUSTRALIA 
7 INDONESIA/SOUTHEAST ASIA 
8 CHINA 
9 AUSTRIA 
10 BELGIUM/LIECHTENSTEIN/LUXEMBOURG 
11 SWITZERLAND 
12 GERMANY 
13 SPAIN 
14 FRANCE 
15 GREAT BRITAIN 
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16 HONG KONG 
17 ITALY 
18 MALAYSIA 
19 NETHERLANDS 
20 SINGAPORE 
21 SWEDEN 
22 THAILAND 
23 SOUTH AFRICA 
24 FINLAND 
25 IRELAND 
26 NORWAY 
27 KOREA, REPUBLIC OF 
28 NEW ZEALAND 
29 NORTH AFRICA 
30 CENTRAL AFRICA 
31 FORMER USSR 
32 EAST EUROPE 
33 PACIFIC OCEAN ISLANDS 
34 CENTRAL/SOUTH AMERICA 
35 SOUTHERN SOUTH AMERICA 
36 ISRAEL 
37 TURKEY 
38 PHILIPPINES 
39 TAIWAN 
40 INDIA 
41 PAKISTAN 
42 PORTUGAL 
43 SOUTH ASIA 
44 POLAND 
45 MIDDLE EAST 
  
 INDUSTRY EFFECT 
1 AEROSPACE & DEFENSE 
2 AGRICULTURE 
3 AIR TRANSPORTATION 
4 APPAREL & SHOES 
5 AUTOMOTIVE 
6 BANKS AND S&LS 
7 BROADCAST MEDIA 
8 BUSINESS PRODUCTS WHSL 
9 BUSINESS SERVICES 
10 CHEMICALS 
11 COMPUTER HARDWARE 
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12 COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
13 CONSTRUCTION 
14 CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS 
15 CONSUMER DURABLES 
16 CONSUMER DURABLES RETL/WHSL 
17 CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
18 CONSUMER PRODUCTS RETL/WHSL 
19 CONSUMER SERVICES 
20 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 
21 ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 
22 ENTERTAINMENT & LEISURE 
23 FINANCE COMPANIES 
24 FINANCE NEC 
25 FOOD & BEVERAGE 
26 FOOD & BEVERAGE RETL/WHSL 
27 FURNITURE & APPLIANCES 
28 HOTELS & RESTAURANTS 
29 INSURANCE - LIFE 
30 INSURANCE - PROP/CAS/HEALTH 
31 INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 
32 LESSORS 
33 LUMBER & FORESTRY 
34 MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT 
35 MEASURE & TEST EQUIPMENT 
36 MEDICAL EQUIPMENT 
37 MEDICAL SERVICES 
38 MINING 
39 OIL REFINING 
40 OIL, GAS & COAL EXPL/PROD 
41 PAPER 
42 PHARMACEUTICALS 
43 PLASTIC & RUBBER 
44 PRINTING 
45 PUBLISHING 
46 REAL ESTATE 
47 REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS 
48 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS 
49 SEMICONDUCTORS 
50 STEEL & METAL PRODUCTS 
51 TELEPHONE 
52 TEXTILES 
53 TOBACCO 
54 TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 
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55 TRANSPORTATION 
56 TRUCKING 
57 UNASSIGNED 
58 UTILITIES NEC 
59 UTILITIES, ELECTRIC 
60 UTILITIES, GAS 
61 CABLE TELEVISION 
  
120 TOTAL  
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Appendix VII: Example Data Details – For Commercial Entities 
 
The fields below are requested by the Moody’s KMV Credit Research Database Initiative 
as discussed in sub-section 6.4 of Chapter 6 with the highest priority fields shown in bold. 
Not all banks can provide all of the high priority fields on all of its customers. So some 
“Must Have” fields have been identified for the non financial statement chart of account 
data.   
i. Customer Data 
Customer data may be sourced from either financial statement database or loan systems.  
 
Field Description Type Must Have 
if Bank 
Matches 
and Detects 
Defaults 
Company 
Name/Identifier 
Name of company or a coded name; consistent 
throughout submitted data 
Text X 
Financial Statement 
Database ID 
ID for this company in financial statement 
database 
Text  
Loan System ID ID for this company in loan system Text  
Fiscal Year End Month & Date of company’s fiscal year end  Date/Time  
State/Province State or province in which company HQ are 
located 
Text X 
Postal Code Postal code of borrowing company Text  
Country Country of borrowing company Text X 
Incorporation/Foun
ding Date 
Date company was incorporated or founded Date/Time  
SIC Standard Industrial Classification code Text X 
NACE General Name for Economic Activities in the 
European Union code 
Text X 
Legal Form Company legal form:  
Incorporated, Limited Liability Corporation, 
Partnership, Limited Liability Partnership, 
Sole Trader, Not For Profits, Trusts, etc. 
Text X 
Parent Company or 
Subsidiary? 
 Text  
Public or Private 
Company? 
 Text X 
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ii. Financial Statement (FS) Data 
 
Field Description Type Must Have if 
Bank Matches 
and Detects 
Defaults 
Company 
Name/Identifier 
Name of company or a coded name; 
consistent throughout submitted data 
Text X 
Financial Statement 
Database ID 
ID for this company in financial statement 
database 
Text  
Balance Statement 
Date 
Date of financial statement Date/Ti
me 
X 
Statement Year Fiscal Year for this financial statement  Date/Ti
me 
 
Months in statement Number of months in financial statement Number X 
Audit Quality Audit, Unaudited, Tax Return, Compiled, 
Projection, etc 
Text X 
Annual Statement? Indicates if statement is annual or not Yes/No X 
Units Units used in financial statement, e.g. actual, 
thousands, etc 
Text X 
Consolidated or 
Company 
Statement? 
 Text X 
Currency Currency used in this financial statement Text X 
 
iii. Balance Sheet:  
  
A CALLED UP SHARE CAPITAL NOT PAID Number 
B FIXED ASSETS Number 
  I Intangible assets Number 
    1.      Development costs Number 
    
2.      Concessions, patents, licenses, trade marks and similar 
rights and assets 
Number 
    3.      Goodwill Number 
    4.      Payments on account Number 
  II Tangible assets Number 
    1.      Land and Buildings Number 
    2.      Plant and machinery Number 
    3.      Fixtures, fittings, tools and equipment Number 
    4.      Payments on account and assets in course of construction Number 
  
II
I Investments 
Number 
    1.      Shares in group undertakings Number 
    2.      Loans to group undertakings Number 
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    3.      Participating interests Number 
    
4.      Loans to undertakings in which the company has a 
participating interest 
Number 
    5.      Other investments other than loans Number 
    6.      Other loans Number 
    7.      Own shares Number 
C CURRENT ASSETS Number 
  I Stocks Number 
    1.      Raw materials and consumables Number 
    2.      Work in progress Number 
    3.      Finished goods and goods for resale Number 
    4.      Payments on account Number 
  II Debtors Number 
    1.      Trade debtors Number 
    2.      Amounts owed by group undertakings Number 
    
3.      Amounts owed by undertakings in which the company has a 
participating interest 
Number 
    4.      Other debtors Number 
    5.      Called up share capital not paid (A) Number 
    6.      Prepayments and accrued income (D) Number 
  
II
I Investments 
Number 
    1.      Shares in group undertakings Number 
    2.      Own shares Number 
    3.      Other investments Number 
  
I
V Cash at bank and in hand 
Number 
D PREPAYMENTS AND ACCRUED INCOME Number 
E 
CREDITORS: AMOUNTS FALLING DUE WITHIN ONE 
YEAR 
Number 
    1.      Debenture loans Number 
    2.      Bank loans and overdrafts Number 
    3.      Payments received on account Number 
    4.      Trade creditors Number 
    5.      Bills of exchange payable Number 
    6.      Amounts owed to group undertakings Number 
    
7.      Amounts owed to undertakings in which the company has a 
participating interest 
Number 
    8.      Other creditors including taxation and social security Number 
    9.      Accruals and deferred income (J) Number 
F NET CURRENT ASSETS (LIABILITIES) Number 
G  TOTAL ASSETS LESS CURRENT LIABILITIES Number 
H 
CREDITORS: AMOUNTS FALLING DUE AFTER MORE 
THAN ONE YEAR 
Number 
    1.      Debenture loans Number 
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    2.      Bank loans and overdrafts Number 
    3.      Payments received on account Number 
    4.      Trade creditors Number 
    5.      Bills of exchange payable Number 
    6.      Amounts owed to group undertakings Number 
    
7.      Amounts owed to undertakings in which the company has a 
participating interest 
Number 
    8.      Other creditors including taxation and social security Number 
    9.      Accruals and deferred income (J) Number 
I PROVISIONS FOR LIABILITIES AND CHARGES Number 
        1.      Pensions and similar obligations Number 
    2.      Taxation, including deferred taxation Number 
    3.      Other provisions Number 
J ACCRUALS AND DEFERRED INCOME Number 
K CAPITAL AND RESERVES Number 
  I Called up share capital Number 
  II Share premium account Number 
  
II
I Revaluation reserve 
Number 
  
I
V Other reserves 
Number 
    1.      Capital redemption reserve Number 
    2.      Reserve for own shares Number 
    3.      Reserves provided for by the articles of association Number 
    4.      Other reserves Number 
  V Profit and loss account Number 
iv. Income Statement:  
  
1.  Turnover Number
2.  Cost of Sales Number
3.  Gross profit or loss Number
4.  Distribution costs Number
5.  Administrative expenses Number
 - Depreciation Expense Number
 - Amortization Expense Number
 - Exceptional Items Number
6.  Other operating income Number
 Operating profit or loss Number
 Profits or losses on the sale or termination of an operation Number
 Costs of a fundamental reorganization or restructuring Number
 Profits or losses on the disposal of fixed assets Number
7.  Income from shares in group undertakings Number
8.  Income from participating interests Number
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9.  Income from other fixed asset investments Number
10 Other interest receivable and similar income Number
11 Amounts written off investments Number
12 Interest payable and similar charges Number
 Profit or loss on ordinary activities before taxation Number
13 Tax on profit or loss on ordinary activities Number
14 Profit or loss on ordinary activities after taxation Number
15 Minority interests Number
16 Extraordinary income Number
17 Extraordinary charges Number
18 Extraordinary profit or loss Number
19 Tax on extraordinary profit or loss Number
20 Minority interests Number
21 Other taxes not shown under the above items Number
22 Profit or loss for the financial year Number
 
v. Loan Accounting System (LAS) Data 
 
Field  Description Type Must 
Have if 
Bank 
Matche
s and 
Detects 
Defaults
Company 
Name/Identifier 
Name of company or a coded name; 
consistent throughout submitted data 
Text X 
Loan System ID ID for this company in loan system, 
unique for any customer for any given 
source system business division 
identified next   
Text  
Source System Identifier A computerized accounting system 
identifier to indicate the data source of 
customer records.  
Text  
Business Division 
Identifier 
Code to identify business division 
where loan is housed 
Text  
Loan Identifier Code to identify loan facility Text  
Commitment or Draw 
Record? 
Whether this record reflects the overall 
commitment or an underlying draw 
Text  
Draw ID ID for this draw record, if applicable Text  
Currency Currency in which this facility is 
denominated 
Text  
Participation Identifier Code to identify if the loan has been 
participated out 
Text  
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Field  Description Type Must 
Have if 
Bank 
Matche
s and 
Detects 
Defaults
As Of Date Date of facility information provided Date/Time  
Loan Status Active, Closed, Inactive, etc.  Text  
Loan Type Term, line, letter of credit, commit etc. Text  
Loan Purpose Primary purpose of the loan Text  
Loan Index i.e. Prime, LIBOR, etc. Text  
Loan Index Rate Index rate at the As of date Number  
Interest Rate Loan's current interest rate Number 
(decimal) 
 
Loan Spread Interest rate pricing as a percentage 
over index (if available) 
Number  
Origination Date Date loan originated Date/Time  
Origination Amount Amount of originated loan Number  
Renewal Date Date loan was renewed Date/Time  
Maturity Date Date loan is to mature Date/Time  
Customer Risk Rating Assigned risk rating for this customer 
(preferably PD rating) 
Text  
Facility Risk Rating Assigned risk rating for this particular 
facility (preferably LGD rating) 
Text  
Gross Commitment 
Amount 
Total amount currently available 
through this facility, including any 
amounts outstanding  and any amounts 
participated out to other financial 
institutions 
Number  
Gross Balance Amount Total amounts outstanding for this 
facility, including any amounts 
participated out to other financial 
institutions. 
Number  
Net Commitment 
Amount 
Gross Commitment Amount less any 
amounts participated out to other 
financial institutions 
Number  
Net Balance Amount Gross Balance Amount less any 
amounts participated out to other 
financial institutions  
Number  
Default Date Earliest date on which any default event 
occurred, if applicable 
Date/Time X 
Default Type Substandard, 90DaysPastDue, 
NonAccrual, Loss, 
TroubleDebtRestructure, Charge Off, 
Bankruptcy 
Text X 
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Field  Description Type Must 
Have if 
Bank 
Matche
s and 
Detects 
Defaults
Net Charge Off 
Amount 
Cumulative amount of charge-offs on 
the financial books 
Number  
Charge-off Date Date of loan’s first charge–off / write-
down 
Date/Time  
Non-accrual Indicator Identifies if loan is currently on non-
accrual status 
Text  
Non-Accrual Date Date loan was first put on non-accrual 
status 
Date/Time  
Past Due Date  A scheduled payment date for which a 
principal and/or interest payment has 
not been made on time 
Date/Time  
Past Due Days  Number of days that interest and or 
principal payment is currently past due 
the date above 
Number  
Times 90 DPD Number of separate instances where 
loan exceeded 90 days due 
Number  
Collateral Type Code Signifies the primary collateral type 
that secures the loan 
Text  
Bankruptcy / Credit 
Protection 
Indicates if a borrower is currently in 
Bankruptcy status 
Text  
Bankruptcy Date Date borrower entered bankruptcy Date/Time  
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vi. Data Details – For Low Default Categories 
Categories and columns can be subject to change. 
 
 
Category (Portfolio) 
 
Obligors 
New 
Obligor 
Defaults 
 
Amount 
Committed 
New 
Amount 
Defaulted 
Local Authorities      
Higher Education      
Further Education      
Registered Social Landlords 
(Housing Associations)  
    
Large Scale Voluntary Transfers 
(Housing Associations)  
    
Private Finance Initiative      
Foundation Hospitals     
Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
(e.g. Insurance, Pensions funds)  
    
Fund managers, investment trusts, 
hedge funds etc. 
    
Banks      
Large PLCs (i.e. FTSE 100 - 250)     
Sovereign entities     
 
Default may take on a less severe meaning if needed to obtain statistics. For example, 30 
days past due may be reported on. 
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vii. Exposure at Default according to Facility Type 
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